An Inquiry into & a Critique of Dennett on Intentional Systems (original) (raw)
Related papers
Daniel Dennett: intentionality system. An interpretation of intentional strategy
In this article, we show some of the meanings in which Daniel Dennet uses the term intentionality, in an attempt to establish to it the quality of key concept for understanding the mind, namely consciousness. By analyzing the American thinker’s ideas, we consider that in all of them an intentionality system can be identified, which includes the approaches and different names that he dedicates to this concept. Qualitative differences in the discourse about intentionality can open the way of the approach of intentionality from an evolutionary perspective, indicating the changes over time. The intentionality system is a proposal for understanding Dennet’s thinking in a coherent paradigm. Keywords: intentionality, intentional attitude, intentional strategy, intentional system, intentionality system, consciousness, mind, mind development. Daniel Dennett: intentionality system. An interpretation of intentional strategy, in Annals of “Ştefan cel Mare” University of Suceava PHILOSOPHY, SOCIAL AND HUMAN DISCIPLINES SERIES 2015 VOLUME I, pp. 9-29
Dennett on Intentional Systems
1999
Dennett on Intentional Systems Stephen P. Stich During the last dozen years, Daniel Dennett has been elaborating an interconnected-and increas-ingly influential-set of views in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of psychology, and those parts of moral philosophy that deal with ...
Dire Straits for Dennett . How Not to Talk Your Way Past Human Intentionality
2011
Daniel Dennett has produced a large, thought-provoking and often highly entertaining body of literature on human intentionality. Even if Dennett’s position is not easily characterized or strapped down in traditional terms, one central theme is recurrent: Human intentionality is nothing special. In principle it may be accounted for in terms similar to those in which we defend ascriptions of intentional states to simple animals, or even machines. The present paper disentangles two lines of thought behind this stance on human intentionality: A fictionalistand a constructivist position not always held clearly apart by Dennett himself. The paper argues that neither line of thought ultimately succeeds in demystifying human intentionality. At several instances of his long career Daniel Dennett has voiced serious skepticism towards contemporary metaphysics as an academic discipline and its current systems of categorization. Accordingly, he has persistently refused to self-apply any fashiona...
Dennett's Strategy for Naturalizing Intentionality: An Innovative Play at Second Base
I briefly review the three basic strategies for naturalizing intentionality discussed by Haugeland (1990), and Hutto and Satne (this volume), recounting their deficits. Then, I focus on Dennett’s version of what Haugeland calls the “second-base … neo-behaviorist” strategy. After briefly explaining Dennett’s proposal, I defend it against four common objections: circularity, relativity, under-specified rationality, and failure to track robustly natural facts. I conclude by recounting the advantages of Dennettian neo-behaviorism over the neo-Cartesian and neo-pragmatist alternatives, as well as Hutto and Satne’s proposal that intentionality comes in two distinct kinds. Key Words: Intentionality, naturalization, Dennett, neo-Cartesianism, neo-pragmatism, neo-behaviorism, intentional stance, natural selection, Haugeland, Hutto and Satne
A naturalistic perspective on intentionality. Interview with Daniel Dennett
Mind & Society, 2002
A naturalistic perspective on intentionality. Interview with Daniel Dennett by Marco Mirolli Marco Mirolli You describe yourself as a philosopher of mind and you reject the exhortations to get more involved in the abstract problems of ontology and of philosophy of science in general, even if the problems of the philosophy of mind and those of philosophy of science are deeply mutually dependent. I think this is an important issue because, while you say that your philosophy presupposes only the standard scientific ontology and epistemology 1, it seems to me that what you really presuppose is rather a Quinean view of ontology and epistemology, which is not so standard, even if it may well be the one we should accept. Daniel Dennett Well, maybe so, let's see. Certainly I have seen almost no reason to adopt any other ontology than Quine's; and when I look at the work in the philosophy of science and more particularly at the work in science, I do not find any ground yet for abandoning a Quinean view of ontology for something fancier. It could happen, but I haven't seen any reason for doing this; so if you want to say that I am vulnerable on this, that's really true. I have stated that I don't see any of the complexities of science or philosophy of mind raising ontological issues that are more sophisticated than those a Quinean ontology could handle; but I may be wrong. You might show me where I am wrong. M.M. No, I also think that Quinean ontology and epistemology are the ones we should accept. The point I wanted to stress is that much of the discussion about the realism on intentional entities is due not to a substantial disagreement on intentionality itself, but rather to ontological assumptions. I mean, for example, your discussion in "Real Patterns ''2 about what you called 'mild realism' versus 'strong realism' and so on. D.D. Well, in "Real Patterns" I presented what I thought the issues were and I showed what the difference was between my position and Davidson's, and between my
Why Dennett Cannot Explain what It Is to Adopt the Intentional Stance
Since our mastery of intentional state concepts requires our ability to adopt the intentional, according to Dennett's intentional stance theory, such concepts cannot be presupposed in an explanation of what it is to adopt the intentional stance, on pain of vicious circularity. I argue that Dennett's own revisionary take on intentional systems prevents him from providing a characterization of the intentional stance that does not hinge on the use of intentional state concepts. Hence, Dennett is unable to explain what, exactly, it is to adopt the intentional stance.
