The Reign of Bahram V Gur: The Revitalization of the Empire through Mounted Archery by Dr. Ilkka Syvanne (Syvänne/Syvaenne) (original) (raw)

Abstract

The article in Historia-i-Swiat (final version available online at http://www.ihism.uph.edu.pl/historia-i-swiat) reconstructs the military history of Persia under Bahram V Gur and points out the historical significance of his reign, campaigns as well as the importance of his military reforms – in particular the adoption of the new style of archery and cavalry tactics. It also includes material which is of interest to those who are interested in the history of late Rome, religion (Christianity, Jewish religion, paganism, Zoroastrians, Muslims), commerce between east and west, Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, naval history, Huns, Middle East, Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, East Africa, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Central Asia, India and China. The article includes also material related to Roman history which will appear in a slightly different and longer form in the vols. 3-4 of my forthcoming A Military History of Late Rome due to be published by Pen & Sword Publishing. The article included here is an earlier version which has a couple of mistakes left (affiliation after the name, illustration shown ‘between’ the pages so that it is not visible and some verbs missing) that have been corrected in the final version which is available online but it should not have any mistakes in the content but if there are those are my mistakes. The final version available online at: http://www.ihism.uph.edu.pl/historia-i-swiat/ Keywords: Sasanian Warfare, Military History, Sasanian Army, Late Antiquity, Archery

Figures (6)

but very bloody battle at Karnipora (possibly to be identified with Karin)*" after which they withdrew via Iberia back to Persia. This suggests that the Romans had probably employed a hollow/oblong infantry square which the Persian cavalry had failed to break. According to the Armenian version of the Chronicle, “Zeno” came to Sper to assist the Iberians, but then returned back to Karin (Theodosiopolis/Erzurum) when he learnt of Vaxtang’s wound. It was after this that the Persian King destroyed Tpilisi and Armazi, and the surroundings of Mcxeta, and marched against the Greeks (=Romans). The battle ended in a stalemate and the Persians withdrew via Iberia to their own land.

but very bloody battle at Karnipora (possibly to be identified with Karin)*" after which they withdrew via Iberia back to Persia. This suggests that the Romans had probably employed a hollow/oblong infantry square which the Persian cavalry had failed to break. According to the Armenian version of the Chronicle, “Zeno” came to Sper to assist the Iberians, but then returned back to Karin (Theodosiopolis/Erzurum) when he learnt of Vaxtang’s wound. It was after this that the Persian King destroyed Tpilisi and Armazi, and the surroundings of Mcxeta, and marched against the Greeks (=Romans). The battle ended in a stalemate and the Persians withdrew via Iberia to their own land.

The above-mentioned accounts of the single combat between Areobindus and Ardazanes are important also for another reason, which is that it appears to describe a situation which is familiar to us from the sixth century Strategikon. The presence of the comes foederatum in the army suggests that he and his foederati were placed in the centre of the first line (Areobindus would also have been the second-in-command hypostrategos) while the commander strategos Ardaburius stood in the middle of the second support line

The above-mentioned accounts of the single combat between Areobindus and Ardazanes are important also for another reason, which is that it appears to describe a situation which is familiar to us from the sixth century Strategikon. The presence of the comes foederatum in the army suggests that he and his foederati were placed in the centre of the first line (Areobindus would also have been the second-in-command hypostrategos) while the commander strategos Ardaburius stood in the middle of the second support line

Despite the Roman victory the following terms of peace were not too unfavourable for the Persians because the East Romans needed peace so that they could transfer their forces against the Huns who were invading the Balkans. Conversely, Bahram had every reason to conclude the peace. He had suffered a defeat, his army was suffering from lack of supplies, Armenia and Iberia were in a state of revolt, and the Turks/Hephthalites had invaded. It is quite likely that the defeat of the Persian armies resulting from the policies followed by the nobles gave Bahram greater amount of political freedom — after all there was little else that he could do but to conclude the peace. According to Holum*’ and Blockley*' the terms of peace were as follows: 1) Each side agreed not to receive any Saracen deserters from the other side; 2) Each side agreed not fo construct new fortifications near the border; 3) Both sides agreed to follow policy of religious tolerance. In contrast to Holum, Blockley and the consensus view, I see no reason fo think that the Romans would have agreed to pay any money to the Persians in return for their defence of the Derbend Pass. The Romans made this agreement only after the war of 440." On top of that, Moses and Isaac of Antioch,*® imply in no uncertain terms that the Romans were in possession of the city of Nisibis in 440, which does strongly suggest that the Persians had to hand over Nisibis to the Romans as part of the peace treaty. The Persians were Clearly in no position to make demands of payment to the Romans. Regardless, it is

