WITTGENSTEIN’S UNIQUE GREAT ANALYSIS - A CONSEQUENCE OF THE CONSTRUAL OF PROPOSITIONAL SENSE AS TRUTH-CONDITIONS (original) (raw)
Related papers
2012
International audienceIn this paper we question the differences between the truth-conditional meaning-theories propounded by Frege in the Basic laws of arithmetics and Wittgenstein in the Tractatus. We show that the rejection of the sense/reference distinction for every linguistic unit by Wittgenstein is the consequence of a thoroughly applied conception of the sense of propositions as expression of their truth-conditions. Sense can only do so, in Wittgenstein's view, if the proposition is the picture of a fact. A fact is composed of objects, but is not itself an object, and nothing associated to a fact could be an object. Thus it is misleading to consider the true and the false as objects that would be the references of propositions. Further, the sense/reference distinction is unnecessary, because reference is a condition for determinacy of sense. It is not its accidental consequence, as one could think if one interpreted Frege as conceiving sense as a mode of determination of ...
Rule-Following and Realism The skeptical paradox which Kripke found in Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations threatens the very notion of meaning. However, Kripke also offered a skeptical solution to it, according to which semantic sentences have no truth conditions and their meaning is determined by assertability conditions instead. He presented Wittgenstein's development as the abandoning of semantic realism of the Tractatus in favor of semantic antirealism, characteristic of Philosophical Investigations. Crispin Wright, although at points critical of Kripke's interpretation, also understood the rule-following considerations as containing a crucial argument for antirealism. Contrary to Wright, John McDowell maintained that they offer a transcendental argument for realism. I will argue that neither the realist nor the antirealist reading is faithful to Wittgenstein, as his important conceptual distinction between criteria and symptoms is not adequately recoverable in any of them. Therefore, the upshot of rule-following considerations is that the distinction between realism and antirealism should not be articulated in terms of truth/ assertability conditions.
Philosophical Problems: A Wittgensteinian Solution
Most of the philosophical problems arise from the miss-interpretation of language. But it is not true that language is responsible for this problem, only user of the language is responsible. Because, if the philosopher who use language and he fail to understand the logic of language then philosophical problem comes to being. Some philosopher can say-ideal language is better to solve the philosophical problems, because ideal language is stronger in nature than the ordinary language. But, Wittgenstein proved that ordinary language is so much strong as ideal language. He said ordinary language function like exact calculus as mathematics and there are certain definite and unique rules; and ordinary language can give a precise definition of every word. Another source of philosophical problem is ‗craving for generality' of word meaning. Wittgenstein by introduce ‗language game' shows a word meaning is not unitary and unchangeable. He has shown language is constituted by the species of the rule like the cluster of properties as game. In this paper, I intending to show with Wittgenstein that (i) miss-interpretation of language & (ii) Craving for generality are the two fundamental problems to philosophizing for linguistic philosopher's. The status of language is far different between the Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations but, causes of the philosophical problems remain same. The earlier Wittgenstein highlighted the importance of the ‗Picture theory of meaning ' in his book Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus to abolish so called unitary meaning of a proposition and to setup craving for unity by criss –cross relations of properties. And, by admitting ‗Logical Atomism' he solved the ‗miss – interpretation' of words in a proposition. According to later Wittgenstein the problem of philosophy is the occupational disease of linguistic philosopher. He goes on to say that when a person thinks about something philosophically, he inevitably becomes puzzled. But, he hopes that a good philosopher might have managed to avoid it. To know the fullest sense, what a philosophical problem is, entails being thus settled. A philosophical problem has the form as ―I do not know my way out‖to a linguistic philosopher. A linguistic philosopher if never lost or suffers he will not feel the need for further philosophical investigation. He will always try to point out the puzzles and confusion into certain philosophical notion. In philosophical Investigation Wittgenstein say ―My aim is to teach you to pass from a piece of disguised nonsense to something that is patent non – sense‖. He farther asserts that ―philosophical confusion to a person caught in a philosophical confusion is like a man in a room who want to get out but does not know how it possible‖. He (the man) tries to get out by the window but it is too tight, he tries to get out by the chimney but it is too narrow. Similarly, when one thinks about sense perception of physical objects can be directly perceived or not, the same sort of thing happens when one thinks about the nature of God, about our knowledge of other mind. In the case of puzzlement, a man in the grip of a philosophical problem is a man who is intellectually sick, one who has a conceptual illness. A philosopher seeks to be free himself from this deplorable condition by developing a theory as system to deal with the puzzles. Wittgenstein prescribed about such types of Mihir Ranjan Biswas, Asst.Prof. in Philosophy, Gangarampur college. conceptually sick philosophers ―show the fly (here, philosophers) the way out of the fly-bottle (here, philosophical problems)‖. So, necessarily I become bound in my paper to discuss and high lighten the later wittgensteinian philosophical conception where he had introduced the concept of (i) game (ii) Language game (iii) family resemblance (iv) forms of life etc. Lastly, it is well known to all students of philosophy that the early Wittgenstein had used ‗ideal language' to setup philosophical discussion on the certain way. Similarly, also, he had proved the certain ways of philosophical discussion like ‗calculus' in his later writing by dependent on the ‗usage' theory.
Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: an elementary exposition
2008
A revised version of chapter one of my 2004 book, Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: an introduction. An exposition of the method that Wittgenstein uses in the opening sections of the Philosophical Investigations, a discussion of its place in the broader argumentative structure of the book as a whole, and of the relationship between the argumentative and dialogical aspects of the book.
Some Remarks on Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Method
The article discusses the problem of the unity of Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy. It is demonstrated that Wittgenstein applied two methods of study. Changes in his philosophy are correlated with modifications in his method of thinking and investigation. In his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, the only correct method is logical proposition analysis. In the early 1930s, he transformed his philosophy into a phenomenological description of experience, defining its aim as the development of phenomenological language. After 1933, Wittgenstein recognised the grammatical dimension of language and created tools of grammatical analysis. He introduced the notions of language-games and life forms. His philosophy turned into morphology and a description of human language practice.
Wittgenstein,:Picture Theory of Proposition
The Review of Laser Engineering, 2020
In this paper,, I will first introduce the ontological view of Wittgenstein as it appears in the Tractatus. He starts his ontological discussion with the discussion of facts, which he then clarified by appealing to the notions of state of affairs and simple objects. I will then discuss his semantic view, which is based on his Picture Theory of Language, which brings in the notion of propositions. In such an analysis, he appeals to the notion of basic or elementary propositions and names. In his view, there is an isomorphic relationship (actually correspondence) between the logical structure of language (and its mental counterpart, thought) and the world. It is only in such a relation which a proposition can gain any meaning, or Sense. In this paper, I will investigate the relationship between the early Wittgenstein's ontological and semantic views and the way these views are related to other basic logical ideas in the Tractatus.
Wittgenstein's Tractatus and the Descriptiveness of Elementary Propositions
Synthesis Philosophica, 2021
According to Wittgenstein, the elementary propositions cannot be analysed into any further proposition. In T. 4.22, Wittgenstein speaks of names as the constituents of the elementary proposition. What does he mean by names? He does not mean proper names because such names refer to complex things. According to him, "a name means an object" (T. 3.203), "objects are simple" (T. 2.02), and the "analysis of propositions must bring us to the elementary propositions which consist of names in immediate combination" (T, 4.221). There is a dispute over the descriptiveness of elementary propositions. The picture theory, accepted by the early Wittgenstein, tells us that it is necessary to refer to some existent objects for a proposition to have a meaning. However, in Tractatus, there is no exemplification for the elementary propositions and their constituents, i.e. objects. Thus, the equation between the states of affairs and the elementary propositions or between objects and proper names may turn out to be just a logical equation without any empirical content, despite the positivistic reading of Tractatus promoting empiristic interpretation. This paper tries to show that by drawing on the picture theory the elementary propositions should describe something in the real world. Nevertheless, since what is depicted by them cannot be designated and referred by any ostensive definition, except in the logical sense of word, the way in which they depict reality is doubtful and controversial.
The Late Wittgenstein and Late Husserl on Language and its Role in the Constitution of Reality , 2021
The Late Wittgenstein and Late Husserl on Language and its Role in the Constitution of Reality This article investigates the role of language in the constitution of reality in E. Husserl’s phenomenology and L. Wittgenstein’s late philosophy. I have discovered some resemblances and differences in their ideas and concepts on language and its role in the constitution of reality, and how their ideas complement each other in a few as- pects. We can find common features in such concepts as ‘languages-games’, ‘forms of life’, ‘picture of the world’, and the ‘community of monads’, ‘life–world’. Both philosophers are in their late periods interested in the same problems (intersubjective world, values, meanings, beliefs, culture) but from different points of view. Husserl suggested we “Return to the things themselves!” while Wittgenstein called us “Back to solid ground!”. These philosophies represent two ways to our living world: from consciousness and from language. Wittgenstein told us that to imagine a language is to imagine a form of life. It is what we do and who we are and what gives meaning to our life. The problem of intersubjectivity and understanding of others is central for both Wittgenstein and Husserl. Wittgenstein said: I cannot understand a lion’s language because I do not know what his world is like. I do fail in understanding because I cannot get in its mind. Husserl, in Logical Investigations, considers language as something purely external in relation to meaning. This understanding of language can be called instrumental. In his analysis, Husserl seeks to study the language with a predetermined goal: to completely subordinate it to the idea of ‘pure science’ and to distinguish the language of theory from language natural. It should become a suit- able expression tool without introducing any distortion. The role of language in phenomenological work, Husserl believes, should be minimal and generally be reduced to ‘pure expression’.
The ontology of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. A bibliography
2016
Frege's notion of concept-the reference (vs. the sense) of a predicate-is here compared with cognate notions in Husserl's Logical Investigations and in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Their common trait is unsaturatedness or existential dependency: the different treatment of this chief notion of formal ontology is in turn examined comparatively, with regard to the conflicts and the alliances taking tacitly place between the three. In Frege's notion of concept, at any rate, an inner tension arises from its twofold nature of property and of truth-function: saturation and function/argument are too heterogeneous models. Hints for a way out suggested." 17.