Deciding Analytically or Trusting your Intuition? The Advantages and Disadvantages of Analytic and Intuitive Thought (original) (raw)
Related papers
2002
Recent research has highlighted the notion that people can make judgments and choices by means of two systems that are labeled here tacit (or intuitive) and deliberate (or analytic). Whereas most decisions typically involve both systems, this chapter examines the conditions under which each system is liable to be more effective. This aims to illuminate the age-old issue of whether and when people should trust “intuition” or “analysis.” To do this, a framework is presented to understand how the tacit and deliberate systems work in tandem. Distinctions are also made between the types of information typically used by both systems as well as the characteristics of environments that facilitate or hinder accurate learning by the tacit system. Next, several experiments that have contrasted “intuitive” and “analytic” modes on the same tasks are reviewed. Together, the theoretical framework and experimental evidence leads to specifying the trade-off that characterizes their relative effectiv...
Pitting intuitive and analytical thinking against each other: The case of transitivity
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 2013
Identifying which thinking mode, intuitive or analytical, yields better decisions has been a major subject of inquiry by decision-making researchers. Yet studies show contradictory results. One possibility is that the ambiguity is due to the variability in experimental conditions across studies. Our hypothesis is that decision quality depends critically on the level of compatibility between the thinking mode employed in the decision and the nature of the decision-making task. In two experiments, we pitted intuition and analytical thinking against each other on tasks that were either mainly intuitive or mainly analytical. Thinking modes, as well as task characteristics, were manipulated in a factorial design, with choice transitivity as the dependent measure. Results showed higher choice consistency (transitivity) when thinking mode and the characteristics of the decision task were compatible. Keywords Choice. Decision making. Judgment and decision making. Dual-process theories There is considerable agreement among researchers that information in decision making involves two qualitatively different thinking modes: (1) an intuitive mode characterized by fast and parallel processes that are affective, holistic, and associative in nature and (2) a deliberative/analytical mode characterized by slower processes that are rule based in nature (Epstein, 1994; Evans, 2008; Kahneman, 2003; Sloman, 1996). However, according to Evans, despite the abovementioned agreement, there are different viewpoints regarding the ways in which these two thinking modes interact. Some authors (e.g., Kahneman & Frederick, 2002) have argued that the two modes operate sequentially, so that intuitive answers to judgment problems are generated rapidly and automatically, and then the analytical mode may initiate a process of monitoring, endorsing, correcting, or overriding the initial intuitive response. Yet other researchers (e.g., Damasio, 1994; Epstein, 1994; Glöckner & Betsch, 2008; Sloman, 1996) have suggested that the two thinking modes work in parallel and are used to different extents depending on the decision environment. Evans also pointed out that various definitions of intuitive processes have been used in the literature. For example, some authors (e.g., Sloman, 1996) have ignored emotion altogether, while others (e.g., Damasio, 1994; Epstein, 1994) have linked intuition to emotional thinking and have emphasized the fact that intuition relies on feelings as information, whereas analytical thinking involves reasoned cost-benefit assessment, which relies on rules rather than emotion. To the present day, there is an ongoing debate concerning the relative advantage of each mode of thinking in decision making. Studies show contradictory results. Some studies show that the intuitive mode is inferior to the analytical mode, so that intuition and/or emotion may be a source of faulty decisions (
Intuitive and Deliberate Judgments Are Based on Common Principles
A popular distinction in cognitive and social psychology has been between intuitive and deliberate judgments. This juxtaposition has aligned in dual-process theories of reasoning associative, unconscious, effortless, heuristic, and suboptimal processes (assumed to foster intuitive judgments) versus rule-based, conscious, effortful, analytic, and rational processes (assumed to characterize deliberate judgments). In contrast, we provide convergent arguments and evidence for a unified theoretical approach to both intuitive and deliberative judgments. Both are rule-based, and in fact, the very same rules can underlie both intuitive and deliberate judgments. The important open question is that of rule selection, and we propose a 2-step process in which the task itself and the individual's memory constrain the set of applicable rules, whereas the individual's processing potential and the (perceived) ecological rationality of the rule for the task guide the final selection from that set. Deliberate judgments are not generally more accurate than intuitive judgments; in both cases, accuracy depends on the match between rule and environment: the rules' ecological rationality. Heuristics that are less effortful and in which parts of the information are ignored can be more accurate than cognitive strategies that have more information and computation. The proposed framework adumbrates a unified approach that specifies the critical dimensions on which judgmental situations may vary and the environmental conditions under which rules can be expected to be successful.
