Consciousness and the natural method (original) (raw)
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A biological account of consciousness
Recent studies of cognition had put forward a number of hypotheses about the nature of consciousness, regarded now as being the central phenomenon in the relationship between the mind and the world. Theories put forward by Edelman, Baars, Rosenfield, Dennett, Varela and others emerged simultaneously with a common idea: in order for us to acquire a better understanding of cognition, a biological and psychological approach to consciousness is not only possible but necessary. In this dissertation I will examine two of these hypotheses and argue that the relationship between them can provide a mechanistic and biological account of how our brains generate mental content. In the first part of my dissertation I will discuss a naturalistic approach to consciousness, arguing that at the present moment, considering this phenomenon an empirical construct is our best alternative. In the second part of the present work I will analyse the way in which some key aspects of the two theories are supported by experimental evidence and what are the problems encountered. In the last part I will argue in favour of the idea that the relationship between the two theories can offer us a better understanding of consciousness and dispose of several problems articulated by philosophers of mind like subjectivity and phenomenal experience, or qualia.
Evolutionary Explanation and Consciousness
Journal article by Steven Horst; Journal of Psychology …, 2002
If there is a received orthodoxy in contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science, it is that all features of the mind, including meaning, action, and consciousness, can and perhaps must be naturalized (ie, accommodated within the framework of the world of nature as ...
The evolution of consciousness
There have been various attempts to apply Darwinian evolutionary theory to an understanding of the human condition within psychology and the social sciences. This paper evaluates whether Darwinian Theory can explain human consciousness. Starting with a brief definition of phenomenal consciousness and the central features of evolutionary theory, the paper examines whether random variations in the genome that confer a selective, reproductive advantage can explain both the emergence of consciousness and its varied forms. To inform the discussion, the paper reviews what is known about the conditions for consciousness within the human mind/brain, understood in both structural (neural) terms and functional terms (in terms of human information processing), and concludes that " random variations in the genome " provide no explanatory mechanism for why some neural activities (but not others) are accompanied by consciousness. The paper then evaluates the many functional advantages that have been proposed for various forms of phenomenal consciousness once they emerge, and concludes that, on close examination, phenomenal experiences themselves do not carry out the information processing functions attributed to them, which challenges the Darwinian requirement that they could only have persisted (once emergent) it they enhanced reproductive fitness. The paper turns finally to what can be said about wider distribution of consciousness in non-humans, contrasting discontinuity theories with continuity theories. Discontinuity theories argue for a critical functional transition that " switches on consciousness " while continuity theories argue for a gradual transition in consciousness from unrecognisable to recognisable. All theories accept that there is an intimate, natural relationship of conscious experiences with their associated material forms. Consequently, as the material forms evolve, their associated experiences co-evolve—suggesting an indirect mechanism by which the emergence of species-specific forms of consciousness can be influenced by Darwinian evolution. It also allows a non-reductive understanding of human consciousness within the social sciences.
Natural Evolution and Human Consciousness
A visual conscious experience is my empirical basis. All that we know comes to us through conscious experiences. Thanks to natural evolution, we have nearly direct perception, and can largely trust the information we attain. There is full integration, with no gaps, of organisms in the continuous world. Human conscious experiences, on the other hand, are discrete. Consciousness has certain limits for its resolution. This is illustrated by the so-called light-cone, with consequences for foundations in physics. Traditional universals are replaced by feels and distributions. Conscious experiences can be ordered within a framework of conceptual spaces. Triple Aspect Monism (TAM) can represent the dynamics of conscious systems. However, to fully represent the creative power of human consciousness, an all-inclusive view is suggested: Multi Aspect Monism (MAM).
The evolution and development of consciousness: the subject-object emergence hypothesis
Biosystems, 2022
A strategy for investigating consciousness that has proven very productive has focused on comparing brain processes that are accompanied by consciousness with processes that are not. But comparatively little attention has been given to a related strategy that promises to be even more fertile. This strategy exploits the fact that as individuals develop, new classes of brain processes can transition from operating 'in the dark' to becoming conscious. It has been suggested that these transitions occur when a new class of brain processes becomes object to a new, emergent, higher-level subject. Similar transitions are likely to have occurred during evolution. An evolutionary/developmental research strategy sets out to identify the nature of the transitions in brain processes that shift them from operating in the dark to 'lighting up'. The paper begins the application of this strategy by extrapolating the sequence of transitions back towards its origin. The goal is to reconstruct a minimally-complex, subject-object subsystem that would be capable of giving rise to consciousness and providing adaptive benefits. By focusing on reconstructing a subsystem that is simple and understandable, this approach avoids the homunculus fallacy. The reconstruction suggests that the emergence of such a minimally-complex subsystem was driven by its capacity to coordinate body-environment interactions in real time e.g. hand-eye coordination. Conscious processing emerged initially because of its central role in organising real-time sensorimotor coordination. The paper goes on to identify and examine a number of subsequent major transitions in consciousness, including the emergence of capacities for conscious mental modelling. Each transition is driven by its potential to solve adaptive challenges that cannot be overcome at lower levels. The paper argues that mental modelling arose out of a pre-existing capacity to use simulations of motor actions to anticipate the consequences of the actions. As the capacity developed, elements of the simulations could be changed, and the consequences of these changes could be 'thought through' consciously. This enabled alternative motor responses to be evaluated. The paper goes on to predict significant new major transitions in consciousness.
