“Measuring up to Measure” Dysmorphophobia as a Language Game (original) (raw)
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Language games and (hi)stories: Wittgenstein, Bateson and Schapp on the role of language in therapy
Kybernetes, 2007
PurposeIn Bateson's theory of mind, the adaptation of Russell's theory of logical types is of key importance. Korzybski represented the type‐logical difference between language and reality as the metaphorical distinction between map and territory. The confounding of logical types generates cognitive, and logical problems, which Bateson reflected in his theory of schizophrenia. In Wittgenstein's philosophy, this type‐logical distinction is of equal significance.Design/methodology/approachThe present paper, through the elucidation of the concept of language‐game and its relationship with grammar, demonstrates the proximity of Wittgenstein's and Bateson's understanding of language, which allows for a productive improvement of possible therapies of insanity.FindingsFor Bateson, schizophrenia is the attempt to escape from a pathogenic learning context, within which the map of thought has become malformed. Insanity can thus be understood as transformed grammar and can ...
After noting how psychoanalysis has fragmented into theoretical and methodological clusters lacking a common language, the author proposes a unifying nomenclature for clinical psychoanalysis. Specifically, he suggests psychoanalysts, regardless of theoretical orientation, frame psychoanalytic relationships, bring presence to their patients, and engage them. These methods facilitate transformation most commonly by bringing features of the unconscious into consciousness. They also disrupt patients’ internalization processes—phenomena synonymous with what Fairbairn (1941) called the “schizoid background” (p. 250), Klein (1946) “schizoid mechanisms” (p. 99), Steiner (1993) “psychic retreats” (p. 1), Kernberg (2007) the “narcissistic spectrum” (p. 510), and Summers (2014) “narcissistic encapsulation” (p. 233). The author provides a clinical vignette demonstrating how framing, presence, and engagement describe psychoanalytic work, and concludes by discussing how such nomenclature could enhance psychoanalysts’ capacity to communicate with one another while also making the field more accessible to the general public.
The Language of Psychotherapy: Metaphor, Ambiguity, Wholeness
British Journal of Psychotherapy, 1985
Psychoanalysis is approached from the perspective of linguistics. It is argued .hat analysis is concerned with a type of communication different in nature and logic from that of the natural sciences. The characteristics of analytic language are illustrated by comparing poetry and psychoanalysis. Transference is discussed as a special type of metaphor; ambiguity is seen as an intrinsic aspect of aesthetic language; wholeness is held to be a goal of both therapy and the arts. The relevance of this view to recent findings in neurophysiology and ethology is discussed.
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I argue that Wittgenstein’s grammatical method is a form of therapy intended to help us to escape the evasions of philosophical theory and to use our language honestly. Real solutions to the problems that trouble us in life are only possible if we can think about them clearly and truthfully.
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Interdisciplinary Studies in Pragmatics, Culture and Society, Alessandro Capone and Jacob L. Mey eds. , 2015
In this chapter, I propose to take seriously the comparison between Freudian psychoanalysis and Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy. Philosophy and psychoanalysis have in common two facts: they are activities that have to do with the analysis of language, and they have an ethical goal. Both, in fact, mean to liberate the human body, and to make it able to move freely. The fundamental concept that allows this comparison is that of “surveyable representation” ( übersichtliche Darstellung). From this point of view, the main concern of Wittgensteinian philosophy is ethics.
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Wittgensteinian therapeutic philosophy is accused of being an uncritical philosophy. This allegation is raised by Critical Theory and specifically by Matthew Crippen. Wittgensteinian therapeutic philosophy purportedly redacts any critique towards oppressive social conditions especially the ones engendered in language itself. It therefore refrains and discourages the questioning of oppressive conditions of pressing concern. However, this accusation against Wittgensteinian therapeutic philosophy is found wanting. This research shows that Crippen and Critical Theory inadequately assess the character of Wittgensteinian therapeutic philosophy. This work argues that, on the contrary, Wittgensteinian therapeutic philosophy facilitates the endeavor of critique. It offers a paradigmatic reminder of how to do critique viz. doing a critique that is sensitive to