Patents and patent policy (original) (raw)

International patent protection: 1960–2005

Research Policy, 2008

This note provides an update to the index of patent protection published in this journal in 1997. The original paper presented the index for 1960-1990 for 110 countries. The index has now been updated to 2005 and extended to 122 countries. The adoption of stronger patent laws and the composition of patent rights vary across countries by level of economic development.

Notes on patents, distortions, and development

Policy Research Working Paper Series, 1990

What are the economics of patents? What problems arise in implementing a patent system? How much do distortions in developing countries affect the benefits and costs of a patent system? And what are the policies that would increase the likelihood of patents benefiting a developing country? The Policy, Planning, and Research Complex disuibutes PPR Working Papers to disseminate the findings of work in progress and to cncourage the exchange of ideas among Bank staff and all othes interested in development issues. Tese papers carry the names of the authors, reflect only their views, and should be used and cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions am the authorsown. They should not beattributed to the World Bank, its Board of Dirctors, its management, oranyof its membercountries.

On Aiding Technological Development: The Max Planck Declaration on Patent Protection

2015

The Declaration on Patent Protection is a welcome addition to the Max Planck Institute’s work on the flexibilities available under the TRIPS Agreement. Like the previously published Copyright Declaration, it improves on the WTO’s interpretations of the three-part open-ended exceptions provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. Furthermore, it attempts to clarify the other regulatory options that are retained under TRIPS. Here, we contend, the Declaration makes three mistakes. First, its aggressive interpretations of certain provisions undermine its credibility, making it a less useful resource than a document prepared by such notable scholars might be. Second, the options, if adopted in toto, would significantly undermine incentives to invent. Yet the Declaration does not provide guidance on which options a state that is intent on encouraging innovation should adopt. Third, the Declaration’s focus on the provisions in TRIPS that maintain sovereign regulatory authority misses the Agreement’s...

10. Patent regimes and the application process

Oxford University Press eBooks, 2019

This chapter assesses the rationales and justifications commonly seen for and against patents, which inform all aspects of patent law. Against this backdrop, the chapter explains the architecture and procedures of contemporary patent systems as they operate in the UK, within the European patent system, and through international agreements, instruments, and procedures. The chapter considers the patent registration process in the UK. Unlike copyright-and like registered trade marks and registered designs-patent protection is a registered right, granted by an intellectual property office following an application and examination process. The chapter also reviews changes over time and areas of particular debate and possible future evolution.

Functions and Limits of Patent Law

2009

Patents are a key element of our knowledge based economy. They are meant to operate as an instrument for fostering innovation by generating incentives through the grant of temporary exclusive rights. The present paper starts by describing some major trends in patent law and practice and throws some light on the concerns to which modern patent law gives rise: extension of patentable subject matter, growing attention for patent quality, appearance of patent thickets and restrictive licensing practices, emergence of governance issues such as the North-South divide, increasing influence of “epistemic communities�?, as well as an enlarged role of ethics and of human rights. Some of these trends have led to serious concerns with regard to current patent law and practice and urged competent authorities to launch a patent reform debate (Chapter 1). In aiming at a better comprehension of these trends and concerns, an analytical model has been deployed revolving around the objectives and func...

The economics of patents: from natural rights to policy instruments

2013

This paper uses latest advances in economic research for examining recent changes in patent regimes aimed at strengthening patent protection, and beyond that, for rethinking the rationale of the patent system. Considering that economic theory does not regard patents as a natural right that should be systematically granted to inventors, but as a policy instrument aimed at fostering innovation and diffusion, three major implications can be drawn from economic theory regarding current policy debates. First, patents may not be the most effective means of protection for inventors to recover R&D investments when imitation is costly and first mover advantages are important. Moreover, they may do more bad than good to innovation if innovation is cumulative and first generation inventions are essential to develop further inventions, especially when patent protection is strong. Patents should not be seen as the solution by default, notably as regards new areas of patentability such as software, business methods and genetic inventions. Second, patentability requirements, such as novelty or non-obviousness, should be sufficiently stringent to avoid the grant of patents for inventions with low social value that increase the social cost of the patent system. Third, rather than the statutory patent life, what matters is the effective life of patents: the broader is a patent the longer is its effective life. Policy instruments affecting patent breadth (e.g. extra fee for independent claims above a certain threshold) and length (e.g. renewal fees) could be used to provide long effective lives to inventions with high social value. Beyond these currently debated issues, economic theory pleads for an in-depth reshuffling of the patent system. If the system were to be radically changed, an optimal patent policy could be based on a multidimensional menu of different degrees of patent protection associated to different patent fees, where stronger protection would correspond to higher fees. Patents could be transformed into self-selection mechanisms whereby patentees reveal the economic characteristics of their inventions, compensate society for the protection they are granted and obtain sufficient incentives to innovate.