“The Family as a Basic Institution”: A Feminist Analysis of the Basic Structure as Subject (original) (raw)
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In this essay I will argue that John Rawls' theory of justice has the potential to accommodate feminist demands for justice, given appropriate modification. We need not reject Rawls' theory, instead we ought to consider its deficiencies and how to correct for them. At the heart of Rawls' theory lies a powerful tool for effectuating critical analysis of traditions, institutions, and forms of structural disadvantage – the original position. The feminist demands for justice can be met when we re-purpose this tool for their ends. To demonstrate the potential of Rawls' theory I will first outline his account given in A Theory of Justice. I will then turn to the work of Susan Moller Okin to highlight several deficiencies of Rawls' account relating to his treatment of family and gender.
Rawls, Justice in the Family and Justice of the Family
The Philosophical Quarterly, 1998
A form of contractualism more individualistic than Rawls' would do better at addressing concerns about justice and the family raised by feminist theorists, and would also compel us to be more egalitarian. That is, dissatisfactions expressed with Rawls' theory and his neglect of issues related to gender and the family can only be addressed if 'parties in the original position' are strictly defined as individuals. Provided no ties of sentiments between family members are assumed in the original position, individuals in it are able to address questions of justice within families, and also inequalities between members of different families. In the following essay I shall defend this view. This will entail examining the equivocal place the family occupies in Rawls' theory. 1 Why take Rawls to task on the family, though? At first sight, the themes of justice in and of the family-the former concerning the division of labour and, more generally, the application of principles of rights and justice within this institution, the latter concerning the less familiar question of whether the family should exist from the point of view of justice, and which form, or forms, if any, it would take-may seem only two among a number of themes that Rawls refuses to explore in depth. Other important questions which his account of justice leaves almost entirely aside are justice between states, protection of the environment, civic education, retributive justice, the needs of the handicapped, democracy in the workplace and women's equality. A number of Rawls' critics have found his conception of justice defective precisely because he fails to address some or all of these questions. He does provide a form of answer to these critics by saying that his conception of justice is 'worked up by focusing on a few long-standing classical problems' and should 'provide guidelines for addressing further questions' (PL p. xxix).
John Rawls, Justice in and Justice of the Family
1998
A form of contractualism more individualistic than Rawls' would do better at addressing concerns about justice and the family raised by feminist theorists, and would also compel us to be more egalitarian. That is, dissatisfactions expressed with Rawls' theory and his neglect of issues related to gender and the family can only be addressed if 'parties in the original position' are strictly defined as individuals. Provided no ties of sentiments between family members are assumed in the original position, individuals in it are able to address questions of justice within families, and also inequalities between members of different families. In the following essay I shall defend this view. This will entail examining the equivocal place the family occupies in Rawls' theory. 1 Why take Rawls to task on the family, though? At first sight, the themes of justice in and of the family-the former concerning the division of labour and, more generally, the application of principles of rights and justice within this institution, the latter concerning the less familiar question of whether the family should exist from the point of view of justice, and which form, or forms, if any, it would take-may seem only two among a number of themes that Rawls refuses to explore in depth. Other important questions which his account of justice leaves almost entirely aside are justice between states, protection of the environment, civic education, retributive justice, the needs of the handicapped, democracy in the workplace and women's equality. A number of Rawls' critics have found his conception of justice defective precisely because he fails to address some or all of these questions. He does provide a form of answer to these critics by saying that his conception of justice is 'worked up by focusing on a few long-standing classical problems' and should 'provide guidelines for addressing further questions' (PL p. xxix).
Rawls’s Original Position: The Question of Gender-Inequality
isara solutions, 2019
This paper is an attempt to examine John Rawls’s works A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism from a gendered perspective. His theory of justice and political conception of justice have been very influential in the contemporary social and political discourses. However, I found his principles of justice and the notion of original position to be inadequate in doing justice to the question of gender inequality. In this paper I will also assess Susan Okin’s account of Rawls’s position.
Rawls, Political Liberalism, and the Family
British Journal of American Legal Studies, 2014
Abstract: Responding to an article in a previous issue of the journal on the impermissibility of same-sex marriage, this reply corrects a misinterpretation of Rawls’s understanding of political liberalism and a misdirected complaint against the jurisprudence of the U.S. federal courts on civil marriage and other matters. In correcting these interpretations, I demonstrate that a publically reasonable case for same-sex civil marriage is conceivable in line with political liberalism. I conclude the reply by arguing that, although the same-sex civil marriage issue is likely to be a matter of controversy for some time in western societies, a proper understanding of the theoretical issues at stake may contribute to a partial de-escalation of the ‘culture wars’ currently surrounding the issue.
Rawls, Political Liberalism, and the Family: A Reply to Matthew B. O'Brien
2014
Responding to an article in a previous issue from Matthew B. O'Brien on the impermissibility of same-sex marriage, this reply corrects a misinterpretation of Rawls's understanding of political liberalism and a misdirected complaint against the jurisprudence of the U.S. federal courts on civil marriage and other matters. In correcting these interpretations, I seek to demonstrate that a publicly reasonable case for same-sex civil marriage is conceivable in line with political liberalism. I conclude the article by arguing that, although the same-sex civil marriage issue is likely to be a matter of controversy for some time in western societies, a proper understanding of the theoretical issues at stake may contribute to a partial de-escalation of the 'culture wars' currently surrounding the issue.
The effect of social construction of Gender on Rawls-Feminists debates
The problem of essay is to show the social construction, how it works and why it should be reshaped. Thus, here will be considered the question of social construction as a fact, questions whether constructs are to be good or bad, and give the example of gender as construct and deeply implicated ideology. This problem is reflected on higher political discussion which is represented by Rawls and Feminists. Rawls is developing social contract idea which is criticized by Feminists equipped with social construction idea, especially gender and family. This essay will conclude that feminists have a point when argue for reshaping the system which will be broader and deeper; the system which will be suitable for people but not only for masculine gender.