Dennett's Reduction of Brentano's Intentionality
2014
Since as far back as the middle ages, philosophers have been concerned with the inner representations of the mind. St Thomas Aquinas suggested that when he thinks of an object, the object of his thought has a different sort of existence in his mind.1 Indeed, there certainly seems to be a difference between physical phenomena and mental phenomena but merely seeming like there is a difference is not enough to show that there is a difference. In this paper I will compare two different approaches to the supposed distinction between the mental and the physical. First I will outline Brentano's theory of `Intentionality', which, in its early formulation, proposes a true distinction between physical objects and the objects of thought. I will then introduce Daniel Dennett's `Intentional Systems Theory'. Dennett's theory is an attempt to naturalise the mind and to reduce mental phenomena such as beliefs and desires to simple physical systems. 1. Brentano's Intent...
Daniel Dennett on Responsibility
The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 1984
The essays in Daniel Dennett's Brainsforms have been closely examined and widely debated. But suprisingly, Dennett's remarks on responsibility have received comparatively little attention. Suprisingly, since Dennett's discussion of responsibility is particularly creative. And doubly surprising, since Dennett not only includes two major essays on responsibility; he even seems to champion two quite different positions: a compatibilist soft determinism and an incompatibilist libertarianism. This essay will examine Dennett's two positions on responsibility; indicate the important common ground in the apparent diversity; and finally, argue that Dennett's imaginative efforts to establish responsibility are an instructive failure. Mechanistic Responsibility Dennett opens "Mechanism and Responsibility" by arguing that rational behavior may be mechanical: that it is sometimes possible to give an accurate mechanistic account of behavior that could also be described from an intentional stance, and there is no conflict between mechanism and intentionality.' I find Dennett's argument for that compatibility convincing. Thus an underlying principle in Dennett's essay-and in this paper-is the possibility of mechanisticdeterministic accounts of rational processes. My objections are aimed exclusively at Dennett's efforts to accommodate responsibility. In the second half of "Mechanism and Responsibility" Dennett attempts to establish the compatibility of mechanism and responsibility. His first step is to isolate the crucial factor in responsibility: The crucial point when assessing responsibility is whether or not the antecedent inputs achieve their effects as inputs of information, or by short-circuit.* Dennett attempts to justify this claim by examining "excusing conditions"in cases of manipulation (tampering, short-circuiting) of an intentional system. He illustrates with three stories about Tom, ".. . who wakes up to discover a non-rationally induced belief in his head (he does not know it was non-rationally induced; he merely encounters this new belief in the course of reflection, let us say).", In
In this paper I introduce some of the key elements of Daniel Dennett’s theory of intentional attribution and their relation with his notion of rationality. While doing so I will show that Dennett’s approach implies a circularity in the process of attribution of rationality, and that his resource to evolutionary arguments for trying to avoid an infinite regress does not help him to avoid the problem. My presentation will include a revision of Dennett’s arguments for epistemic intentional ascription and rationality attribution as well as some criticisms developed against his proposal. At the end of the article I will extend the criticisms and present my view about his proposal for ideal rationality attribution.
A Naturalistic Account of Free Will with Reference to Daniel C. Dennett
From Ethos to Ethics: Theory and Practice (An Anthology of Peer Reviewed Research Articles), ISBN: 978-93-88207-55-3, 2019
Dennett is one of the foremost contemporary American Philosopher. His work synthesizes traditional philosophical themes such as mind, self, freedom and ethics with current scientific theories. Dennett aim is positive and concedes that we can accept the view science gives us of the world and still maintain human dignity and value. More than that Dennett argues that science offers us a better foundation for the things we hold dear than traditional philosophical, religious, or commonsensical accounts ever could. Daniel Dennett's mission has been to show how science and our self-conception can be reconciled, and, indeed, how both can be made stronger by reaching approachment. Dennett seeks to show that we can retain the richness of our concepts, the richness that is required to sustain what matters to us about our self-conception while reconciling them with naturalism. Within the worldview of natural science, it is usually assumed that, since all events are caus