Expectations of clumpy resources influence predictions of sequential events (original) (raw)
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Memory & cognition, 2015
In this study, we examined perceptions of binary sequences under uncertainty in an attempt to depict a holistic and unifying framework. The first experiment applied a projection method that motivated participants to observe binary series and provide descriptions of their possible underlying mechanisms or processes. This procedure revealed four distinct perceptual categories: two previously studied categories of chance mechanisms and human performance, associated with the gambler's and hot-hand fallacies, and two newly identified categories-periods and processes and traits and preferences. The next three experiments tested the associations between the four categories and the alternation rates of the observed sequences under three categorical decisions structures: screening, discrimination, and classification. The results reveal the relativity of binary sequence perception. They show that the categories of chance mechanisms and periods and processes reflected rather stable percept...
Biases in preferences for sequences of outcomes in monkeys
Cognition, 2014
Movies, vacations, and meals are all examples of events composed of a sequence of smaller events. How do we go from our evaluations of each scene in a movie to an evaluation of the sequence as a whole? In theory, we should simply average the values of the individual events. In practice, however, we are biased towards sequences where each element tends to be better than the previous, where the last value is large, and we overweight the best (or worst) part of the sequence. To study how general these biases are we examined monkeys' preferences for sequences of rewards in a novel reward repeat task. Monkeys were first given a sequence of rewards and then chose between repeating the sequence or receiving a standard comparator sequence. We found that, like humans, monkeys overweight events that happen later in a sequence, so much so that adding a small reward to the end of a sequence can paradoxically reduce its value. Monkeys were also biased towards sequences with large peak values (the highest value in the sequence), but only following a working memory challenge, suggesting that this preference may be driven by memory limitations. These results demonstrate the cross-species nature of biases in preferences for sequences of outcomes. In addition, monkeys' consistent preference for sequences in which large values occur later challenges the generality of discounting models of intertemporal choice in animals.
Randomization in individual choice behavior
Psychological Review, 1997
There is ample evidence that people cannot generate random series when instructed to do so. Rather, they produce sequences with too few symmetries and long runs and too many alternations among events. The authors propose a psychological theory to account for these findings, which assumes that subjects generate nonrandom sequences that locally represent theoretical random series subject to a constraint on their short-term memory. Closed-form expressions are then derived for the major statistics that have been used to test for deviations from randomness. Results from 3 experiments with 1 and 3 equiprobable alternatives support the model on both the individual and group levels. Our ability to discriminate between random and nonrandom events is fundamental to the process of induction, which, in turn, is essential for survival (Lopes, 1982). Without this ability we cannot detect successfully nonrandomness (signals) against a background of randomness (noise), discern patterns in human decision behavior (e.g., the controversy regarding the "hot hand" effect in basketball discussed by Gilovitch, Vallone, & Tversky, 1985), and recognize departures from chance probability to perceive causal relationships between events (Ayton & Wright, 1987). Numerous studies of subjective randomization, which are mostly concerned with our ability to discriminate between random and nonrandom events or produce random sequences when specifically instructed to do so, have concluded that this cognitive ability is seriously limited. To illustrate the findings that these studies typically reveal, consider an experiment reported by Green (1982), who used a recognition task (Bar-Hillel & Wagenaar, 1991) in which subjects are presented individually with predetermined sequences of binary events and asked to choose the ''truly random sequences" or rate all the series according to their "degree of randomness." Green presented a very simple coin-tossing problem to 2,930 English school pupils aged 11 to 16 years. The problem stated that a teacher asks each of 2 female students, named Clare and Susan, to toss a coin many times and record every time whether the coin landed heads (1) or tails (0). Two sequences of 150 Os and Is were then presented, one produced by Clare and the other by Susan. The students were informed that ' 'one girl performed the task honestly, by actually tossing the coin 150 times," whereas the other girl "cheated and just made it up.'' They were then asked to inspect the two sequences, decide which student cheated, and specify the reasons for their decision. Green stated five hypotheses regarding different properties
