False claims about false memory research (original) (raw)

False memories: Phenomena, theories, and implications

Zeitschrift Fur Psychologie, 2007

In recent years, there has been an explosion of research on false memories: the subjective experience of remembering something if that something did apparently not happen in reality. We review a range of findings concerning this phenomenon: False memories of details and of whole events by adults and children, as well as false memories of words in laboratory experiments (in the DRM paradigm). We also briefly discuss the converse phenomenon: Evidence of forgetting or repression of significant events, and evidence of recovered memories. Knowledge of both phenomena is needed for judging whether "new" memories are false, recovered, or whether both options are possible. More general as well as specific theories explaining false memories are discussed, and we close with implications for practice.

Recent advances in false memory research

South African Journal of Psychology, 2013

In the last few years, substantial gains have been made in our understanding of human memory errors and the phenomenon of false memory, wherein individuals remember entire events that did not happen at all. Research had established that false memories can be consequential and emotional, that they can last for long periods of time, and that they are not merely the product of demand characteristics or the recovery of extant but hidden memories. These recent advances are discussed as extensions of earlier foundational research.

False perceptions of false memories

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 1996

We argue that the preceeding comment by J. J. Freyd and D. H. Gleaves (1996) on H. L. Roediger and K. B. McDermott's (1995) article contests claims that we never made. In this reply, we consider and rebut their arguments, defend our use of the term events, and consider the role of relatedness in producing false memories. In proposing a critical experiment intended to illuminate the debate about memory recovery in therapy, it is Freyd and Gleaves who generalize directly from a laboratory experiment to complicated events in therapy. However, our analysis of their proposed experiment finds it irrelevant to the development of false memories, either inside or outside the lab.

Madill, A., Holch, P. (2004) A range of memory possibilities: The challenge of the false memory debate for clinicians and researchers.

Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy: An International Journal of Theory & Practice, 11, 299-310., 2004

The aim of this article is to present a succinct review and evaluation of the main areas of contention in the false memory debate and, from this basis, to suggest ways in which the best from both sides can be utilized. We examine the potential pitfalls of therapy in terms of the fallibility and suggestibility of autobiographical memory and therapists and therapeutic techniques as the architects of false memories. We then evaluate the case for false memory formation examining if some researchers hold misconceived views of psychotherapy, if experimental studies lack ecological validity, and the effect of trauma on memory. Finally, we explore how the potential pitfalls of therapy can be avoided in practice, reflecting on the usefulness of British Psychological Society guidelines, how clinicians can implement research findings, and how research on the false memory debate can be improved. We conclude that the way forward is researcher–clinician collaboration in the development of ecologically valid research paradigms.

The Study of False Memories: Historical Refl ection

Temas em Psicologia, 2018

This work consists of a theoretical review with the aim of historically framing the way false memories have been studied. Although most of the studies on false memories have been developed since the last decade of the 20 th century, the earliest is dated from the late 19 th century. With the aim of pointing out the great historical milestones in the research of false memories, the pioneering studies carried out in the 19 th century, as well as the researches on the effect of the questions on the reports of children and adults, are presented. Subsequently, we present the fi rst researches carried out with the specifi c objective of studying the effect of suggestive questions on the production of false memories, followed by those who used a naturalistic approach and become decisive for the understanding of this phenomenon. In the second half of the 20 th century, a more cognitive approach takes place, and the paradigms of misinformation and DRM arise, which will also be discussed. Throughout the manuscript, it is also refl ected on the mechanisms that were considered to be the basis of the production of the false memories, as well as on the scientifi c and social implications of this phenomenon.

False Memories

International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2015

Our memories are not always the perfect representation of past events. We are certainly prone to forgetting, but somewhat less obviously, our memories are also susceptible to distortion. We are even capable of developing whole, new memories that are entirely false. False memories have consequences for people in their daily lives. Scientists have studied false memories in a laboratory setting in order to understand how they develop. Here, we describe various research methodologies and theoretical explanations for false memory phenomena.

What science tells us about false and repressed memories

Memory

What does science tell us about memory phenomena such as false and repressed memories? This issue is highly pressing as incorrect knowledge about these memory phenomena might contribute to egregious effects in the courtroom such as false accusations of abuse. In the current article, we provide a succinct review of the scientific nature of false and repressed memories. We demonstrate that research has shown that about 30% of tested subjects formed false memories of autobiographical experiences. Furthermore, this empirical work has also revealed that such false memories can even be implanted for negative events and events that allegedly occurred repeatedly. Concerning the controversial topic of repressed memories, we show that plausible alternative explanations exist for why people claim to have forgotten traumatic experiences; explanations that do not require special memory mechanisms such as the unconscious blockage of traumatic memories. Finally, we demonstrate that people continue to believe that unconscious repression of traumatic incidents can exist. Disseminating scientifically articulated knowledge on the functioning of memory to contexts such as the courtroom is necessary as to prevent the occurrence of false accusations and miscarriages of justice.

Commentary on “False Memory Syndrome and the Authority of Personal Memory-Claims

Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 5 (1998): 299-304, 1994

Andy Hamilton's approach to the so-called false memory debate is novel, interesting, and in many respects very sensible. I'm sympathetic to his claim that participants in the debate have paid little or no attention to the distinction between personal and factual memory, and to the reasons why (and the respects in which) the former is--justifiably--regarded as reliable. And I agree that Hamilton's attention to these matters helps to clarify and undermine at least some of the positions taken in the false memory debate. I also share and applaud Hamilton's cynicism regarding the merits of cognitive science generally, and the information storage and retrieval model of memory in particular. In addition to the sources he cites, I would add and , on the fatal confusions underlying memory trace theory. I, too, have made a contribution to the small body of philosophical works critical of trace theory (see Braude 1979, 184-210).