Can virtuous people emerge from tragic dilemmas having acted well? (original) (raw)

Right Action and the Non-Virtuous Agent

According to qualified-agent virtue ethics, an action is right if and only if it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically do in the circumstances. I discuss two closely related objections to this criterion, both of which relate to the actions of the non-virtuous. The first is that this criterion sometimes gives the wrong result, for in some cases a non-virtuous agent should not do what a virtuous person would characteristically do. A second objection is it altogether fails to apply whenever the agent, through previous wrongdoing, finds herself in circumstances that a virtuous person cannot be in. I focus on Rosalind Hursthouse’s account of right action, and argue that it can provide a satisfactory response to both these objections. I do so by drawing attention to the distinction between action guidance and action assessment, and arguing that while the above criterion is adequate as a means of action assessment, we should turn to the virtue- and vice-rules (v-rules) for action guidance.

Common-sense virtue ethics and moral luck

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2005

Moral luck poses a problem for out conception of responsibility because it highlights a tension between morality and lack of control. Michael Slote’s common-sense virtue ethics claims to avoid this problem. However there are a number of objections to this claim. Firstly, it is not clear that Slote fully appreciates the problem posed by moral luck. Secondly, Slote’s move from the moral to the ethical is problematic. Thirdly it is not clear why we should want to abandon judgements of moral blame in favour of judgements of ethical deplorability. Finally this paper defends an alternative solution to the problem of moral luck, which focuses on judgements of probability, but which has been rejected by Slote.

Rightness and goodness in agent-based virtue ethics

In Morals from Motives (2001) Michael Slote puts forward an agent-based virtue ethics that purports to derive an account of deontic terms from aretaic evaluations of motives or character traits. In this view, an action is right if and only if it proceeds from a good or virtuous motive or at least does not come from a bad motive, and wrong if it comes from a bad motive. I argue that Slote does not provide an account of right action at all, that is, if ‘right action’ is understood in the strict deontic sense of an act that is either permissible or obligatory. An examination of Slote’s treatment of the problem of moral luck shows that he presupposes a conceptual link between what is morally wrong and what is blameworthy. I conclude by suggesting that agent-based virtue ethics may do better as an attempt to eliminate deontic notions altogether.

Giving Responsibility a Guilt-Trip: Virtue, Tragedy, and Privilege

2012

In this paper, I argue for the ethical importance of the retributive emotion of ‗tragic-guilt,‘ namely, the feeling of self-recrimination for doing harm even if it could not be prevented. Drawing on empirical evidence concerning the phenomenology of such guilt, as well as thought-experiments concerning moral responsibility for inherited privilege, I distinguish tragic-guilt from the closelyrelated retributive emotions of regret, remorse, shame, and non-tragic guilt. I attempt to understand the emotion of tragic-guilt in light of an ethics of virtue, and I argue that sensitivity to tragic-guilt has significant theoretical, ethical, and motivational benefits. The reality of such tragic-responsibility reveals an uncomfortable, but undeniable messiness in the moral domain. The virtuous person is characterized by a deep emotional responsiveness to this messiness.  Earlier versions of this paper were presented at Ghent University and to the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology....

Breaking Ties: The Significance of Choice in Symmetrical Moral Dilemmas

Dialectica, 2006

In symmetrical moral dilemmas, the agent faces a choice between two incompatible actions, which are equally justified on the basis of the same value. These cases are generally discounted as spurious or irrelevant on the assumption that, when there is no failure of commensurability, choice between symmetrical requirements is indifferent and can be determined by randomization. Alternatively, this article argues that the appeal to randomization allows the agent to overcome a deliberative impasse, but it does not really resolve the moral dilemma. This is because randomization fails to provide the agent with a genuine reason for action. The argument is based on an account of arbitrariness as a threat to the agent's authorship on action. By focusing on lack of authorship, rather than on failure of commensurability, we gain the adequate perspective to assess the philosophical significance of moral dilemmas, their impact on the agential integrity, and their consequences for ethical theory. 1 I recast Sartre's example using the definition of 'moral dilemma' defended by Sinnott-Armstrong 1988, Chapter I. 2 This example is the non-tragic and perfectly symmetrical variation on the example of Sophie's choice, which is generally taken as paradigmatic of symmetrical dilemmas, see Styron 1980.

A Solution to the Problem of Moral Luck

The Philosophical Quarterly, 1992

We become worried about the fairness of treating people on the basis of what they do when we see that chance has played a crucial role. The condition of control is central to a particular view of moral agency; but this view seems attractive only because it helps to justify attitudes which we believe are central to morality but which are, in fact, morally wrong. The condition of control is in fact incoherent — agents are not complete instigators. Any solution to the problem of moral luck will need, therefore, to explain why we should have such a deep-rooted and yet flawed intuition. The paper reconciles our conflicting intuitions by accommodating them within a certain range of reactions to wrong-doing. Our need for justice might be met through requirements which do not involve punishment and which do not create problems of moral luck. Central to this will be the agent’s remorse, which is an expression of the realization of the wrongness of the deed.