Myopic Distributed Protocols for Singleton and Independent-Resource Congestion Games (original) (raw)
2008, Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Let n atomic players be routing their unsplitable flow on m resources. When each player has the option to drop her current resource and select a better one, and this option is exercised sequentially and unilaterally, then a Nash Equilibrium (NE) will be eventually reached. Acting sequentially, however, is unrealistic in large systems. But, allowing concurrency, with an arbitrary number of players updating their resources at each time point, leads to an oscillation away from NE, due to big groups of players moving simultaneously and due to nonsmooth resource cost functions. In this work, we validate experimentally simple concurrent protocols that are realistic, distributed and myopic yet are scalable, require only information local at each resource and, still, are experimentally shown to quickly reach a NE for a range of arbitrary cost functions.
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