the influence of schemas stimulus ambiguity and intervies eyewitness memory over time (original) (raw)
Related papers
Effects of different types of forensic information on eyewitness’ memory and confidence accuracy
The European Journal of Psychology Applied to Legal Context, 2014
This study investigated eyewitnesses' memory and confidence accuracy for action information (what happened at the crime scene), and detail information (descriptions of persons, objects, time and place). In Experiment 1, 89 participants watched a film and participated in one of four conditions: Laboratory discussion, Family discussion, Retell and Control, the first three with five meetings each. Three weeks later all participants open free recalled the events, and confidence judged their answers. The participants showed better free recall and confidence accuracy for action than for detail information. Participants in the two discussion conditions and in the Retell condition recalled more items and those in the Lab-discussion and Retell conditions more correct items for action information, than those in Control group. However, the four conditions did not differ for proportion correct of all action items recalled and confidence accuracy for action items. In brief, Experiment 1 showed that witness discussions and retellings of the experienced event with others improved recall for action information but had had no, or small, effects on confidence accuracy. Experiment 2 investigated recall and confidence accuracy performance for action and detail information using focused questions. Seventy-seven participants watched a film, answered and confidence judged 63 questions about action and detail information about the events. Again, participants showed better memory and confidence accuracy for action information. Overall, the results indicate that, for both free recall and focused questions, witnesses' recall and confidence accuracy is better for action information than for detail information, thus extra precaution is needed in the forensic system when detail information from witnesses is considered.
Cognition, 2011
Research examining detection of verbal deception reveals that lay observers generally perform at chance. Yet, in the criminal justice system, laypersons that have not undergone specialist investigative training are frequently called upon to make veracity judgements (e.g., solicitors; magistrates; juries). We sought to improve performance by manipulating the timing of information revelation during investigative interviews. A total of 151 participants played an interactive computer game as either a truth-teller or a deceiver, and were interviewed afterwards. Game information known to the interviewer was revealed either early, at the end of the interview, or gradually throughout. Subsequently, 30 laypersons individually viewed a random selection of interviews (five deceivers and five truth-tellers from each condition), and made veracity and confidence judgements. Veracity judgements were most accurate in the gradual condition, p < .001, g 2 = .97 (above chance), and observers were more confident in those judgements, p < .001, g 2 = .99. Deceptive interviewees reported the gradual interviews to be the most cognitively demanding, p < .001; g 2 = .24. Our findings suggest that the detection of verbal deception by non-expert observers can be enhanced by employing interview techniques that maximize deceivers' cognitive load, while allowing truth-tellers the opportunity to respond to evidence incrementally.
In the current study the influence of schema consistent and schema inconsistent misinformation on eyewitness memory, as well as the effects of an online version of the Self-Administered Interview (SAI) to preserve the memory of an original event with and without time delay have been investigated. For online interviewing purposes, the SAI was slightly amended and did not have drawing options. Participants (n=117) were divided between nine different study conditions. The misinformation types were ‘no misinformation, schema consistent and schema inconsistent misinformation’. Retrieval conditions investigated were ‘immediate with SAI, delay with SAI and delay without SAI’. All participants watched the same video of an event in an insurance broker’s office and were presented in the office with schema consistent and schema inconsistent items, determined from a normative study. Later on, except for control conditions, schema consistent and schema inconsistent changed and added misinformation, also determined by the normative study, were presented to participants using a mock TV news story about industrial espionage in the insurance broker’s office. Participants had more accurate memories of the schema inconsistent items than schema consistent items upon immediate retrieval. As the retrieval interval increased, the accuracy of correctly recalled items decreased in all delayed conditions with both schema consistent and schema inconsistent misinformation types. Memory decay of schema inconsistent items was more rapid than with schema consistent items; however, this did not result in acceptance of more schema consistent misinformation. Another finding was that schema inconsistent changed items were better remembered than schema consistent changed items. The results of the current study also suggest that completing an SAI facilitates more accurate retrieval of information following a time delay. The implications of the findings are discussed in relation to eyewitness memory.
Verbally recalling the appearance of a perpetrator and the details of an event can sometimes hinder later eyewitness memory performance. In two experiments, we investigated the effects of verbally recalling a face on people’s ability to resist subsequent misinformation about that face. Participants watched a video of a theft and then completed either a recall test or a distractor activity. After a delay, some participants heard a piece of misinformation. Memory was assessed with a recall test in Experiment 1 and with a target-present lineup in Experiment 2. In both experiments, initial testing reduced eyewitness suggestibility for the face.
