Neuroscience and Theoretical Psychology (original) (raw)
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Neuroscience and Theoretical Psychology: What's to Worry About?
Theory & Psychology, 2007
This paper explores three connected claims about the interrelation of psychology and neuroscience that occur in discussions within theoretical psychology. The first and second claims are that neuroscience cannot offer a complete account of human psychology because it can show only correlations between neural events and cognitive or behavioral events. The third claim is that neuroscience ultimately is incomplete or irrelevant to psychological accounts since it is silent on crucial cultural and historical issues relevant to human knowledge and action. We argue that all of these claims are false, not because neuroscience can replace psychology, but because each discipline should be seen to complement and support the other.
In an intellectual atmosphere still marked by the ideological failures of the twentieth century, the expectations for neuroscience are extremely high, even in fields traditionally sheltered from the seductions of neurobiological explanations, such as political theory, sociology and philosophy. In an attempt to problematize the reception that this neuroscientific vocabulary has received, I provide in this article a cartography of three major lines of philosophical criticism of neuroscience – ‘conceptual’, ‘societal’ and ‘embodied-enactive’ – put forward recently by philosophers of different intellectual traditions. Although these criticisms are important in shedding light on some epistemological inconsistencies of the neuroscientific programme, the need remains to supplement this philosophical work with a different kind of critique, one that could address more directly the social and political relevance of neuroscience as well understand our epoch's urge to ‘turn neurobiological’ previously cultural or sociological phenomena.
Cognitive psychology does not reduce to neuroscience
cogsci.mq.edu.au
Contemporary scientific investigations of the mind have increasingly looked towards the brain in order to explain intelligent behavior. This is most evident with the rise of cognitive neuro-imaging. This approach has, however, been met with mixed reactions. On the one hand, classical cognitive scientists-in the computationalist-functionalist tradition-have argued that cognitive neuro-imaging does not, and cannot, answer questions about the cognitive mechanisms that are responsible for creating intelligent behavior; it is limited to questions about neural function or the neural basis of cognition. On the other hand, there are those who argue that an understanding of intelligent behavior can only be gained through study of the brain. We suggest that both views are misguided. We will present a third option: That neuroscience, properly used, can be employed in the development of cognitive theory, but that cognitive science does not reduce to neuroscience, because intelligent behavior can only be understood by studying how the brain interacts with the body and the brain-body with the environment.
The Philosophy of Neuroscience
Over the past three decades, philosophy of science has grown increasingly "local." Concerns have switched from general features of scientific practice to concepts, issues, and puzzles specific to particular disciplines. Philosophy of neuroscience is a natural result. This emerging area was also spurred by remarkable recent growth in the neurosciences. Cognitive and computational neuroscience continues to encroach upon issues traditionally addressed within the humanities, including the nature of consciousness, action, knowledge, and normativity. Empirical discoveries about brain structure and function suggest ways that "naturalistic" programs might develop in detail, beyond the abstract philosophical considerations in their favor. The literature distinguishes "philosophy of neuroscience" and "neurophilosophy." The former concerns foundational issues within the neurosciences. The latter concerns application of neuroscientific concepts to traditional philosophical questions. Exploring various concepts of representation employed in neuroscientific theories is an example of the former. Examining implications of neurological syndromes for the concept of a unified self is an example of the latter. In this entry, we will assume this distinction and discuss examples of both.
There is a long-standing debate in the philosophy of science regarding how best to interpret the relationship between neuroscience and psychology. It has traditionally been argued that either the two domains will evolve and change over time until they converge on a single unified account of human behaviour, or else that they will continue to work in isolation given that they identify properties and states that exist autonomously from one another (due to the multiple-realizability of psychological states). In this paper, I argue that progress in psychology and neuroscience is contingent on the fact that both of these positions are false. Contra the convergence position, I argue that the theories of psychology and the theories of neuroscience are scientifically valuable as representational tools precisely because they cannot be integrated into a single account. However, contra the autonomy position, I propose that the theories of psychology and neuroscience are deeply dependent on one another for further refinement and improvement. In this respect, there is an irreconcilable codependence between psychology and neuroscience that is necessary for both domains to improve and progress. The two domains are forever linked while simultaneously being unable to integrate.
Philosophical foundations of neuroscience
2003
In this tome of wide ranging scope the authors continue to be interested in the philosophical analysis of non-philosophical disciplines. Some of the topics discussed technically in Max Bennett's 1997 book The idea of consciousness are now philosophically situated. For Peter Hacker, the present volume is the second comprehensive critique of a whole field of inquiry, after Language, sense and nonsense published in 1985 with Gordon Baker. Two decades ago intellectual opportunism was seen as pervasive in the modern theories of language; today transgressions of the bounds of sense are found to be ubiquitous in the theories of mind inspired by neuroscience.