'Review of Y. Dolev, Time and Realism,' Humana.Mente 8 (2009): 173-176 (original) (raw)
Related papers
A Philosophical Investigation into Time and Tense
1996
I defend and develop the new tenseless token-reflexive theory of time. I begin by charting the development of the debate between the tensed and the old tenseless theories of time. The tensed theory of time maintains that time exists and is intrinsically tensed. According to the old tenseless theory, time exists and is intrinsically tenseless, the notions of past, present and future being analytically reducible to tenseless temporal relations.
Taking Times Out: Tense Logic as a Theory of Time
Ulrich Meyer’s book The Nature of Time uses tense logic to argue for a ‘modal’ view of time, which replaces substantial times (as in Newton’s Absolute Time) with ‘ersatz times’ constructed using conceptually basic tense operators. He also argues against Bertrand Russell’s relationist theory, in which times are classes of events, and against the idea that relativity compels the integration of time and space (called by Meyer the Inseparability Argument). I find fault with each of these negative arguments, as well as with Meyer’s purported reconstruction of empty spacetime from tense operators and substantial spatial points. I suggest that Meyer’s positive project is best conceived as an elimination of time in the mode of Julian Barbour's The End of Time.
Other Times, 1997
Philosophical perspectives on past, present and future. Cambridge University Press, 1997. Available in hardback, paperback and kindle. 5 The role of tense 1. CONTEMPORARY FORMULATIONS OF THE TENSELESS VIEW In chaptcr 2 I considered Spinoza's defence of the claim that in so far as we are thinking clearly, and have adequate knowledge of the world, we will be affected by the thought of some event in the same way whether that event lies in the past, present or future. That defence is closely linked with-perhaps is inseparable from-the idea that the tense of an utterance does not pick out some objective feature of the world; or, as we might put it, that past and future events have exactly the same kind of reality as do present events. I suggested that, contrary to what has been argued by some recent philosophers, Spinoza is right in thinking that these claims involve a demand for a radical revision in our normal thought about time, but that his argument for them (or, rather, the particular argument that I considered) makes use of a suspect premise. I want to turn now to a range of contemporary formulations of, and defences of, the tenseless view: past, present, and future arise from time-relations of subject and object ... In a world in which there was no experience there would be no past, present, or future, but there might well be earlier and later. 1 A-series statements have B-series truth conditions. .. A-series statements and beliefs reflect our limited epistemic access to reality'. .. All times, and hence all the individuals occupying them, are equally real.. . The future is not ontologically indeterminate. 2 …. nothing in reality is past, present or future at all. …. Our temporal interest in reality is indeed tensed; but the tense attaches to our interest, not to the reality….. We have seen that using tensed sentences demands nothing more than knowledge of w r hen they are true and when false, i.e. of their tcnseless token-reflexive truth conditions; so that, I suggest, is all there is to the tensed beliefs they express… Tense ... is not being banished altogether, merely replaced w r here it belongs-in our heads. ... in reality' there are no [tensed] facts. 3 Events are not intrinsically past, present and future. 4 there are no instances of time modes. 5 the alleged passage of time or pure becoming is an illusion. Certainly w r e feel that time flows, but I w r ant to say. .. that this feeling arises out of metaphysical confusion. 6 1Russell, 'On the Experience of Time', p. 212. 2Le Poidevin, Change, Cause and Contradiction, pp. 4-5.
The Old Tenseless Theory Back from the Dead (Philosophia)
Recently, Orilia and Oaklander have attempted to revive the so-called old tenseless theory of time, which most tenseless theorists themselves had given up as untenable, heralding the appearance of the so-called new tenseless theory. I argue that Orilia and Oaklander have not successfully shown that the old tenseless theory of time is still viable.
Philosophy of time: A slightly opinionated introduction
There are several intertwined debates in the area of contemporary philosophy of time. One field of inquiry is the nature of time itself. Presentists think that only the present moment exists whereas eternalists believe that all of (space-)time exists on a par. The second main field of inquiry is the question of how objects persist through time. The endurantist claims that objects are three-dimensional wholes, which persist by being wholly present, whereas the perdurantist thinks that objects are four- dimensional and that their temporal parts are the bearers of properties. The third debate in the field of contemporary philosophy of time is about tense- versus tenseless theory. Tensers are at odds with detensers about the status of the linguistic reference to the present moment.
Between the Time of Physics and the Time of Metaphysics, the Time of Tense Logic?
Einstein vs. Bergson
Accordingt oR ussell, Being is divided into atemporal universals and temporal particulars. But,t ot he extent that the Antisthene'sc aballeity pops up in the topos noeton,the ancestors of the horse must precede the horse in the sublunar. Thus, Being must be divided into Sosein, Dasein and Zeitsein. Onlythe Whiteheadian "eternal objects",s uch as geometricalf orms and colours,a re atemporal universals, while caballeity is in the Zeitsein togetherw ith Conquérant (one among Napoleon'sh orses). In this ontology,a ccordingt ot he Lautmanian shift, Spatiotemporality pertains to the Sosein and has at wo-fold structure: logical and mathematical. The tensel ogic of A.N.P rior describes it,while its link with the mathematics of spacetime is fixed by the Boolean kernel in the vonNeumann algebraf or quantum logic. Thiss peculation will be precededb yanarrative exposition of elementaryt ense logic. *Iam grateful to the all staff at the What is time? symposium for theirinvitation and generous hospitality.Great thanks are especiallydue to RoccoRonchi for his marked concerns, to Elie During for the courtesy of his discussion and to AlessandraC ampof or the truth of her philosophical enthusiasm. As pecial thanks is for the anonymous reviewer of this paper. 1T he Tale of TenseL ogic Tense logic is avariety of temporal logic, and temporallogic is abranch of modal logic. Thus, in order to give ashort history of tenselogic, we must start by tracing as hort genealogyo ft he modal logic.¹ The latter has threem ain moments: the Leibnizian foundation,t he Kripkean mathematization and the creation of tense logic by Arthur Prior. See Blackburn,D eR ijkea nd Venema (2001). Arthur Prior and Hybrid Logic is af ascinating paper which focuses on the morep romisingl ines of thoughti nt he area.
1 1 I have in mind that there is a sentential operator 'in reality, __' by means of which the various realist claims are to be made ). This paper should be regarded as a summary of views which are elaborated at much greater length in Fine [2005] and I have made no attempt to engage with the extensive literature on the topic.