Scientific study of witness memory: Implications for public and legal policy
Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 1995
The legal system relies heavily on human memory. Crime investigations, criminal trials, and many civil trials depend on memory to reconstruct critical events from the past. Getting at the "truth" is often synonymous with establishing the who, what, when, and how of some prior episode. Past events tend to leave traces, and the process of reconstructing events from the past is aided by various types of trace evidence. These traces can be physical, such as a footprint, a blood stain, or a fingerprint. An event can also leave traces of a somewhat different type, namely memory traces. Although these traces can also be said to have a physical property, in the sense that there exists a biological residue for the event somewhere in the brain, they cannot be observed directly by crime investigators or triers of fact. Instead, the memory trace that resides within the human brain is manifested for investigators and triers of fact through verbal testimony. It is probably safe to conclude that courts of law could not function without relying on human memory. Even physical evidence, such as a bloody glove, requires someone to take the witness stand and recall where it was found, by whom, at what time, in what condition, and so on. The scientific study of human memory was initiated over 100 years ago by Hermann Ebbinghouse (1885/1913), and the scientific study of human memory today remains almost exclusively the province of psychology and related cognitive and neurological sciences. The scientific study of memory is so fundamental to psychology that no general textbook in psychology could fail to devote a chapter or its equivalent to memory. Over the last 20 years or so, psychologists have developed a specific research literature on witness testimony. This research has been directed primarily at eyewitnesses, such as victims or bystanders to a criminal event. This issue of Psychology, Public Policy, and Law is devoted to the potential contributions of the scientific study of witness testimony to public policy and legal issues. Making policy or procedure recommendations to the criminal justice system on eyewitness reliability issues is not new for psychologists. Nearly 90 years ago, Hugo Munsterberg (1908) argued that "Nearly every chapter and sub-chapter of sense psychology may help to clear up the chaos and confusion which prevail in the observation of witnesses" (p. 33), and he bemoaned the fact that juries and judges are not obliged to know and understand these things. Following a long period of near dormancy on the issue, research programs in psychology arose again in the mid-1970s, and there has been a renewal of the argument that scientific psychology has something important to offer the legal system. Unlike Munsterberg, who tried to rely almost exclusively on basic findings and theories of sensation and perception, modern researchers on eyewitness issues have made heavy use of complex stimulus
Psychophysiology, 2010
This study examined the role of memory for crime details in detecting concealed information using the electrodermal measure, Symptom Validity Test, and Number Guessing Test. Participants were randomly assigned to three groups: guilty, who committed a mock theft; informed-innocents, who were exposed to crime-relevant items; and uninformedinnocents, who had no crime-relevant information. Participants were tested immediately or 1 week later. Results showed (a) all tests detected the guilty in the immediate condition, and combining the tests improved detection efficiency; (b) tests' efficiency declined in the delayed condition, mainly for peripheral details; (c) no distinction between guilty and informed innocents was possible in the immediate, yet some distinction emerged in the delayed condition. These findings suggest that, while time delay may somewhat reduce the ability to detect the guilty, it also diminishes the danger of accusing informed-innocents.
2011
This thesis investigated the effects of eyewitnesses retellings and discussions with non-witnesses on the eyewitness memory and meta-memory judgments. In Study I, the effect of eyewitness discussions with non-witnesses (persons who had not experienced the event) on eyewitness memory and meta-memory realism for the overall information about an event was investigated. The results suggest that discussions of an experienced event may reduce some of the beneficial memory and meta-memory effects caused by mere retellings, but may not have great negative effects compared to a control condition. Analysis of the type of questions asked suggests listeners ask more about the peripheral details as compared with the central details. In a follow-up study to study I conducted a year later participants in the Retell condition no longer showed evidence of the memory and meta-memory benefits evident at the original final test after about 24 days. However, participants in the Retell condition recalled a higher number of correct items than participants in the Control condition. In Study II, the effect of eyewitness discussions with non-witnesses on eyewitness memory and meta-memory realism for different types of information was investigated. The different types of information were Forensically central, Forensically peripheral, and Non-forensic information. These are types of information that the police may ask at the beginning of a crime investigation. The results from the two experiments showed that participants had better memory and meta-memory realism for Forensically central and Non-forensic information than for Forensically peripheral information. Moreover, participants in the four conditions were equally capable of distinguishing between correct and incorrect items. Further, in Experiment 1 participants in conditions involving retelling and discussing the event reported more total number and number of correct Forensically central items as compared to the Control condition. Study III investigated if retellings and discussions would cause more reminiscence and hypermnesia than mere retellings. The results showed that discussions indeed cause more reminiscence and hypermnesia over the five sessions as compared to mere retellings. The results also showed that the number of times a piece of information was repeated over the sessions was associated with a higher probability for that piece of information being retrieved at the final recall. Interestingly, if the information was retold or discussed in an earlier or later session did not predict if this information would be reported in the testing session or not. Last, the results showed that the forensically peripheral information, but not forensically central information was affected by the reiteration effect (i.e., the effect that confidence tends to increase when a person asserts the same statement many times). This may be due to the fact that the peripheral information was less integrated than the central information.