Taking the Human Sciences Seriously (original) (raw)
Related papers
Philosophy, 2012
There is a puzzling tension in contemporary scientific attitudes towards human nature. On the one hand, evolutionary biologists correctly maintain that the traditional essentialist conception of human nature is untenable; and moreover that this is obviously so in the light of quite general and exceedingly well-known evolutionary considerations. 1 On this view, talk of human nature is just an expression of pre-Darwinian superstition. 2 On the other hand, talk of human nature abounds in certain regions of the sciences, especially in linguistics, psychology and cognitive science. Further, it is very frequently most common amongst those cognitive-behavioral scientists who should be most familiar with the sorts of facts that putatively undermine the very notion of human nature: sociobiologists, evolutionary psychologists, and more generally, theorists working on the evolution of mind and culture.
Science and morality: The role of values in science and the scientific study of moral phenomena
Psychological Bulletin, 1990
This article contributes to the debate over values in science. A critical co-constructivist framework is proposed for conceptualizing the role that debate over values plays in all science. Using the psychological literature on moral development, it is shown that although debate over values is an integral part of all scientific discourse, it plays a more explicit role in fields within the human sciences (e.g., anthropology, psychology, sociology, etc.) that touch on moral phenomena. Debate over values thus raises a central issue for modern science, namely the need to develop consensually agreed-on methods for resolving such debate.
Science and Human Nature: A Complex Dynamics of Reality
Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 2013
Man is a complex being that has defied all efforts to comprehend. This complexity is basically due to the nature of man. Several scholars and philosophers right from the ancient epoch to the contemporary period have employed several methods toward the understanding of man, but without any satisfying result. This effort to understand the nature of man has generated several problems that transcend philosophy into the sciences. Also, the scientific approach to grasp the nature of man has not yielded concrete evidence of satisfaction. This again, is due to the nature of science, which empirical orientation and root cannot capture the whole essence or nature of man which transcends the physical. This therefore, has created epistemological vacuum that has made it difficult for man to understand himself or reality that he constitutes. This scenario has created confusion in the search towards the understanding of man thereby revealing the dynamic nature of reality which includes man. This paper, therefore, seeks to explain human nature and the nature of science and posits that man or reality cannot be understood using a singular method of science but rather a combination of what the paper describes as a philo-scientific approach.
The True, the Good, and the Value of Science
This paper defends the claim that questions about the epistemic value of the sciences cannot be detached from wider ethical questions about ‘the good life’ for human beings. Science cannot be conceived as valuable solely or primarily because of its capacity to provide Truths about the world. The reason is that Truth can only appear as a valuable and meaningful in relation to a wider conception of the Good. Identifying and articulating the conception of the Good which animates the modern sciences is therefore a neglected project for the philosophy of science.
Science, Values, and the World
The central aim of science is to demythologize our intuitions about the natural world, to convert the irrationality of discovery into the rationality of justification. A judicious mixture of both creative inspiration and rigorous testing is essential to the success of this massive human project.
Review of: "Naturalism's maxims and its methods. Is naturalistic philosophy like science?
Qeios, 2022
This review of Carin Robinson's 'Naturalism's maxims and its methods. Is naturalistic philosophy like science?' is taken, at the outset, from a standpoint of agreement with her conclusion: that naturalistic philosophy is not like science. However I do not find all her arguments compelling. On the other hand, this is not to say I find them uninteresting. I think they might be strengthened. This review is written with that goal in mind. My initial reasons for getting involved with this topic were practical rather than theoretical, as I shall briefly explain in the paragraphs immediately below. Further investigating Carin's argument has drawn me into some more theoretical considerations. These have led in the direction of supporting Carin's view that science is discontinuous with naturalistic philosophy in certain respects. I argue the discontinuity occurs in some ways but not in others. Naturalistic philosophy and science share the same points of origin. Science differs in its methods of justification. Naturalistic philosophy does not originate in science but rather originates the a priori, which means in the literal sense, ' from the former'. Naturalistic philosophers may form productive relationships with science but continuation of these depends, ultimately, for their scientific justification, on what scientists, rather than naturalistic philosophers, do. All these points need much further expansion. My necessarily brief response to the article takes an occupational perspective which is primarily focussed on what people do, but brings in other considerations based on humanistic perspectives. As a 'practical' philosopher who has worked in collaboration with scientists for the past three decades, I have never assumed that my work (mainly in moral and political philosophy, and applied ethics) is anything like theirs. In short, I have never claimed to be doing science. I have, rather, relied on a distinction between science as predictive, and ethics as deliberative. The aims of science are fulfilled when predictions are accurate; the aims of ethics are fulfilled when deliberations lead to satisfactory moral outcomes. However I do not think this cursory distinction adequately summarises either discipline, nor does it touch upon their relationship. Much more needs to be said in either case.