The effects of managerial regulatory fit priming on reactions to explanations (original) (raw)
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How regulatory focus impacts the process-by-outcome interaction for perceived fairness and emotions
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 2008
Judgments of fairness take into account at least two pieces of information-the outcome received and the process by which the outcome was assigned. Generally speaking, low levels of fairness are apt to be reported when the outcome is unfavorable and the allocation process is deemed inappropriate. In this study, we investigate how regulatory focus theory can further our understanding of the process by outcome interaction. Specifically, when individuals are working to add to their earnings (a promotion focus) the typical effect is observed. However, when individuals are focused on maintaining something that is their own (a prevention focus) the most negative emotion occurs when individuals are allocated an unfavorable outcome through a process that contains procedural safeguards.
Bringing the Frame Into Focus: The Influence of Regulatory Fit on Processing Fluency and Persuasion
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2004
This research demonstrates that people's goals associated with regulatory focus moderate the effect of message framing on persuasion. The results of 6 experiments show that appeals presented in gain frames are more persuasive when the message is promotion focused, whereas loss-framed appeals are more persuasive when the message is prevention focused. These regulatory focus effects suggesting heightened vigilance against negative outcomes and heightened eagerness toward positive outcomes are replicated when perceived risk is manipulated. Enhanced processing fluency leading to more favorable evaluations in conditions of compatibility appears to underlie these effects. The findings underscore the regulatory fit principle that accounts for the persuasiveness of message framing effects and highlight how processing fluency may contribute to the "feeling right" experience when the strategy of goal pursuit matches one's goal.
Counterfactual Thinking and Regulatory Fit
2006
According to regulatory fit theory , when people make decisions with strategies that sustain their regulatory focus orientation, they "feel right" about what they are doing, and this "feeling-right" experience then transfers to subsequent choices, decisions, and evaluations. The present research was designed to link the concept of regulatory fit to functional accounts of counterfactual thinking. In the present study, participants generated counterfactuals about their anagram performance, after which persistence on a second set of anagrams was measured. Under promotion framing (i.e., find 90% or more of all the possible words) upward counterfactual thinking in general elicited larger increases in persistence than did downward counterfactual thinking in general, but under prevention framing (i.e., avoid failing to find 90% or more of all the possible words) upward evaluation (comparing reality to a better reality) elicited larger increases in persistence than did upward reflection (focusing on a better reality), whereas downward reflection (focusing on a worse reality) elicited larger increases in persistence than did downward evaluation (comparing reality to a worse reality). In all, the present findings suggest that the generation of counterfactuals enhances the likelihood that individuals will engage in courses of action that fit with their regulatory focus orientation.
Forming Fairness Judgments: Why People Favor Unfair Information
Justice and Conflicts, 2011
People value fair conditions and show positive reactions towards fairness, whereas they oppose unfair conditions. Fairness is especially important to people in situations without immediate control. This, for example, is the case when people are dealing with authorities such as supervisors or the police. Amazingly, there is hardly any research on how people search for information in order to judge the fairness of an authority. In our research, we explored how information search differs after fair versus unfair events, and what motivates people to search for different fairness-relevant information. Overall, we found that people both in fair and unfair situations are more interested in unfairness-relevant information than fairness-relevant information. However, the search for information on the fairness of the authority is motivated by two different goals: Fairness is not taken for granted and people aim to find out whether an unknown authority is really trustworthy in order to avoid costly misjudgments (i.e., accuracy motives). In contrast, unfairness seems to be convincing and people are motivated to confirm their first impression (i.e., defense motives). These results have important practical implications: People seem to have a general bias by focusing on unfair information. Unfortunately, therefore, in conflict situations (a) it becomes more difficult to convey fair information and (b) the importance of single, less relevant unfair information is likely to be overestimated by conflict partners. Both effects make conflict resolutions more difficult. Accordingly, in particular in situations where the interaction partners do not know each other and have not established a stable and trustworthy relationship (e.g., a first encounter with an authority), it is very import to avoid any impression of unfairness.
When two wrongs can make a right: Regulatory nonfit, bias, and correction of judgments
Journal of Experimental …, 2006
We propose that when people consider whether their judgments are accurate enough, feelings of wrongness from regulatory nonWt (inconsistency between regulatory state and strategic means) can suggest that the answer is no and enhance correction of judgments relative to feelings of rightness from regulatory Wt. Results from two experiments supported that hypothesis. When we activated an accuracy motive, participants who experienced regulatory nonWt provided judgments more consistent with correction for bias when they experienced regulatory nonWt than when they experienced regulatory Wt (Experiment 1). Drawing participants' attention to an earlier event as a source of rightness feelings eliminated the eVect of regulatory Wt on apparent correction of judgments (Experiment 2), suggesting attribution of regulatory Wt/nonWt feelings to the accuracy of those judgments.
