The Fate of Muslim Nationalism in Independent Indonesia (original) (raw)

My doctoral dissertation at Yale University, 2012. This dissertation traces the fate of groups in Indonesia who sought to make their country an Islamic state by transforming politics and society. Although these groups played a critical role in winning Indonesia's independence during the Indonesian Revolution (1945-1949), divisions between political leaders, theological leaders, and the grassroots split the movement, and by 1960 these divisions caused the failure of Islam as a political movement for an Islamic state. During revolution, Dutch-educated political leaders took the leadership of the Islamic movement through appointments in the Socialist-led cabinets. These political leaders brought their Western norms to the struggle to establish an Islamic state. Theological leaders, prominent for their roles in Islamic education and mass organizations, also sought to establish an Islamic state, but they were less involved in Indonesia's modern governance. Across Indonesia, pious Muslims disconnected from the national leadership of the Islamic movement also contributed to the revolution. At this grassroots level, the Indonesian Revolution was experienced as an Islamic fight for independence. The diversity of Muslim experiences in the revolution, including many heterodox practices, demonstrated the distance between the syncretic Islamic grassroots and the new leadership of the Islamic movement nationally. After Indonesia's independence was recognized in late 1949, Islamic political parties and mass organizations sought to shape the state and nation to make them more Islamic. They were hindered in this by tensions between the political and theological leaders in the Islamic bloc, tensions that climaxed in the 1952 departure of Nandlatul Ulama from the major Islamic party Masjumi. The Islamic movement experienced many successes after independence, such as the expansion of Islamic organizations and education, but national trends such as the standardization of language limited the influence of Islamic ideas and activists. Things came to a head in the national elections of 1955, when the political leaders, theological leaders, and Islamic grassroots not only battled political parties opposed to Islam but also battled each other. Facing the elections, political interests proved to be paramount over existing social and cultural interests in the Indonesian Islamic movement. Although they expected an unambiguous victory, Islamic parties won only 45% of the seats in the resulting parliament and Constituent Assembly, severely restricting their ability to implement their vision of an Islamic state. After this defeat, the strain between the Islamic political elite and the Islamic grassroots and theological leaders became too great. Islamic political leaders were pushed into increasing irrelevance, failing to pass legislation, failing in the constitutional assembly, and committing half-heartedly to the PRRI rebellion of 1958-61. As a result, the debilitated Masjumi party was dissolved. Islamic mass organizations freed themselves from political parties and embraced the Sukarno regime. The Islamic movement as a bloc struggling for Indonesia to become an Islamic state fell apart.