The Impact of the Mode of Thought in Complex Decisions: Intuitive Decisions are Better
Frontiers in Psychology, 2011
A number of recent studies have reported that decision quality is enhanced under conditions of inattention or distraction (unconscious thought;. These reports have generated considerable controversy, for both experimental (problems of replication) and theoretical reasons (interpretation). Here we report the results of four experiments. The first experiment replicates the unconscious thought effect, under conditions that validate and control the subjective criterion of decision quality. The second and third experiments examine the impact of a mode of thought manipulation (without distraction) on decision quality in immediate decisions. Here we find that intuitive or affective manipulations improve decision quality compared to analytic/deliberation manipulations. The fourth experiment combines the two methods (distraction and mode of thought manipulations) and demonstrates enhanced decision quality, in a situation that attempts to preserve ecological validity. The results are interpreted within a framework that is based on two interacting subsystems of decisionmaking: an affective/intuition based system and an analytic/deliberation system.
A popular distinction in cognitive and social psychology has been between intuitive and deliberate judgments. This juxtaposition has aligned in dual-process theories of reasoning associative, unconscious, effortless, heuristic, and suboptimal processes (assumed to foster intuitive judgments) versus rule-based, conscious, effortful, analytic, and rational processes (assumed to characterize deliberate judgments). In contrast, we provide convergent arguments and evidence for a unified theoretical approach to both intuitive and deliberative judgments. Both are rule-based, and in fact, the very same rules can underlie both intuitive and deliberate judgments. The important open question is that of rule selection, and we propose a 2-step process in which the task itself and the individual's memory constrain the set of applicable rules, whereas the individual's processing potential and the (perceived) ecological rationality of the rule for the task guide the final selection from that set. Deliberate judgments are not generally more accurate than intuitive judgments; in both cases, accuracy depends on the match between rule and environment: the rules' ecological rationality. Heuristics that are less effortful and in which parts of the information are ignored can be more accurate than cognitive strategies that have more information and computation. The proposed framework adumbrates a unified approach that specifies the critical dimensions on which judgmental situations may vary and the environmental conditions under which rules can be expected to be successful.
Since its inception, experimental philosophy has been bound up with methodological questions regarding the status of intuition. Several of the most well-known early experimental studies attracted attention due to their criticisms of " traditional " intuition-based argumentation, in which a philosopher takes intuitive reactions to an imagined case to serve as evidence for or against philosophical claims. When, for example, and found cross-cultural variation in responses to thought experiments, they took this to provide a serious challenge to the default assumption of a " shared " set of intuitions on which they claimed traditional methodology rests.
Making Better Decisions, 2020
About the Role of Intuition 2.1 Background Intuition is a very necessary element of creative work, such as research. Many famous scientists have discussed the role of intuition in their work. We provide two quotes. "Isaac Newton supposedly watched an apple fall from a tree and suddenly connected its motion as being caused by the same universal gravitational force that governs the moon's attraction to the earth." John Maynard Keynes, the famous economist, said "Newton owed his success to his muscles of intuition. Newton's powers. . ." (www.p-i-a.com/Magazine/ Issue19/Physics_19.htm). Gigerenzer, author of the book Gut Feelings: The Intelligence of the Unconscious (2008), claims that he is both intuitive and rational. "In my scientific work, I have hunches. I can't explain always why I think a certain path is the right way, but I need to trust it and go ahead. I also have the ability to check these hunches and find out what they are about. That's the science part. Now, in private life, I rely on instinct. For instance, when I first met my wife, I didn't do computations. Nor did she." (B. Kasanoff in Forbes Magazine February 21st, 2017.) But the difference between research and decision-making is that, intuition often guides research, but is subsequently subjected to rigorous laboratory and field tests. We ask that the same is done about the use of intuition in decision-making. Because solely basing your decisions (in particular, in the corporate context) on intuition, is very risky-and unnecessary. If possible, one should do some form of analysis, either to help support the intuition or challenge it. This chapter serves as motivation for us, why we often benefit from some form of analysis. Daniel Kahneman was interviewed on May 25th, 2012, for the Spiegel Online Magazine about the role of intuition in decision-making. The interview is interesting and we reproduce here the beginning of it (Also see Kahneman 2011).
Intuition's Role in Making Decisions
Competitive Intelligence Magazine, 2007
Typically, managers assume better decisions are a matter of combining better inputs with better analysis, leading to better prediction, planning and execution. These assumptions are based on persistent, fundamental misunderstandings about the inputs to decisions, the outcomes from decisions, and the very nature of "deciding."