Measuring strategic voting in multiparty plurality elections (original) (raw)

Voting Strategically in Canada and Britain

Studies in Public Choice, 2009

The objective of this paper is to ascertain the level of strategic voting in Canada and Britain through a simple "direct" approach. We wish to show that the level of strategic voting is remarkably constant over time and across space; it varies little from one election to the next in Canada and the level of strategic voting is about the same in Britain and Canada. We show that though the overall degree of strategic voting is low in each of the elections examined, it represents a substantial fraction of those for whom strategic voting is a meaningful option.

How Do Voters Form Expectations about the Parties' Chances of Winning the Election?*

Social Science Quarterly, 2006

Objective. This article examines the factors that form voters' perceptions of the parties' chances of winning at both the national and the local levels. Method. We make use of the 1988 Canadian Election Study and we employ a HLM model to estimate the effect of individual-level and contextual-level variables. Results. It is shown that voters' expectations are affected by a combination of ''objective'' contextual information and personal preferences (projection effects). Conclusion. The basic contextual information that is utilized to ascertain local chances is the outcome of the previous election in the local constituency, whereas polls are crucial in the case of perceived national chances. We also find that the most politically aware are more strongly influenced by ''objective'' indicators.

Measuring strategic voting: A two-step procedure

Electoral Studies, 1996

The paper proposes a two-step procedure to measure strategic voting in legislative elections. The approach uses voters' rank-order of preferences as well as their perceptions of the parties' chances of winning the election. It proceeds in two steps. The first step consists of identifying the pool of potential strategic voters, those who are faced with a strategic choice because their most preferred party (candidate) is perceived to have smaller chances of winning than their second choice. The second stage is confined to that group for whom strategic voting is a real option. We examine the actual vote decisions of that group, and relate them to the intensity of preferences and perceptions of the race. The methodology is applied to the 1988 Canadian election, We show that at least 6 per cent of the total electorate can be said to have voted strategically. We also show that the propensity to vote strategically increases when the intensity of preference for the first choice over the second decreases, when the second choice is perceived to have much better chances of winning than the first choice, and when the race between the second and third choices gets closer.

Expectations in Mass Elections: Back to the Future?

Social Science Quarterly, 2013

Objectives. This article examines whether voters look to the past or the future when forming their perceptions of the parties' chances of winning. Methods. We use OLS regression models to analyze panel survey data from the districts where the incumbent was defeated in the 2011 provincial election in Ontario (Canada). Results. We find that voters' expectations in the districts are mainly affected by the results of the upcoming election and not by the outcome of the previous election. We also find that expectations are influenced by the phenomenon of wishful thinking. Conclusions. This study sheds light on how voters form their perceptions of the parties' chances of winning.

Voter Beliefs and Strategic Voting in Two-Round Elections

Political Research Quarterly, 2020

How widespread is strategic voting in two-round electoral systems, and which types of voters are most likely to engage in such behavior? While runoff elections are common in presidential systems around the world, research on strategic voting in these settings remains limited. This paper explores four different types of strategic behavior that are possible in two-round systems, including some types, such as “strong-to-weak” strategic voting, which are not possible in single-shot elections. We use a nationwide survey to assess the incidence and correlates of strategic voting in Brazil’s 2018 presidential election, where 13 candidates competed in the first round. We find evidence of “weak-to-strong” strategic voting at a similar rate to that documented in single-round elections in other countries. We find little evidence of other types of strategic voting. Further, we show that voters’ confidence in their predictions of the likely electoral outcome and their ideological preferences strongly predict strategic voting. These results point to the importance of accounting for voter beliefs and attitudes in addition to objective voter characteristics to explain strategic voting.

Does Tactical Voting Matter? The Political Impact of Tactical Voting in Canadian Elections

International Area Studies Review, 2011

Tactical voting primarily takes place under single-member district plurality electoral institutions and takes the form of third-party supporters voting for one of the major parties. Although much has been written about tactical voting, few studies have attempted to show the impact of tactical voting on the seat distribution within the parliament, and the subsequent government makeup, in countries with single-member plurality systems. In this paper, we attempt to assess the magnitude and impact of tactical voting in the Canadian general elections between 1988 and 2000. We build a model of tactical voting by identifying factors that are known to affect the level of tactical voting that we can measure using available data. Based on this model, we generate predicted levels of tactical voting for all parties within each district. Using these predicted values, we adjust the actual election data to produce a new set of data containing a would-be election outcome in the absence of tactical voting. By comparing actual election data, adjusted election data, and the seat share of political parties in the parliament after these elections, we discuss the political impact of tactical voting in Canada.

Accounting for Biases in Election Surveys: The Case of the 1998 Quebec Election

During the last electoral campaign in Quebec, Canada, all the polls published in the media had a similar estimate of vote intentions, putting the Parti Quebecois (PQ), a centre-left party dedicated to Quebec sovereignty, clearly ahead, by an average of ®ve points in the last six polls of the campaign. The PQ won the election, held on November 30, 1998, but with a smaller share of the vote (43 per cent) than the contending Liberal party (44 per cent), a centre-right federalist party. Pollsters and many observers have maintained that the discrepancy between the polls and the actual vote could be explained either by a last minute shift in favour of the Quebec Liberal party or by differential turnout.

Why Is there So Little Strategic Voting in Canadian Plurality Rule Elections?

Political Studies, 2002

Using the 1988 Canadian Election Study I examine why there was only restricted strategic voting in single-member district plurality elections. In that election 19 percent of Canadian voters preferred the party that actually finished third in their constituency, but among these third party supporters only one in eight decided to vote strategically for one of the top two contenders. Strategic voting was relatively rare for two key reasons. First, many third party supporters had a strong preference for their party over all others and were therefore reluctant to rally to either of the top two contenders. Second, many overestimated their party's chance of winning and as a consequence did not feel that their vote would be wasted.