The Awarding of Public Works in Italy: An Analysis of the Mechanisms for the Selection of Contractors (original) (raw)
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The EU Directive 93/37 defi ned the “third kind” of tender procedures, that a public commissioning body may use to select a fi gure that is responsible for “the realization, by whatever means, of a work corresponding to the requirements specifi ed by the contracting authority.”. Italy has interpreted in an original way this tender procedure, introducing (through law 443/2001) the role of “contraente generale”. The point is that the notion of “contraente generale” still remains controversial on the ground of international comparisons, especially in terms of risk allocation between public client and contractor. The paper presents some results of a study on the Italian “contraente generale” scheme, compared with the procurement models as identifi ed by the available international literature. In conclusion, some recommendations are made for the adaptation of the Italian legislation, allowing to improve its compatibility with the ppp model generally adopted in Europe.
Index: 1. Corruption, human rights and economic implications 2. International anti-corruption instruments. 3. French and Italian models compared. 4. US and UK models: The Common law approach. 5. Preventive anti-corruption measures in Europe. Private and Public ethics and compliance programs 6. Contract renegotiation and risk of corruption 7. Final remarks. 1. Corruption, Human Rights and Economic Implications. How to ensure integrity, accountability, and transparency of public authorities and economic operators across countries? A community of values is growing in the wider context of transnational and international bodies such as the OECD, the UN, and in single Member States, to promote a joint system against corruption, but it still needs clear means of actions. The lack of integrity and corruption affect human rights and the market, and are an issue in Public Procurement. Non-transparent economic interests supported by lobbies and conflicts of interests may influence the legislation, its implementation, competition and, ultimately, the economic growth and competiveness of the market itself.
Rules, Discretion, and Corruption in Procurement: Evidence from Italian Government Contracting
2020
The benefits of bureaucratic discretion depend on the extent to which it is used for public benefit versus exploited for private gain. We study the relationship between discretion and corruption in Italian government procurement auctions, using a confidential database of firms and procurement officials investigated for corruption by Italian enforcement authorities. Based on a regression discontinuity design around thresholds for discretion, we find that, overall, a large increase in the use of discretionary procedures in the 2000s led to a minimal increase in auctions won by investigated firms. To understand this 'non-result,' we further investigate the attributes of "corrupted" auctions. We show that discretionary procedure auctions are associated with corruption only when conducted with fewer than the formally required number of bidders; similarly, discretionary criteria ("scoring rule" rather than first price) auctions are won more often by investigated firms. We further show that these "corruptible" discretionary auctions are chosen more often by officials who are themselves investigated for corruption, but less often in procurement administrations in which at least one official is investigated for corruption. These findings fit with a framework in which more discretion leads to greater efficiency as well as more opportunities for theft, and a central monitor manages this trade-off by limiting discretion for high-corruption procedures and locales. Additional results based on two standard tools for curbing corruption-turnover and subcontracting limits-corroborate this interpretation. Overall, our results imply that discretion is under-utilized, given the high potential benefits as compared to the modest increment in corruption.
Corruption in Procurement Auctions
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
We review different kinds of corruption that have been observed in procurement auctions and categorize them. We discuss means to avoid corruption, by choice of preferable auction formats, or with the help of technological tools, such as secure electronic bidding systems. Auctions that involve some soft elements, such as complex bids consisting of technical and financial proposals, are particularly prone to corruption. We do not believe that it is possible to eradicate corruption altogether in such situations, but we discuss means to make it less likely. This is a preliminary version of a contribution to: Handbook of Procurement -Theory and Practice for Managers, Dimitri, Piga, and Spagnolo (eds.), Cambridge University Press, 2006 (forthcoming). * We would like to thank Gustavo Piga for his detailed comments and Giancarlo Casartelli for sharing his insight into modern procurement. Financial support was received by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), SFB Transregio 15, "Governance and Efficiency of Economic Systems".
2019
This study develops an original corruption risk indicator at the Italian procurement level – analysing Italian public infrastructures from 2007 to 2013 – and estimates the correlation between the profile of contract suppliers and the corruption risk indicator in question. The methodology builds on a three stage semi-parametric procedure and relies on a residual approach in which the unexplained part of an inefficiency equation provides the estimates of the potential risk of corruption. The results from an updated Italian public procurement dataset suggest that the risk of corruption prevails in larger urban, especially in Lazio, Tuscany and Lombardy. Then, a risk-based assessment exercise is performed to profile suppliers. The risk indicator is regressed on suppliers’ financial and ownership data to identify patterns among firms winning risky contracts. Suppliers associated with high levels of corruption risk in public contracting are more profit-seeking, hold low levels of debts an...