On Two Theorems of Quinzii and Rent Controlled Housing Allocation in Sweden or" I Buy Your Slithy Tove Only if my Best Friend's Wife Buys Your Best Friend's Husband's Slithy Tove (original) (raw)

2007

Abstract

The Swedish rent control system creates a white market for swapping rental contracts and a black market for selling rental contracts. Empirical data suggests that in this black-and-white market some people act according to utility functions that are both discontinuous and locally decreasing in money. We discuss Quinzii's theorem for the nonemptiness of the core of generalized house-swapping games, and show how it can be extended to cover the Swedish game.In a second part, we show how this theorem of Quinzii and her second theorem on nonemptiness of the core in two-sided models are both special cases of a more general theorem.

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