Kant’s philosophy of education. Between relational and systemic approaches (original) (raw)
Related papers
Kant's Account of Moral Education
Educational Philosophy and Theory, 2012
While Kant's pedagogical lectures present an account of moral education, his theory of freedom and morality seems to leave no room for the possibility of an education for freedom and morality. In this paper, it is first shown that Kant's moral philosophy and his educational philosophy are developed within different theoretical paradigms: whereas the former is situated within a transcendentalist framework, the latter relies on a teleological notion of human nature. The second part of this paper demonstrates that the core ideas of Kant's moral philosophy are also present in his pedagogy. This means that the problem of moral education must be solved within the transcendentalist framework. It is finally claimed that Kant himself outlines a solution to this problem in his pedagogical lectures.
Kant begins his Lectures on Pedagogy by stating, ‘[t]he human being is the only creature that must be educated’ (Kant, 2007, 9:441), and he argues that it is through education that we can transform our initial ‘animal nature into human nature’ (ibid. 2007, 9:441). Kant understands education as involving an ordered process of care, discipline, instruction and formation through enculturating, civilizing and moralizing (Formosa 2011). Further, Kant envisages that we should pursue as a species the ‘moral perfection’ that is the ‘final destiny of the human race’ through education (Collins, 1997, 27:470; see Dean, 2014). However, to engage in this pursuit Kant believes that, through education and social change, we have to regulate our ‘animal nature’ and counter the moral corruption of our species, which he calls the ‘radical innate evil in human nature (not any the less brought upon us by ourselves)’ (Kant, 1998, 6:32). If humanity is to pursue its final destiny of moral perfection, then education will need to respond responsibly to the propensity to evil that is deeply rooted in us as finite and imperfect rational beings living in imperfect and at times even in morally corrupted social conditions. In this way, Kant’s philosophy of education draws together several strands of his thought, including his discussions of virtue (from his moral philosophy), evil (from his account of religion), and moral progress (from his accounts of teleology, history and political philosophy).
Formosa, P., (2018) “Evil, Virtue, and Education in Kant”. Educational Philosophy and Theory
For Kant, we cannot understand how to approach moral education without confronting the radical evil of humanity. But if we start out, as Kant thinks we do, from a morally corrupt state, how can we make moral progress? In response, I explore in this paper Kant’s gradualist and revolutionary accounts of moral progress. These differing accounts of progress raise two key questions in the literature: are these accounts compatible and which type of progress comes first? Against other views in the literature, I argue that gradual progress through a change of mores must come first and can gradually lead toward, as its ideal endpoint, a revolution in our disposition (or a change of heart) and the overthrowing of our radical evil. This has important implications for moral pedagogy.
From Homo Educandus to Homo Aestheticus: Kant on Education.
The strength and weakness of the committed enlightenment of Professor Kant and his disciples lies in this surface paradox : in the kingdom of nature there is a being whose nature cannot be completely developed by nature, a being whose real nature is freedom, that is to say, a being which needs an ‘artifi cial’ or ‘artistic’ eff ort to unfold his nature. This species of being is mankind as constituting to itself its absolute beginning as well as its absolute end. The strength of this position consists in the ultimate synthetic unity tying nature and education through a certain naturalisation of freedom. As for its weakness, one can point out the ontological temptation of an aesthetic self-comprehension that seduces inevitably every free subject and encourages him to divide time and history, ‘to divide in order to rule’. In man, the development of nature is not reducible to generation, but it implies production. For man is not a natural given: he does not appear to himself as an originally ‘ready-made’ work of nature. Instead, he finds in himself nothing but the « natural readiness » (natürliche Fertigkeit) that has to be cultivated and exercised so that his natural organic system of virtual powers can convert into an organic unifi ed system of actual performances.
Moral Education as a Method in the Immanuel Kant Ethics Project 1
Respons-Jurnal Etika Sosial, 2016
Immanuel Kant's theory of education is clearly written in the Metaphysics of Morals, specifically the part about the "Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Virtue." The first principle of the doctrine of virtue, Kant developed what he called the Doctrine of the Method of Ethics which consists of two parts, namely, teaching and ethical Asceticism. According to Kant, ethics is a doctrine regarding moral obligations that are not derived from laws or regulations from outside. Obligation is not naturally ascribed, but the achievement of the subject's actions in accordance with reason and conscience. Following reason and one's conscience is a moral obligation and not a natural inclination. This is the reason why according to Kant moral virtue can be taught.
In this paper I argue that Kant develops, in a number of texts, a detailed three stage theory of moral development which resembles the contemporary accounts of moral development defended by Lawrence Kohlberg and John Rawls. The first stage in this process is that of physical education and disciplining, followed by cultivating and civilising, with a third and final stage of moralising. The outcome of this process of moral development is a fully autonomous person. However, Kant’s account of moral development appears to be in tension with other elements of his moral philosophy. I identify two such tensions, which I call the knowledge and revolution tensions, and show why these tensions are illusory. As such, a proper understanding of Kant’s theory of moral development, far from exposing genuine tensions, helps rather to deepen our understanding of Kant’s moral philosophy.
Kant on Cosmopolitanism and Education (Thesis Chapter 3)
2020
This chapter explores Immanuel Kant's works in detail, expanding on the narrow and partial approaches typically taken and which were discussed in the previous chapters. This examination re-presents his arguments on Cosmopolitanism as resting on five main overt themes that run through much of his writings; the importance of religion, human nature, reason, and education, and the danger of emotions, as well as a further two implicit themes: elitism and exclusion. These all combine together to form the structure that his cosmopolitan system relies upon. I approach this chapter with an under examined aspect of his work, religion (3.2), before moving on to his understanding of human nature (3.3) and the groupings that humans form (3.4). The final two sections explore his arguments on education, firstly of a formal kind (3.5), which has seen much exploration and critique (from the philosophical side at least), before examining the informal ways education works in Kant's political system.
Educational Philosophy and Theory
Kant argues that we have a duty to perfect ourselves morally and promote the happiness of others. He also argues that we have an innate propensity to evil. Our duty to perfect ourselves suggests that we struggle with our innate propensity to wilfully deviate from doing our duty. And we do this when we struggle against the depravation of our heart, namely our propensity to reverse 'the ethical order as regards the incentives of a free power of choice', namely, our propensity to wilfully comply with the principle of self-love and override the moral law. It seems, however, that education does not enable those concerned to fulfil their duties. It seems, instead, that education basically makes them efficacious with regard to desired ends and with the devised means. It seems, too, that education does not necessarily make it possible for those concerned with duty to perfect themselves morally and help others to do the same, which in turn suggests that those concerned are not being enabled to make themselves 'as conscientious as possible in [their] moral self-examination'. I argue that education ought to enable those concerned to cultivate their moral strength to do so and enable others to do the same.