Why should cognition be somewhere at all? (original) (raw)

Abstract

On the basis of the existence of a long tradition of philosophical conceptions of space and location which render them not applicable to cognition -from Berkeley to Bergson and beyond-, but also for more practical reasons, I want to argue that this apparently obvious claim cannot be accepted without discussion, the proponents of both the ExMT (Extended Mind Thesis) and its direct opposite bearing the burden of proof with regards to it. Furthermore, I contend that while the “folk” attribution of spatial location to minds and cognitive processes should not be considered wrong or meaningless (being indicative of a valid knowledge about which physical objects take part in certain processes), its philosophical counterpart should be avoided for the sake of conceptual clarity, or at the very least made a lot more explicit with regards to its assumptions. It should be clearly stated, for example, if the “space” coextensive to mind is to be identified as the allocentric space of physics, the egocentric phenomenological space or any kind of socially constructed space. However, I think that in spite of any further specification of these details of the ExM proposal, some of its central features are intrinsically problematic Insofar as the ontological claim of the locatedness of mind leads to the emergence of otherwise non existent problems (such as deciding on the existence of definite spatial boundaries for cognitive processes) and promotes counterintuitive descriptions of common situations (such as the successive displacement of the borders of a cognitive system when processes implying a discontinuous use of tools occur), it is a bad heuristic for increasing our knowledge about cognition. I also contend, against ExMT supporters and some of their opponents, that the temporal and causal structure of cognitive processes (and not their location) stands out as a the most reasonable criterion for the individuation of cognitive systems. Finally, I want to show that there are some philosophically scientifically reasonable descriptions of the world which are in direct conflict with crude spatialized cognition, i. e. those in which some features of physical space itself are dependant on cognitive processes.

Andreu Ballús hasn't uploaded this conference presentation.

Let Andreu know you want this conference presentation to be uploaded.

Ask for this conference presentation to be uploaded.