Kant's Practical Metaphysics of Freedom (original) (raw)

What is the status of freedom, according to Kant? How convincing is his theory of freedom?

The question of freedom in Kant's first critique arises from the Third Antinomy of pure reason, the seeming contradiction between nature and freedom. In Kant's words, the question could be put thus: " whether it is a correct disjunctive proposition that every effect in the world must arise either from nature or freedom, or whether instead both, each in a different relation, might be able to take place simultaneously in one and the same occurrence ." The relations which he refers to is the different ways that we can think of causality, namely causality from nature and causality from freedom. Could the causal laws of nature coexist with this superseding causality through freedom? In this essay I will elaborate on Kant's theory of freedom as well as explore various problems arising therein.

Bolstering the Keystone: Kant on the Incomprehensibility of Freedom

Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 2020

In this paper, I give an explanation and defense of Kant's claim that we cannot comprehend how freedom is possible. I suggest that this is a significant point that has been underappreciated in the secondary literature. My conclusion has a variety of implications both for Kant scholars and for those interested in Kantian ideas more generally. Most notably, if Kant is right that there are principled reasons why freedom is beyond our comprehension, then this would lift an undesirable explanatory burden off the shoulders of his ethical and metaethical views. It would be a boon for Kantians if they could ground their lofty claims about the unique, elevated status of rational agency without committing to an implausible view of libertarian freedom. On the negative side, there are certain debates concerning moral motivation and transcendental idealism that might have to change in response to Kant's claims about the incomprehensibility of freedom.

Kant on Freedom

Cambridge University Press, 2023

Kant's early critics maintained that his theory of freedom faces a dilemma: either it reduces the will's activity to strict necessity by making it subject to the causality of the moral law, or it reduces the will's activity to blind chance by liberating it from rules of any kind. This Element offers a new interpretation of Kant's theory against the backdrop of this controversy. It argues that Kant was a consistent proponent of the claim that the moral law is the causal law of a free will, and that the supposed ability of free will to choose indifferently between options is an empty concept. Freedom, for Kant, is a power to initiate action from oneself, and the only way to exercise this power is through the law of one's own will, the moral law. Immoral action is not thereby rendered impossible, but it also does not express a genuine ability.

On the Concept of "Freedom" in Kant's Moral Philosophy

Philosophy and Progress, 2012

The concept of freedom (Freiheit) plays a central role in Kant's ethical theory. Moral laws are called 'laws of freedom' on the very first page of Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals 1 (387); and at the beginning of Section III, Kant declares a free will and a will under moral laws to be 'one and the same'. "Freedom", for Kant, "is the keystone of the whole architecture of the system of pure reason and even of speculative reason." 2 Among all the ideas of pure speculative reason it is only the concept of freedom which opens up to us our means to access to the supersensible. Yet all the knowledge which it makes available to us belongs to the practical order. Above all, the concept of freedom concerns action, and especially moral action. It is "the stumbling block of all empiricists but the key to the most sublime practical principles to critical moralists, who see, through it, that they must necessarily proceed rationally." (CPrR: 7)

Kant’s Metaphysics of Freedom (1775-1782): Theoretical and Practical Perspectives

Kant’s Lectures on Metaphysics. A Critical Guide, ed. Courtney Fugate, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 179-193., 2018

Kant’s lectures on metaphysics are an important source when we want to understand the development and the sources of his thinking. Among the surviving lectures those from the mid-1770s and from 1782/83 stand out. They document not only Kant’s endeavours to redefine the contents and the methods of previous metaphyiscs as part of a critique of pure reason. Eventually, they also testify to the close connection between his published writings and his lectures in the shape they were passed on to us. This is also true of Kant’s remarks on the concept of freedom. While the transcripts are an indispensable source for our knowledge of Kant’s thoughts on the concept of freedom in the 1770s because he did not publish anything relevant during this period of time, the Metaphysics Mrongovius does not include anything important that we cannot also look up in the "Critique of Pure Reason".

Freedom Immediately after Kant

European Journal of Philosophy, 2019

Kant's effort to defend the coexistence of transcendental freedom and natural necessity is one of the crowning achievements of the first Critique. Yet by identifying the will with practical reason in his moral philosophy, he lent support to the view that the moral law is the causal law of a free will-the result of which, as Reinhold argued, left immoral action impossible. However, Reinhold's attempt to separate the will from practical reason generated difficulties of its own, which Maimon was quick to point out. By identifying freedom with indifferent choice, Maimon argued, Reinhold had no resources to explain why a free will acts at all. My aim in this article is to show how Fichte's theory of freedom seeks to reconcile these two commitments: The key lies in what I call Fichte's Genetic Model, according to which indifferent choice is the original condition of the will, but a condition we must actively overcome.