Despite the Roman victory the following terms of peace were not too unfavourable for the Persians because the East Romans needed peace so that they could transfer their forces against the Huns who were invading the Balkans. Conversely, Bahram had every reason to conclude the peace. He had suffered a defeat, his army was suffering from lack of supplies, Armenia and Iberia were in a state of revolt, and the Turks/Hephthalites had invaded. It is quite likely that the defeat of the Persian armies resulting from the policies followed by the nobles gave Bahram greater amount of political freedom — after all there was little else that he could do but to conclude the peace. According to Holum*’ and Blockley*' the terms of peace were as follows: 1) Each side agreed not to receive any Saracen deserters from the other side; 2) Each side agreed not fo construct new fortifications near the border; 3) Both sides agreed to follow policy of religious tolerance. In contrast to Holum, Blockley and the consensus view, I see no reason fo think that the Romans would have agreed to pay any money to the Persians in return for their defence of the Derbend Pass. The Romans made this agreement only after the war of 440." On top of that, Moses and Isaac of Antioch,*® imply in no uncertain terms that the Romans were in possession of the city of Nisibis in 440, which does strongly suggest that the Persians had to hand over Nisibis to the Romans as part of the peace treaty. The Persians were Clearly in no position to make demands of payment to the Romans. Regardless, it is

However, there is also another possibility, which is that Bahram and the Romans actually conducted a joint operation against the Y emenites and Aksumites, if one dates the campaign of Qusayy with the support of the Roman ‘Caesar’ against the city of Mecca to the same time period. Qusayy was an ancestor of the Prophet Muhammad. He was born in Mecca, but his father died soon after that. His mother remarried a man from the tribe of Udra. As a result of this, Qusayy spent his youth among the Udra near the Roman border. According to the Arabic tradition, Qusayy marched to Mecca and fought against the southern Arabic tribe of the Khuzaa and with the assistance of Caesar overthrew them. After this, he gathered together the clans of Quraysh and settled them in and around Mecca, restored the ‘religion of Abraham’, and rebuilt the Kaba and thereby assured the supremacy of Mecca as a place of worship. Since it is known that Qusayy was a contemporary of al-Mundhir, it is clear that this event could have taken place at any time between about 405 and 434. On the basis of this it would be possible to date the war against Mecca for example to the immediate aftermath of the Berber and Arab invasion of the Roman East in 410, or to coincide with the Persian War of 421-422. However, in my opinion the likeliest date would be the period 434- 437 for the same reasons as stated above. It is quite possible that the Aksumites had hindered the maritime trade between East and West by demanding exorbitant customs duties, and that it would have been in the interest of both Rome and Persia to restore the previous status quo by crushing the Aksumite power. Since the Vandal threat preoccupied the Roman fleets, the Romans could have asked Bahram to assist by invading Yemen and Horn of Africa while the Roman army consisting mostly of the Arabic foederati (esp. of the Udra and Salihids) would advance along the coastal caravan routes against Mecca and its

However, there is also another possibility, which is that Bahram and the Romans actually conducted a joint operation against the Y emenites and Aksumites, if one dates the campaign of Qusayy with the support of the Roman ‘Caesar’ against the city of Mecca to the same time period. Qusayy was an ancestor of the Prophet Muhammad. He was born in Mecca, but his father died soon after that. His mother remarried a man from the tribe of Udra. As a result of this, Qusayy spent his youth among the Udra near the Roman border. According to the Arabic tradition, Qusayy marched to Mecca and fought against the southern Arabic tribe of the Khuzaa and with the assistance of Caesar overthrew them. After this, he gathered together the clans of Quraysh and settled them in and around Mecca, restored the ‘religion of Abraham’, and rebuilt the Kaba and thereby assured the supremacy of Mecca as a place of worship. Since it is known that Qusayy was a contemporary of al-Mundhir, it is clear that this event could have taken place at any time between about 405 and 434. On the basis of this it would be possible to date the war against Mecca for example to the immediate aftermath of the Berber and Arab invasion of the Roman East in 410, or to coincide with the Persian War of 421-422. However, in my opinion the likeliest date would be the period 434- 437 for the same reasons as stated above. It is quite possible that the Aksumites had hindered the maritime trade between East and West by demanding exorbitant customs duties, and that it would have been in the interest of both Rome and Persia to restore the previous status quo by crushing the Aksumite power. Since the Vandal threat preoccupied the Roman fleets, the Romans could have asked Bahram to assist by invading Yemen and Horn of Africa while the Roman army consisting mostly of the Arabic foederati (esp. of the Udra and Salihids) would advance along the coastal caravan routes against Mecca and its

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