Cognitive and Strategic Components of the Explanation Effect
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 1997
perceived likelihood has been termed the explanation The explanation effect causes an event to seem more effect. The effect has been observed in the development likely after the decision maker has explained it. This of social theories (Anderson & Sechler, 1986) and in robust decision phenomenon is generally attributed to professional accounting settings (Koonce, 1992; Andercognitive changes that occur when causal explanations son & Koonce, 1995; Phillips, Koonce, & Hopkins, 1994; are developed, though no direct evidence of such Anderson & Wright, 1988). changes has been reported. We report results of an The explanation effect has been demonstrated to experiment designed to identify both cognitive and have potentially costly effects on decision making bestrategic causes of the explanation effect. We observed havior in professional accounting settings. For example, the explanation effect in private explanation conditions, and we isolated predicted changes in problem financial statement auditors are required to document representations. Further, we found that participants their judgments and decisions in the audit working possessing high levels of need for positive self-presenpapers (American Institute of Certified Public Accountation experienced explanation effects in public, while tants [AICPA], 1982). Research has demonstrated that participants with low levels experienced explanation if auditors document client-provided reasons for uneffects of similar magnitude in both conditions. We conusual fluctuations in financial statement data, they clude that both cognitive and strategic mechanisms subsequently give increased likelihood assessments cause the explanation effect. ᭧ 1997 Academic Press that these reasons account for the changes (Koonce, 1992). This occurs even when the client-provided reason cannot account for the changes (Anderson & Koonce, Belief perseverance research suggests that the causal 1995). If client-provided reasons are not accurate and evaluation of evidence leads to cognitive changes that the explanation effect causes auditors to believe falsely cause an event that is explained by the decision maker that they are, audit effectiveness is impaired. Large to be judged more likely to occur than an event that is errors in financial statements could go undetected, with not explained by the decision maker. This difference in consequences of large investor and creditor losses and All authors contributed equally to this project; authors' names are large resulting liabilities for auditors. Isolation of the listed in alphabetical order. causes of the explanation effect is necessary in order for We thank JoAnn Pinto for her capable research assistance. We also researchers to efficiently develop debiasing techniques.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 2002
This paper focuses on the psychology of the fair process effect (the frequently replicated finding that perceived procedural fairness positively affects people's reactions). It is argued that when people have received an outcome they usually assimilate their ratings of outcome fairness and affect toward their experiences of procedural fairness. As a result, ratings show fair process effects. It is also possible, however, that when people have received their outcome they compare this outcome to the procedure they experienced: Is the outcome better or worse than the procedure? A result of this comparison process may be that contrast effects are found such that higher levels of procedural fairness lead to more negative ratings of outcome fairness and affect. Research findings suggest that when comparison goals have been primed, contrast effects indeed can be found. The implications for the psychology of the fair process effect and organizational behavior are discussed. Ó
Unfair treatment and self-regulatory focus
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 2007
Ample correlational evidence exists that perceived unfair treatment is negatively related to well-being, health, and goal striving but the underlying process is unclear. We hypothesized that eVects are due in part to contextual priming of prevention focus and the negative consequences of chronic prevention-focused vigilance. Indeed, reasonable responses to unfair treatment-to avoid situations in which it occurs or if this is not possible, confront it head on-Wt prevention self-regulatory focus response patterns. Results from three experiments support this notion. Priming stigmatized social category membership heightened students' prevention (not promotion) focus (n D 117). Priming non-stigmatized social category membership (i.e., white) did not change prevention focus (n D 46). Priming prevention (not promotion) increased perceptions of unfair treatment (and aroused prevention-relevant Wght or Xight responses) in response to a negative ambiguous job situation among low and moderate income adults (n D 112).
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 2011
This research empirically examines the underlying mechanisms of fairness theory , namely counterfactual thought processes. Study 1 used a policy-capturing design to examine the relative importance of contextual variables in predicting counterfactual thoughts and fairness perceptions. Study 2 utilized a between-subjects design and asked participants to generate their own counterfactuals in response to an unfortunate event. Results of both studies showed that fairness perceptions are influenced by contextual variables (i.e., outcome severity, target knowledge and expertise, sin of commission vs. omission) and counterfactual thinking. Counterfactual thoughts partially mediated the effects of contextual variables and fairness perceptions in Study 1. Exploratory analyses from Study 3 revealed that the measurement of counterfactual thoughts (frequency vs. strength) may capture different underlying constructs. Implications are discussed.
Public Administration Review, 2018
This article examines whether and how judgments made by individual organizational actors may be influenced by institutional logics-the historical patterns of cultural symbols and material practices, including assumptions, values, and beliefs, by which individuals and organizations provide meaning to their daily activity, organize time and space, and reproduce their lives and experiences. Using an experimental design, the authors prime three institutional logics in three independent groups of managers (n = 98) and assess the influence of the primes on individual-level judgment preferences. The results show that such priming affects participants' judgments in an ambiguous judgmental task, with each prime influencing judgment in a discernibly unique pattern. Consequently, a more nuanced account of larger patterns of behavior can be constructed. The findings highlight the potential of text as priming stimuli within institutionally complex work settings such as those in the public sector, an important yet underexamined issue. Evidence for Practice • Managers should recognize that their perceptions and judgments may be influenced by institutional logics, which, in turn, may be primed by incidental features in their decision environments. • The work environment may perpetuate certain approaches in the public sector based on the type of stimuli that decision makers are (continually) exposed to. These effects, though subtle and nonconscious, may explain the pervasiveness of certain logics. • Text, and how it is used in organizational communication, may by design or otherwise influence organizational actor perception or receptivity to the object of the communication.