RACING UP TO THE BOTTOM: WORK AND WELFARE IN THE U.S (original) (raw)

Income Support Policies for Low-Income Men and Noncustodial Fathers: Tax and Transfer Programs

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2011

Both wages and labor force participation have been declining for young, less-educated men since the mid-1970s. The purpose of this article is to examine how key income-security policy areas-including unemployment insurance, payroll taxes and the Earned Income Tax Credit, and child support enforcement-affect these men. The article concludes with policy recommendations to improve the impact of work-based subsidies on poverty among low-income men. Subsidized jobs in transitional job programs could play a critical role in helping these men access these subsidies.

When Work Doesn't Pay: What Every Policymaker Should Know

2006

This brief seeks to inform policymakers about the difficulties faced by low-income working parents as they strive to make progress in the workforce. Using data from NCCP's Family Resource Simulator, it highlights ways in which the current structure of work support policies often leads to unintended consequences. As low-wage workers increase their earnings above the federal poverty level, their families begin to lose eligibility for government work supports, such as earned income tax credits, childcare and food assistance, and public health insurance. Given that some of these benefits drop off quickly as wages increase, earning more does not always improve a family's financial bottom line.

The Job Prospects of U.S. Welfare Recipients: Lousier Pay but Bigger Earnings Supplements

The new law changed the nature, organization, and financing of a crucial part of the U.S. safety net. Under the old cash assistance program established in the 1930s, the federal government offered states open-ended grants for welfare benefits for needy children and their parents. States were obliged to match the federal dollars to get the grants, but federal spending had no fixed limit. States were free to define need, establish benefits, and determine eligibility as they saw fit, though the federal law required that families be eligible to receive assistance payments for as long as they remained poor and contained a dependent child under age 18. The 1996 law replaced aid to families with dependent children (AFDC) with a federal block grant called Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). While minor exceptions will be made for low-income states with fast-growing populations and states in recession, most states' TANF grants will be determined by their federal AFDC grants during the two or three years before the 1996 law was passed. The new law ends the individual entitlement to benefits. Under new state programs, poor children may no longer be automatically entitled to cash benefits. The 1996 law gives states more program flexibility in many areas, but it also imposes tough new federal requirements. In particular, each state must now ensure that a rising percentage of its adult aid recipients is engaged in approved work. The head of each family on welfare is required to work within two years after assistance payments begin. Work hours requirements are stringent, and states will face increasingly harsh penalties for failing to meet them. States will not be permitted to use the federal grant to pay for cash benefits that last longer than 60 months for a particular family. Although exceptions can be made for some hardship cases, Congress's clear intention is to limit benefits to the great majority of families to no more than five years. States may adopt even tighter

Work, Income, and Material Hardship after Welfare Reform

Journal of Consumer Affairs, 2000

for helpful comments, Barbara Ramsey for clerical assistance, and the M ichigan Family Independence Agency for their cooperation and consultation throughout this project. The opinions expressed are those of the authors exclusively.