Perception of randomness and predicting uncertain events
Thinking & Reasoning, 2008
Four types of relatively consistent strategies of predicting uncertain binary events have been identified: (1) a strategy insensitive to short-run sequential dependencies involving the prediction of the long-run majority category -thereafter the long-horizon momentum strategy;
Journal of behavioral decision making, 2015
Human choice under uncertainty is influenced by erroneous beliefs about randomness. In simple binary choice tasks, such as red/black predictions in roulette, long outcome runs (e.g. red, red, red) typically increase the tendency to predict the other outcome (i.e. black), an effect labeled the "gambler's fallacy." In these settings, participants may also attend to streaks in their predictive performance. Winning and losing streaks are thought to affect decision confidence, although prior work indicates conflicting directions. Over three laboratory experiments involving red/black predictions in a sequential roulette task, we sought to identify the effects of outcome runs and winning/losing streaks upon color predictions, decision confidence and betting behavior. Experiments 1 (n = 40) and 3 (n = 40) obtained trial-by-trial confidence ratings, with a win/no win payoff and a no loss/loss payoff, respectively. Experiment 2 (n = 39) obtained a trial-by-trial bet amount on an...
Outcome probability modulates anticipatory behavior to signals that are equally reliable
Adaptive Behavior, 2014
A stimulus is a reliable signal of an outcome when the probability that the outcome occurs in its presence is different from in its absence. Reliable signals of important outcomes are responsible for triggering critical anticipatory or preparatory behavior, which is any form of behavior that prepares the organism to receive a biologically significant event. Previous research has shown that humans and other animals prepare more for outcomes that occur in the presence of highly reliable (i.e., highly contingent) signals, that is, those for which that difference is larger. However, it seems reasonable to expect that, all other things being equal, the probability with which the outcome follows the signal should also affect preparatory behavior. In the present experiment with humans, we used two signals. They were differentially followed by the outcome, but they were equally (and relatively weakly) reliable. The dependent variable was preparatory behavior in a Martians video game. Participants prepared more for the outcome (a Martians' invasion) when the outcome was most probable. These results indicate that the probability of the outcome can bias preparatory behavior to occur with different intensities despite identical outcome signaling.
The hot hand phenomenon as a cognitive adaptation to clumped resources
Evolution and Human Behavior, 2009
The hot hand phenomenon refers to the expectation of "streaks" in sequences of hits and misses whose probabilities are, in fact, independent (e.g., coin tosses, basketball shots). Here we propose that the hot hand phenomenon reflects an evolved psychological assumption that items in the world come in clumps, and that hot hand, not randomness, is our evolved psychological default. In two experiments, American undergraduates and Shuar hunter-horticulturalists participated in computer tasks in which they predicted hits and misses in foraging for fruits, coin tosses, and several other kinds of resources whose distributions were generated randomly. Subjects in both populations exhibited the hot hand assumption across all the resource types. The only exception was for American students predicting coin tosses where hot hand was reduced. These data suggest that hot hand is our evolved psychological default, which can be reduced (though not eliminated) by experience with genuinely independent random phenomena like coin tosses.
Randomness in retrospect: Exploring the interactions between memory and randomness cognition
People tend to believe that sequences of random events produce fewer and shorter streaks than is actually the case. Although this error has been demonstrated repeatedly and in many forms, nearly all studies of randomness cognition have focused on how people think about random events occurring in the present or future. This article examines how our biased beliefs about randomness interact with properties of memory to influence our judgments about and memory for past random events. We explore this interaction by examining how beliefs about randomness affect our memory for random events and how certain properties of memory alter our tendency to categorize events as random. Across three experiments, we demonstrate an interaction between randomness cognition and three well-established but distinct properties of memory: (1) the reconstructive nature of memory, (2) primacy and recency effects, and (3) duration neglect. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.