Redoubtable sensor networks (original) (raw)
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IEEE ACM Transactions on Networking, 2016
We investigate the resiliency of wireless sensor networks against sensor capture attacks when the network uses the random pairwise key distribution scheme of Chan, Perrig and Song [3]. We present conditions on the model parameters so that the network is (i) unassailable, and (ii) unsplittable, both with high probability, as the number n of sensor nodes becomes large. Both notions are defined against an adversary who has unlimited computing resources and full knowledge of the network topology, but can only capture a negligible fraction o(n) of sensors. We also show that the number of cryptographic keys needed to ensure unassailability and unsplittability under the pairwise key predistribution scheme is an order of magnitude smaller than it is under the key predistribution scheme of Eschenauer and Gligor.
Connected Component in Secure Sensor NetworkInduced by a Random Key Pre-Distribution Scheme
International Journal of Machine Learning and Computing, 2011
Wireless sensor network (WSN) has a wide range of applications in various areas. Many time the environment in which these sensor were deployed are hostile in nature and sensors have continuous attacks from the adversary, in such environmental conditions we need a secure communication between the sensors. For secure communication, neighbors must posses a secret common key or there must exists a key-path among these nodes. In this paper, the object of study is a random graph induced by the random key pre-distribution scheme of Eschenauer and Gligor under the assumption of full visibility. Here we establish the threshold value of the parameters (Key pool size and key-ring of an individual node) for which the entire network is almost surely a single connected component. We prove that for a network having N nodes, is a single connected component almost surely, if size of the key-ring is m = √ 2 log N and the size of key pool is K = N log N.
On the Connectivity of Sensor Networks Under Random Pairwise Key Predistribution
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 2013
We investigate the connectivity of wireless sensor networks under the random pairwise key predistribution scheme of Chan et al. Under the assumption of full visibility, this reduces to studying the connectivity in the so-called random-out graph ; here, is the number of nodes and is an integer parameter affecting the number of keys stored at each node. We show that if (respectively,), the probability that is a connected graph approaches 1 (respectively, 0) as goes to infinity. For the one-law this is done by establishing an explicitly computable lower bound on the probability of connectivity. Using this bound, we see that with high probability, network connectivity can already be guaranteed (with) by a relatively small number of sensors. This corrects earlier predictions made on the basis of a heuristic transfer of connectivity results available for Erdős-Rényi graphs.
Random key predistribution schemes for sensor networks
Security and Privacy, 2003. …, 2003
Key establishment in sensor networks is a challenging problem because asymmetric key cryptosystems are unsuitable for use in resource constrained sensor nodes, and also because the nodes could be physically compromised by an adversary. We present three new mechanisms for key establishment using the framework of pre-distributing a random set of keys to each node. First, in the q-composite keys scheme, we trade off the unlikeliness of a large-scale network attack in order to significantly strengthen random key predistribution's strength against smaller-scale attacks. Second, in the multipath-reinforcement scheme, we show how to strengthen the security between any two nodes by leveraging the security of other links. Finally, we present the random-pairwise keys scheme, which perfectly preserves the secrecy of the rest of the network when any node is captured, and also enables node-to-node authentication and quorum-based revocation.
2014 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, 2014
To be considered for an IEEE Jack Keil Wolf ISIT Student Paper Award. We study the secure and reliable connectivity of wireless sensor networks. Security is assumed to be ensured by the random pairwise key predistribution scheme of Chan, Perrig, and Song, and unreliable wireless links are represented by independent on/off channels. Modeling the network by an intersection of a random K-out graph and an Erdős-Rényi graph, we present scaling conditions (on the number of nodes, the scheme parameter K, and the probability of a wireless channel being on) such that the resulting graph contains no nodes with degree less than k with high probability, when the number of nodes gets large. Results are given in the form of zero-one laws and are shown to improve the previous results by Yagan and Makowski on the absence of isolated nodes (i.e., absence of nodes with degree zero). Via simulations, the established zero-one laws are shown to hold also for the property of k-connectivity; i.e., the property that graph remains connected despite the deletion of any k − 1 nodes or edges.
