Scientific Realism in Genetics: the Ontological Status of (original) (raw)

Genes: Philosophical analyses put to the test

History and Philosophy of The Life Sciences, 2004

This paper describes one complete and one ongoing empirical study in which philosophical analyses of the concept of the gene were operationalized and tested using questionnaire data obtained from working biologists. These studies throw light on how different gene concepts contribute to biological research. Their aim is not to arrive at one or more correct 'definitions' of the gene, but rather to map out the variation in the gene concept and to explore its causes and its effects.

On conceptual change in biology: The case of the gene

Evolution at a crossroads: The new biology and the …, 1985

The current situation in philosophy of science generally, and in philosophy of biology in particular, is most unsatisfactory. There are at least three general problems that many philosophers thought themselves near to solving twenty years ago, only to find that the anticipated solutions have come unglued. These are (1) the problem of characterizing and understanding the dynamics of conceptual change in science; (2) he problem of understanding the interrelationships among theories including particularly the reduction of one theory to another); and (3) he problem of scientific realism (i.e., the problem of how seriously to take the claims of theoretical science or, at least, of some theoretical scientists, to be describing the world literally--in terms of such theoretical entities as genes and protons, DNA molecules, and quarks). This general situation has significant effects on the philosophical study of particular sciences. In philosophy of biology, for example, although one finds a large number of elegant studies of particular topics, the sad fact is that there is no generally satisfactory large-scale synthesis n sight. We have no agreed-on foundation, no generally acceptable starting point from which to delimit and resolve the full range of theoretical problems of interest to scientists and philosophers regarding biology.

Reference, Truth, and Biological Kinds

Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel, ed. by Julien Dutant, Davide Fassio and Anne Meylan, 2014

This paper examines causal theories of reference with respect to how plausible an account they give of non-physical natural kind terms such as ‘gene’ as well as of the truth of the associated theoretical claims. I first show that reference fixism for ‘gene’ fails. By this, I mean the claim that the reference of ‘gene’ was stable over longer historical periods, for example, since the classical period of transmission genetics. Second, I show that the theory of partial reference does not do justice to some widely held realist intuitions about classical genetics. This result is at loggerheads with the explicit goals usually associated with partial theories of reference, which is to defend a realist semantics for scientific terms. Thirdly, I show that, contrary to received wisdom and perhaps contrary to physics and chemistry, neither reference fixism nor partial reference are necessary in order to hold on to scientific realism about biology. I pinpoint the reasons for this in the nature of biological kinds, which do not even remotely resemble natural kinds (i.e., Lockean real essences) as traditionally conceived

Scientific Realism, the Semantic View and Evolutionary Biology

Models and Inferences in Science, 2016

The semantic view of theories is normally considered to be an account of theories congenial to Scientific Realism. Recently, it has been argued that Ontic Structural Realism could be fruitfully applied, in combination with the semantic view, to some of the philosophical issues peculiarly related to biology. Given the central role that models have in the semantic view, and the relevance that mathematics has in the definition of the concept of model, the focus will be on population genetics, which is one of the most mathematized areas in biology. We will analyse some of the difficulties which arise when trying to use Ontic Structural Realism to account for evolutionary biology.

Conceptual and ethical problems in the epistemology of genetic information

New Genetics and Society, 2010

My thesis will be that the identification of genetic features and their medical interpretation follow at least partially from reductionist premises: “Genes are charging the gun, life(-style) will trigger it.” This simplistic metaphor illustrates a problem of genetic diagnosis: from the viewpoint of philosophy of science, concepts of the gene and the genome are vague and confused. Until now these concepts have not been defined satisfactorily. Partly on account of this there is an additional problem in applying genetic tests in medical diagnostics. The epistemic status of predictive genetic diagnosis in many cases can justifiably be called “opaque.” But a predictive genetic test is designed to reveal genetic knowledge of and for a client on the basis of scientific research. Methodologically the diagnosis of the scientific problem in genetics as a science is developed philosophically as an epistemological argument. The problem of genetics as applied science in medicine and society is the danger of irrationality due to reductionist premises of science. This problem is to be revealed by philosophical analysis. The major result of the argument is that the assessment of applications of basic research in genetics should include considerations from epistemology and philosophy of science. The epistemological status of scientific concepts and reasonableness of advice are interrelated. My thesis is that at the interface between theory of science in genetics and reasonableness of “genetic advice” is the responsibility of the researchers for concepts of their science.

Genes, A Small History of a Big Concept

In this introductory chapter to my M.A. thesis, I trace the history of the gene and pre-gene concepts from Mendel through to the molecular revolution. I draw particular attention to two types of gene concept: the instrumental and material. I try to show how each iteration of the material gene developed from predictive and explanatory successes of the instrumental conception. I also highlight the role of emerging technologies in fueling this dialectic.