Northern Ireland: From Multiphased Conflict to Multilevelled Settlement (original) (raw)

Northern Ireland: A Multi-Phased History of Conflict, a Multi-Levelled Process of Settlement

Jennifer.todd@ucd.ie 7667ww 1 This paper borrows freely in arguments and occasionally in text from a much longer joint workin its final stages of completion -on the conflict and settlement processes in Northern Ireland co-authored with Joseph Ruane. The analysis of the settlement process is informed by as yet unattributable interviews and witness seminars with politicians and officials, made possible by the IRCHSS funded project, Breaking Patterns of Conflict, undertaken with John Coakley and Christopher Farrington.

THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT

2000

This paper argues that until the early twenty-first century the Northern Ireland conflict retained an unstable triangular form (the legacy of the long-past colonial period), where the British state was inextricably imbricated in a communal conflict. By its very structures and modes of statecraft it reproduced the conflict which, by its policies, it attempted to ameliorate and manage. The Good Friday agreement changed all that. It did not resolve the conflict, although it began to create the conditions whereby this might be possible, allowing the British state to reposition itself, so that it could arbiter those aspects of the conflict which were internal and manage those which were ethno-national. In effect, the conflict moved from an unstable triangular to a stable symmetrical form of conflict management. Although the provisions of the agreement appeared to mark radical change, aspects of the older form of conflict management returned in its implementation, suggesting that the triangular structure of conflict is not yet gone. Rather than a move towards stable binationalism, we may be seeing an uneven move towards an unstable multi-variable form of conflict, where the communities compete for alliances and resources in a context of a multiplicity of power centres. In this respect globalisation and the changes in forms of territorial management in the archipelago may be less conducive to stability in Northern Ireland than was initially hoped.

History, structure and action in the settlement of complex conflicts: the Northern Ireland case

This article argues for a historical-structural approach to explaining conflict and settlement. It argues that the manner in which institutions function and actors pursue their ends is in part determined by slow-moving inter-linked structural relationships whose logic, trajectory and effects can only be identified historically. In complex conflicts such structural configurations generate tendencies to conflict and settlement requires that they be weakened. The article elaborates this model to account for settlement in Northern Ireland. It argues that what made the difference between relative success in the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 and earlier failures was not short term actor-oriented mechanisms, nor even a lessening of structural inequality alone, but change in a deeper structural configuration, triggered by a change in the role of the British state. The article traces how this was taken forward, and explains why tensions continue. It contributes to debates on the role of political agency and structural constraint in complex conflicts.

The Origin & Resolution of the Conflict in Northern Ireland

Nationalism and separatist movements are in rise. While some separatists are using democratic methods like referenda, some separatists are engaged in violence. Today comprehending Northern Ireland conflict is much more important than before since both of the methods had been used. The study aims to show how an ethnic & nationalist conflict that involves religious believes had been resolved. For to have a better understanding, the article begins with the nature of the conflict then focuses the process that lead to peace and finally analyzes the peace agreement’s context.

Religion and Conflict: The Case of Northern Ireland

1995

Now that the peace process, however fragile and tenuous, has stayed the course, despite some serious obstacles and setbacks, and talks between the British government and Sinn Fein are taking place, it is a time to reflect on the nature of the divisions that have scarred our lives and psyches. One of the most under-researched and least understood aspects of the conflict is the role religious differences playor do not play. 1 While it is a common practice to label the two communities as "Catholics" and "Protestants," and to keep the tally-roll of the dead according to religious affiliation, it is also commonly acknowledged that these labels are a shorthand way of putting many threads ofidentity under a convenient umbrella. Not all Catholics are Nationalists, and not all Protestants are Unionists, and no one has seriously suggested that differences in theological beliefs are the root cause of our problems. But this is not to say that religion should be dismissed. It is well established that one of the many fears Northern Ireland Protestants harbor is the fear of being culturally and religiously absorbed in an all-Ireland state in which they would account for 20% of the population. A state they would vehemently insist on calling a theocratic state. But beyond that, I will argue in this paper, that religion plays a critical but little understood role in the conflict, one, which, if not acknowledged and addressed, could seriously handicap the prospects for a negotiated settlement.

From War to Peace: Northern Ireland Conflict and the Peace Process

Uluslararası İlişkiler, 2016

This article analyzes the reasons ethnic violence erupted in Northern Ireland at the end of the 1960s. Based on semi-structured interviews with civil society workers, local deputies and residents in Northern Ireland that took place during August-September 2014, it argues that in the Northern Ireland case, the cleavage structure and political competition which overlapped with bipolar ethnic divide rendered political parties incapable to appeal to ethnic diversity within Northern Irish society. This article shows that the unionist-nationalist cleavage structure and political competition based on plurality rule brought about ethnic polarization and intensified interethnic tensions by producing governments supported exclusively by Protestants and hindering the incorporation of Catholics into the political system. It also demonstrates that peace negotiations in Northern Ireland were a process of institutional innovation in order to incorporate both communities into the political system.

Religion and Sectarianism in Ulster: Interpreting the Northern Ireland Troubles

Religion Compass, 2013

The following article considers the various arguments and counter-arguments around the role of religion in causing and sustaining the conflict in Northern Ireland. It identifies the essential elements of the problem and assesses a number of the explanations given, emphasising the difficulty of providing a single answer to such a complex question. The correlation between religion and the divisions in Northern Ireland seems at first sight obvious, but, as a number of commentators have rightly observed, pinning down the relationship between someone's religion and their attitudes is much more problematic. This essay therefore avoids the reductionism and 'either ⁄ or' formulations of so many scholars on both sides of the debate, instead emphasising that religion is ultimately one of a number of dimensions to Northern Irish identity, the politics of which sustains the social divisions and was the source of the political violence that ravaged the region.

Unionists, Loyalists, and Conflict Transformation in Northern Ireland

2011

This chapter introduces the social psychology of ethnic and political division in Northern Ireland, documents continuing segregation and division since the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, and calls for culturally oriented conflict transformation. Many of the circumstances on which unionists and loyalists based their political assumptions and the institutions on which they relied have changed significantly. Feelings of disorientation and alienation persist. With the end of Direct Rule, political persuasion, lobbying, public relations, and grassroots organizing have become increasingly important, and it is critical that unionists, and particularly working-class loyalists, feel empowered and have the organizing capacity to influence democratic politics without violence.