Secure k-Connectivity Properties of Wireless Sensor Networks
2007
A k-connected wireless sensor network (WSN) allows messages to be routed via one (or more) of at least k nodedisjoint paths, so that even if some nodes along one of the paths fail, or are compromised, the other paths can still be used. This is a much desired feature in fault tolerance and security. k-connectivity in this context is largely a well-studied subject. When we apply the random key predistribution scheme to secure a WSN however, and only consider the paths consisting entirely of secure (encrypted and/or authenticated) links, we are concerned with the secure k-connectivity of the WSN. This notion of secure kconnectivity is relatively new and no results are yet available. The random key pre-distribution scheme has two important parameters: the key ring size and the key pool size. While it has been determined before the relation between these parameters and 1-connectivity, our work in kconnectivity is new. Using a recently introduced random graph model called kryptograph, we derive mathematical formulae to estimate the asymptotic probability of a WSN being securely k-connected, and the expected secure kconnectivity, as a function of the key ring size and the key pool size. Finally, our theoretical findings are supported by simulation results.
Designing secure and reliable wireless sensor networks under a pairwise key predistribution scheme
2015 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC), 2015
We investigate k-connectivity in secure wireless sensor networks under the random pairwise key predistribution scheme with unreliable links; a network is said to be k-connected if it remains connected despite the failure of any of its (k−1) nodes or links. With wireless communication links modeled as independent on-off channels, this amounts to analyzing a random graph model formed by intersecting a random K-out graph and an Erdős-Rényi graph. We present conditions on how to scale the parameters of this intersection model so that the resulting graph is k-connected with probability approaching to one (resp. zero) as the number of nodes gets large. The resulting zero-one law is shown to improve and sharpen the previous result on the 1-connectivity of the same model. We also provide numerical results to support our analysis and show that even in the finite node regime, our results can provide useful guidelines for designing sensor networks that are secure and reliable.
Attack-Resilient Random Key Distribution Scheme for Distributed Sensor Networks
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Key pre-distribution schemes are a favored solution for establishing secure communication in sensor networks. Often viewed as the safest way to bootstrap trust, the main drawback is seen to be the large storage overhead imposed on resource-constrained devices and also these schemes are quite insecure because pre-loading global secrets onto exposed devices strengthens the incentive for attackers to compromise nodes. To overcome these drawback, we propose a new key predistribution scheme for pairwise key setup in sensor networks. In our scheme each sensor node is assigned with small number of randomly selected generation keys instead of storing big number of random keys and a shared secrete key can be efficiently computed from it. After generating the keys with neighbors the initial keys rings are being deleted from nodes memory. The analysis of our approach shows that it improves the previous random key pre-distribution schemes by providing the more resiliency against node capture and collusion attacks. Even if a node being compromised, an adversary can only exploit a small number of keys nearby the compromised node, while other keys in the network remain safe.
Designing Securely Connected Wireless Sensor Networks in the Presence of Unreliable Links
2011 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC), 2011
We investigate the secure connectivity of wireless sensor networks under the pairwise key distribution scheme of Chan et al.. Unlike recent work which was carried out under the assumption of full visibility, here we assume a (simplified) communication model where unreliable wireless links are represented as on/off channels. We present conditions on how to scale the model parameters so that the network i) has no isolated secure node and ii) is securely connected, both with high probability when the number of sensor nodes becomes large. The results are given in the form of zero-one laws, and exhibit significant differences with corresponding results in the full visibility case.
Connectivity results for sensor networks under a random pairwise key predistribution scheme
2012
We investigate the connectivity of wireless sensor networks under the random pairwise key predistribution scheme of Chan et al. Under the assumption of full visibility, this reduces to studying connectivity in the socalled random K-out graph H(n; K); here n is the number of nodes and K < n is an integer parameter affecting the number of keys stored at each node. We show that if K ≥ 2 (resp. K = 1), the probability that H(n; K) is a connected graph approaches 1 (resp. 0) as n goes to infinity. This is done by establishing an explicitly computable lower bound on the probability of connectivity. From this bound we conclude that with K ≥ 2, the connectivity of the network can already be guaranteed by a relatively small number of sensors with very high probability. This corrects an earlier analysis based on a heuristic transfer of classical connectivity results for Erdős-Rényi graphs.