Smallpox: Clinical Features, Prevention, and Management (original) (raw)
Related papers
Smallpox: clinical highlights and considerations for vaccination
Journal of postgraduate medicine
Smallpox virus has gained considerable attention as a potential bioterrorism agent. Recommendations for smallpox (vaccinia) vaccination presume a low risk for use of smallpox as a terrorist biological agent and vaccination is currently recommended for selected groups of individuals such as health care workers, public health authorities, and emergency/rescue workers, among others. Information about adverse reactions to the smallpox vaccine is based upon studies completed during the 1950s and 1960s. The prevalence of various diseases has changed over the last four decades and new disease entities have been described during this period. The smallpox vaccination may be contra-indicated in many of these conditions. This has made pre-screening of potential vaccines necessary. It is believed that at present, the risks of vaccine-associated complications far outweigh the potential benefits of vaccination in the general population.
BMC public health, 2003
The United States (US) has re-instituted smallpox vaccinations to prepare for an intentional release of the smallpox virus into the civilian population. In an outbreak, people of all ages will be vaccinated. To prepare for the impact of large-scale ring and mass vaccinations, we conducted a systematic review of the complication and mortality risks of smallpox vaccination. We summarized these risks for post-vaccinial encephalitis, vaccinia necrosum (progressive vaccinia), eczema vaccinatum, generalized vaccinia, and accidental infection (inadvertant autoinoculation). Using a MEDLINE search strategy, we identified 348 articles, of which seven studies met our inclusion criteria (the number of primary vaccinations and re-vaccinations were reported, sufficient data were provided to calculate complication or case-fatality risks, and comparable case definitions were used). For each complication, we estimated of the complication, death, and case-fatality risks. The life-threatening complica...
Evaluation of 21st-Century Risks of Smallpox Vaccination and Policy Options
Annals of Internal Medicine, 2003
The United States stopped vaccinating against smallpox in 1972 because the risks were judged to outweigh the benefits. The possibility of a terrorist attack using smallpox has led to renewed interest in a vaccination program. Smallpox vaccination carries considerable risks, which may be of greater concern today than in the late 1960s because of the increased prevalence of immunosuppression and atopy in the population. This paper reviews the clinical presentations of major adverse events after vaccination and the rates of occurrence of these events observed in the 1960s. The normal dynamics of the spread of smallpox is slow, and usually only persons who have had close personal contact with an overtly ill patient are affected. There are several preattack vaccination policy options, but immunization of medical workers, especially those who might have close contact with infected patients, is sufficient in the absence of a known threat of a bioterrorist attack or the identification of a smallpox-infected person.
Vaccination against Smallpox in the Posteradication Era
Clinical Infectious Diseases, 2008
The following introduction describes the context in which the national smallpox vaccination program was implemented and highlights the significance of the key policy, programmatic, or scientific challenges, observations, and lessons learned that are presented in the articles that follow within this supplement to Clinical Infectious Diseases. Although the execution of this national program posed multiple complex and varied challenges, the focus of this supplement is on vaccine-associated adverse events and vaccine safety. The findings and conclusions in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the funding agency.
Smallpox as a Biological Weapon
JAMA, 1999
Objective To develop consensus-based recommendations for measures to be taken by medical and public health professionals following the use of smallpox as a biological weapon against a civilian population.