Hyde, M., Dixon, J. and Drover, G. (2006) The Privatization of Mandatory Retirement Income Protection: International Perspectives, Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 400 pages. (original) (raw)
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Poverty & Public Policy, 2018
This article argues that based on Chile's 38‐year experience with a privately administered, fully funded, defined contribution system, the adoption of this kind of approach in the United States will be very damaging. We argue that this policy will be especially harmful to low‐income groups, to women, to both racial and gender minorities, and to those who have part‐time employment or find themselves in and out of the labor market. Additionally, this kind of policy does not solve the financial problems of the Social Security system. In fact, transferring either the entire, or a part of the payroll tax to private accounts will add a new burden to the fiscal coffers via transition costs, as fiscal receipts will diminish and the obligation to pay pensions to old and new retirees will continue. From the standpoint of the insured and potential retiree, the cost of administering the retirement accounts will increase, but there is no certainty that the benefits will increase due to the u...
Social Security In Theory and Practice (I): Facts and Political Theories
NBER working paper, 1999
166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forces create and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? We document some of the internationally and historically common features of Social Security programs including explicit and implicit taxes on labor supply, payas-you-go features, intergenerational redistribution, benefits which are increasing functions of lifetime earnings and not means-tested. We partition theories of Social Security into three groups: "political", "efficiency" and "narrative" theories. We explore three political theories in this paper: the majority rational voting model (with its two versions: "the elderly as the leaders of a winning coalition with the poor" and the "once and for all election" model), the "time-intensive model of political competition" and the "taxpayer protection model". Each of the explanations is compared with the international and historical facts. A companion paper explores the "efficiency" and "narrative" theories, and derives implications of all the theories for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan.
Social Protection and Economic Integration: The Politics of Pension Reform in an Era of Capital …
In the past two decades of the 20th century, governments around the world began to apportion greater responsibility for old-age income provision to individuals and market forces through the privatization of pension systems. This article examines the political and economic foundations of the turn to private pension systems through a quantitative analysis of 57 countries around the world. I offer a causal model to explain the likelihood and degree of pension privatization based on the unique incentives and constraints created by domestic political and economic structures in each country. I show that the likelihood and degree of structural pension reform are shaped by the cost of the existing pension system, political party structures, domestic investment and debt levels, and geopolitical networks.
Social Protection and Economic Integration: The Politics of Pension Reform in an Era of Capital …
In the past two decades of the 20th century, governments around the world began to apportion greater responsibility for old-age income provision to individuals and market forces through the privatization of pension systems. This article examines the political and economic foundations of the turn to private pension systems through a quantitative analysis of 57 countries around the world. I offer a causal model to explain the likelihood and degree of pension privatization based on the unique incentives and constraints created by domestic political and economic structures in each country. I show that the likelihood and degree of structural pension reform are shaped by the cost of the existing pension system, political party structures, domestic investment and debt levels, and geopolitical networks.