On the evolution of phenomenal consciousness
Arxiv preprint arXiv:1108.4296, 2011
A number of concepts are included in the term "consciousness". We choose to concentrate here on phenomenal consciousness, the process through which we are able to experience aspects of our environment or of our physical state. We probably share this aspect of consciousness with many animals which, like us, feel pain or pleasure and experience colours, sounds, flavours, etc. Since phenomenal consciousness is a feature of some living species, we should be able to account for it in terms of natural selection. Does it have an adaptive function, or is it an epiphenomenon ? We shall give arguments to reject the second alternative. We propose that phenomenal properties of consciousness are involved in a labelling process that allows us to discriminate and to evaluate mental representations. We also discuss to what extent consciousness as such has been selected for this labelling function. Le terme de "conscience" recouvre plusieurs concepts. Nous parlons ici de conscience phénoménale, cet ensemble de processus par lesquels nous avons une expérience de certains aspects de notre environnement et de notre état physiologique. Nous partageons probablement cet aspect de la conscience avec de nombreuses espèces animales qui, comme nous, ressentent de la douleur et du plaisir, et font l'expérience des couleurs, des sons, des odeurs, etc. Comme la conscience phénoménale est une caractéristique de beaucoup d'espèces vivantes, nous devons l'expliquer en invoquant la sélection naturelle. A-t-elle une fonction adaptative, ou estelle un simple épiphénomène ? Nous donnons des arguments en faveur de la première option. Nous suggérons le fait que les propriétés phénoménales de la conscience sont impliquées dans un processus d'étiquetage qui nous permet de discriminer et d'évaluer les représentations mentales. Nous discutons ensuite l'hypothèse selon laquelle la conscience en tant que telle aurait été sélectionnée pour cette fonction d'étiquetage.
The development of consciousness from an evolutionary perspective
Different interpretations of the concept of consciousness and its function in the phylogeny of our species are discussed. The prerequisites of consciousness are investigated, along with its development starting from the simplest of organisms, through great apes, to the modern human.
2014
What is consciousness? The conference is about consciousness, one of the most fascinating but also most problematic phenomena studied by contemporary empirical science. While be attractive enough for philosophers to produce an endless stream of hot debates, empirical scientists have long hesitated or refused to consider consciousness a valid or fruitful scientific problem. Even worse, many people would be happy to see the workings of the human mind not being explained away, because it touches so fundamentally the way we see ourselves in the universe, shaking the hope for our own personal survival, which many see very much in terms of the continuity of their own consciousness. All that may end up in curiously sardonic definitions of consciousness, like “Consciousness is a fascinating but elusive phenomenon; it is impossible to specify what it is, what it does, or why it evolved. Nothing worth reading has been written about it ” (Sutherland 1989), or, even more cynical, “Nobody has th...
On the function of consciousness - an adaptationist perspective
Consciousness has become one of the most abounding issues in cognitive science. Scientists from disciplines as various as engineering, philosophy, psychology, biology, neurology, quantum physics, physiology, linguistics, and anthropology have contributed to the debate on consciousness. Still it remains the most puzzling topic in cognitive science. For the sake of clarity and economy, the present essay will try to address only one of the important or hard problems of consciousness. Among these questions I have chosen to discuss that of the function or purpose of consciousness: What is consciousness good for?
A Natural Science Approach to Consciousness
Journal of Integrative Neuroscience, 2010
We begin with premises about natural science, its fundamental protocols and its limitations. With those in mind, we construct alternative descriptive models of consciousness, each comprising a synthesis of recent literature in cognitive science. Presuming that consciousness arose through natural selection, we eliminate the subset of alternatives that lack selectable physical phenotypes, leaving the subset with limited free will (mostly in the form of free won't). We argue that membership in this subset implies a two-way exchange of energy between the conscious mental realm and the physical realm of the brain. We propose an analogy between the mental and physical phases of energy and the phases (e.g., gas/liquid) of matter, and a possible realization in the form of a generic resonator. As candidate undergirdings of such a system, we propose astroglial-pyramidal cell and electromagnetic-field models. Finally, we consider the problem of identification of the presence of consciousness in other beings or in machines.