Shared perceptions: morality is embedded in social contexts (original) (raw)
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Current Opinion in Psychology, 2015
Morality indicates what is the 'right' and the 'wrong' way to behave. However, what people see as moral can shift, depending on defining norms and distinctive features of the groups to which they belong. Acting in ways that are considered 'moral' by the group secures inclusion and elicits respect from others who are important to the self. Morality is a central feature of group membership. This helps explain how moral considerations regulate the behavior of individuals in groups, and when this is likely to elicit conflicts with members of other groups. We show how people's internal moral compass is anchored by socially shared conceptions of morality, which determine behavioral choices of individuals living and working together in communities and organizations.
Stereotypic morality: The influence of group membership on moral foundations
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 2019
Today’s modern world affords many benefits, one of which is the ability to have near-instantaneous interactions with groups and cultures other than our own. Though advantageous in many situations, one challenge for these groups is navigating what they perceive to be right and wrong in a cooperative manner despite having different modes of morality. Moral foundations theory holds groups use the same moral foundations to guide their judgments and decision making, but there has been little research on how the perception of these foundations differs within and between groups. Thus, the current study examined how moral foundations operate from a group perspective and potential outgroup moderators of moral foundations. Participants rated the extent to which various groups used moral foundations in one of two conditions. Each condition contained an ingroup and three outgroups that conformed to the quadrants of the stereotype content model. Results showed significant differences in the harm...
Individual moral judgment and cultural ideologies
Developmental Psychology, 1999
Moral judgment cannot be reduced to cultural ideology, or vice versa. But when each construct is measured separately, then combined, the product predicts powerfully to moral thinking. In Study 1, 2 churches (N = 96) were selected for their differences on religious ideology, political identity, and moral judgment. By combining these 3 variables, a multiple correlation of .79 predicted to members' moral thinking (opinions on human rights issues). Study 2 replicated this finding in a secular sample, with the formula established in Study 1 (R = .11). Individual conceptual development in moral judgment and socialization into cultural ideology co-occur, simultaneously and reciprocally, in parallel, and not serially. Individual development in moral judgment provides the epistemological categories for cultural ideology, which in turn influences the course of moral judgment, to produce moral thinking (e.g., opinions about abortion, free speech).
Cultural conceptions of morality: Examining laypeople’s associations of moral character
Journal of Moral Education, 2014
Moral psychology is controversial regarding the question whether it is universal or culturally relative. One option is to refrain from imposing theoretical constraints in the assessment of morality, and instead to ask laypeople from different cultures how they conceptualize morality. Our paper is the first to adopt this approach by examining laypeople's associations of the moral person in individualistic-and collectivisticoriented cultures. Using correspondence analysis we found that the concept of the moral person yields associations with justice and welfare concerns that are widely shared. Yet, as expected, there were also clear cultural differences with individualistic-oriented samples associating more frequently rights-based attributes and collectivistic-oriented samples duty-based attributes. When matching the free-listed trait categories with Schwartz´ (1992) ten value types, the moral values hierarchy was very similar across cultures. Imposing constraints through expert-designed category systems may mask cultural differences and narrow the scope of inquiry to universal aspects of morality.
The role of social expectations in forming moral judgments
It is one of the hallmarks of moral values that they do not rely on the customs of a particular society or the conveniences of particular factions (Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987). Contrast this to conventional or other social norms which are fluid and adaptable to various situations. Yet, it appears that moral rules are not always treated as such1. People have different expectations of moral behavior depending on whom that behavior is directed toward. For example, avoiding full disclosure is immoral for a friend but not for a stranger (Baron & Haidt, 1996). And, people are sensitive to power relations when making culpability judgments (Hamilton and Saunders, 1981). The meaning of behavior changes depending on who it is directed toward. Whether you are a Republican or a Democrat, or from the high end of the social totem pole or the low end, affects how you view the world and also your definitions of what is right and wrong (Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993; Harkness, Edwards, Super, 1981).
This paper considers three current models of morality and social relations, how they inform each other, and their potential unification. Richard Shweder's tripartite theory of morality has a considerable following in moral development circles, while Jonathan Haidt and his collaborators have advanced a dualistic model of how people frame, understand, and discuss morality. These veins of research have already critically engaged and drawn from each other. I propose that Grid-Group Cultural Theory, initiated by Mary Douglas, draws on the strengths of these theories and offers a path toward further unification and greater theoretical holism based on fundamental commonalities between the three models. Cultural Theory offers a structure for framing Shweder and Haidt's models in a theory of social relations, while these models contribute a moral lexicon currently missing in Cultural Theory. Religious moral concerns are examined through the unified model and further research is proposed. To understand why people act as they do, we must first know what they value. As Blasi (1980) points out, theories of moral action must be anchored in a psychological account of morality. In their chapter on morality, Haidt and Kesebir (2010, p. 808) outline three types of moral psychology. The third type, social-functional moral psychology, shares Blasi's recognition and urges moral psychologists to consider how morality acts as a guide to successful human existence within and against larger social groups. This paper examines the principles that guide our moral compasses and the social actions resulting from those moral coordinates. The result is a testable framework of moral concepts tied to social actions built from leading theories of moral psychology. Richard Shweder, Jonathan Haidt, and their intellectual progeny have conducted important work developing psychological accounts of morality. Their groundbreaking work directly examines the moral principles people around the world share. What their theories lack, and what I argue Grid-Group Cultural Theory 1 ("CT") provides, is a social-relational framework within which these morals direct behavior. The purpose of framing Shweder, Haidt, and others' moral research within a clear framework of social action is to further anchor moral behavior within moral psychology theory.
Morality in Groups: On the Social-Regulatory Functions of Right and Wrong
Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 2012
Applying what we know about group-based identities and concerns allows us to improve our understanding of the ways in which morality is relevant to social judgments of right and wrong. We distinguish between three different social functions of moral standards and moral judgments. The identity defining function of morality indicates where people want to belong, and how they are regarded by others. The group dynamic function indicates consensual definitions of what is right and wrong that guide individual behavioral choices. The intergroup relations function of group morality, speaks to the way people tend to communicate with and behave towards members of other groups that have different moral standards.
How social relationships shape moral judgment
PsyArXiv, 2020
Our judgments of whether an action is morally wrong depend on who is involved and their relationship to one another. But how, when, and why do social relationships shape such judgments? Here we provide new theory and evidence to address this question. In a pre- registered study of U.S. participants (n = 423, nationally representative for age, race and gender), we show that particular social relationships (like those between romantic partners, housemates, or siblings) are normatively expected to serve distinct cooperative functions – including care, reciprocity, hierarchy, and mating – to different degrees. In a second pre- registered study (n = 1,320) we show that these relationship-specific norms, in turn, influence the severity of moral judgments concerning the wrongness of actions that violate cooperative expectations. These data provide evidence for a unifying theory of relational morality that makes highly precise out-of-sample predictions about specific patterns of moral judgments across relationships. Our findings show how the perceived morality of actions depends not only on the actions themselves, but also on the relational context in which those actions occur.