Theodor Adorno's Transformed Subjectivity: Correcting the Habermasian Turn in the Critical Theory of Society (original) (raw)

Since the initial work began on this paper a substantial shift has taken place in its theoretical focus. This shift, which can be considered a furthering of the initial critique offered in the abstract, came about because of continued research, writing, and reflection. There are good reasons for rethinking the meaning of subjectivity. Stemming largely from German Idealism, the philosophy of consciousness or subjectivism, to which Adorno's theoretical work has been consistently and unfairly categorized as, has been replaced by the paradigm of intersubjectivity which is based on communicative rationality. The rational and subsequent completeness of this shift has often been characterized as a theoretical necessity, with the hoped for consequence of ensuring that theories of the social are able to proceed beyond the confines of idealism, structuralism, poststructuralism, positivism and even early critical theory, particularly Adorno's brand of critical theory. Despite the question of whether or not such a complete paradigm shift was necessary, the fact remains that it has occurred. One consequence of this shift has been the reception and treatment of Adorno's work, which seems to sway between either the outright dismissal of his theoretical legacy, or its division and separation with the aim of adapting it to current contexts. This has resulted in a popular and persistent interpretation of Adorno's work that centers on the notion that, in its original form, it can offer no further contribution to political practice or to the project of emancipation. This shift can be summarized by what we call here "primitive terms," specifically: subjectivity, aesthetics, mimesis, self-reflection, the social, truth and freedom.