The “Biology” To Come? Encounter between Husserl, Nietzsche and Some Contemporaries (original) (raw)

As we know, it was Nietzsche’s project to reconceptualize Kant’s “judgment.” His choice of force managed to elude the problem of units of quantity, opting instead for an early dynamics. Nietzsche’s dynamics introduced interpretation, accommodation, and domination into the biological model of his time, emphasizing structures of obedience and command in order to preserve the hierarchy intrinsic to value judgments. This simply means that certain organizations of cells, tissues, even living beings “work” better for their growth and flourishing than do others. The problem we noted of a common currency is temporarily suspended with the epochē on quantity—displacing for heuristic ends the primacy of quantity and its metaphysical recourse to units of measure. As a number of Husserl’s commentators have asked (Paul Ricoeur, among them): What are we to make of conscious life when we remove the phenomenological brackets? Could not a similar question be posed of the neuro-phenomenology flowing simultaneously out of Gilbert Simondon and Maurice Merleau-Ponty? To be sure. But what we would have, upon removing the brackets, simply breaks into the objects of psychology and biology, or again, comes down to human experience as the object of multiple sciences or regional ontologies. Gilbert Simondon, like Andrieu and others since the publication of his work in the 1960s, attempted to demonstrate the possibility of a monism based on energetic interactions. His work resists summary because of its complexity and the plethora of new concepts he created. Some of these were the direct result of advances in chemistry and geophysics. The formation of crystalline structures provided one image of what he called “systems of potentials,” on the basis of which elementary schemas constitute “meta-stable fields.” The meta-stable field comes from the dynamics of liquids but should not be restricted to that domain. It could well be argued that the Nietzschean contribution to a psycho-physics lies in its similar refusal of statics and individual substances. And this strikingly anticipates the structural coupling and dynamic co-determination of organism and Urwelt in Thompson and von Uexküll. Without denying that beings “individuate” in transitional and ongoing ways, Nietzsche strove to keep his forces within a framework wherein becoming was not opposed to being. He might have found a real interest in the innovations of Simondon, Andrieu, Thompson, and Varella. That does not mean that we can, or should, speak poetically of qualities, as though no difficulties arose in the absence of some theory of energy or energetics. But most of these theories shared the fate of socio-political environments through whose lens they were read and adjusted to the ideals of a given cultural politics. Those readings are, of course, as hazardous as Hans Driesch’s 1930’s vitalism in which the concept of organic totality and a governing principle slid deplorably into an aestheticized, politicized Führerprinzip. Such slippages may be unavoidable and an entire history of 19th and early 20th century misappropriations of vitalism and Lebensphilosophie could be written. Nevertheless, the imperative of bridging body-world and mind-body dualisms must be taken up by a biology in continuous dialogue with psychology and, today, with neuro-philosophy. I have argued throughout that that was the direction in which Husserl’s biology as the universal ontology was moving.