Alexander Dugin, the Issue of Post-Soviet Fascism, and Russian Political Discourse Today (original) (raw)
Related papers
Submission procedures: Weatherhead C enter affiliates are encouraged to submit papers to the Working Paper Series. Manuscripts are assessed on the basis of their scholarly qualities -the extent of original research, the rigor of the analy sis, the significance of the conclusions-as well as their relevance to contemporary issues in international affairs. Manuscripts should range between 25 and 80 double-spaced pages and must include an abstract of no more than 150 words. We request that each paper be submitted in both electronic format and a hard copy . The electronic format should be on a disk in a standard word processing application (WordPerfect or Microsoft Word preferred) or as an email attachment. Fax: 617-495-8292 www.wcfia.harvard.edu
The Radical Right in Post-Soviet Russia
The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right, 2018
This chapter introduces some basic contours of Russia’s contemporary radical right scene. It distinguishes between systemic and non-systemic ultra-nationalist groups in Putin’s Russia, the principal difference being the groups’ and individual actors’ proximity and clarity of connections to the crypto-authoritarian regime. The systemic component consists of political groups, authors, and activists that are allowed or encouraged to participate in official mass media and public life. Main actors of the mainstream radical right include Vladimir Zhirinovskii’s Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia and organizations using the “Rodina” (Motherland) label. Major expressions of government-supported Russian “uncivil society” and anti-democratic intellectual discourse include the writings of the far right political thinkers Lev Gumilev and Aleksandr Dugin. Manifestations of the non-systemic component of Russia’s extreme right include skinheads and their use of ethnic violence, political movements such as the Movement Against Illegal Immigration, other descendants of the “Pamiat” (Memory) organization in the 1980s, and their activities.
From Red to Black – The rise of Neo-Nazism in Russia in the 90'
2016
Homophobia in Russia is now a very popular subject of debate and is widely discussed on television and social media. Less well-known and receiving less coverage, however, is the issue of Xenophobia and Neo-Nazis in Russia. Xenophobia and Homophobia are strictly connected as the perpetrators of their underlying ideologies are the same. After the Collapse of the Soviet Union, a new sentiment of nationalism spread among the Russian people, which resulted in the formation of Neo-Nazi boneheads (i.e. right-wing skinheads), hooligans and even political organizations. These groups were (and still are) a major force within the country and have had a huge impact on Russian society by carrying out veritable acts of terrorism and leaving behind them not only fear, but also a considerable body count. As Sova reports, from 2004 to 2012 -- 509 people were killed and 3,436 were injured or wounded by Far-right militants, and this is only the official data: according to Sova, the real figures might be three times as high. Yet, from 2004 to 2006, only 68 perpetrators of such crimes were convicted. In this essay I will start by focussing on how Neo-Nazi movements came about in the 90s, examining the reasons and the factors that fostered their growth through society. To this end I will examine the social infrastructure, the geopolitical situation and public attitudes in Russia. I will then proceed to analyse their ideological character, addressing questions such as “What it is to be Russian”, and how these relate to the Soviet past.
Transitions Online, 2013
The emergence of three far-right discussion clubs and their links to the Kremlin spell more bad news for East-West relations. Since the revival of the Russian democracy movement in December 2011, some Western observers of Russian ethnocentrism have focused on the partial cooperation between democrats and ultra-nationalists during the protests. During the past few months, however, radically anti-Western nationalism consolidating itself as a relevant political force has become linked less to the Russian opposition than to Vladimir Putin's authoritarian regime. The recent further promotion of an already rabid anti-Americanism in the public rhetoric and politics of Putin and his cronies is a transparent attempt by the Kremlin to distract the population from other domestic challenges such as widespread corruption, elections manipulation, or bloated government. At the same time, the societal impact of the bizarre TV campaigns, and the deeper effects of the escalating demonization of the United States on Russian public discourse, cannot be dismissed as merely temporary. This has become clear from the long-term repercussions of similar, earlier instances of Russian media hysteria, for instance, in connection with the bombardment of Serbia by NATO in 1999, the Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City in 2002, the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the Russia-Georgia war in August 2008. Following these campaigns, public opinion in the Russian Federation has become increasingly critical of the United States and, to some extent, of the EU. Russian nationalists march in Moscow in November 2012. Photo by RiMarkin/flickr. AN INCREASINGLY 'UNCIVIL' SOCIETY The renewed stimulation of anti-Western discourses through the use of "political technologies" is promoting a dangerous undercurrent and accelerating the development of what may be called "uncivil society" in Russia. The anti-democratic faction in Russia's nonprofit sector represents a network of partly cooperative, partly competing, extremely anti-liberal groups, organizations, and publications. Many, to be sure, are distinguished by the support they receive from government agencies and through active advertising on Kremlin-controlled TV channels. They thus represent GONGOs (Government-Organized Non-Governmental Organizations), rather than genuine civil society initiatives. However, there is a danger that the stepped-up campaign of incitement against the United States may both permanently establish a conspiracy-minded, paranoid world view as the legitimate interpretation of international events and help entrench the clubs that promote this world view as legitimate participants in Russian public discourse. As a result, an aggressively anti-Western right-wing extremism seems to be forming within Russian political life as a stable third pole between the authoritarian regime and the democratic opposition. The Kremlin appears to be implementing a risky political scheme aimed at restructuring public life: the increased incorporation of ultra-nationalists into mainstream political discourse appears designed to cause a comprehensive rightward shift along Russia's ideological spectrum, so that the nationalism of Putin and his immediate associates, which is also quite virulent, seems relatively centrist against the background of the far more radical demands "from the grassroots", i.e., from the increasingly prominent right-wing extremists.
THE RUSSIAN FAR RIGHT A Changing Landscape of Spaces of Hate
The Routledge Handbook of Far-Right Extremism in Europe , 2024
This contribution traces how the Russian far right developed across several decades: its inception in the early 1980s around networks of intellectuals interested in preserving cultural sites and Aryan and Eurasian mythmaking; its growing adoption of neo-Nazism, white supremacism and Straight Edge in the 1990s and 2000s together with establishing nationwide political and paramilitary organisations; its involvement in a wave of violence leaving almost 500 people dead between 2004 and 2009, answered by authorities with imprisoning or killing several far-right leaders and outlawing main organisations; a less violent phase in the 2010s, with the far-right abandoning street violence in favour of promoting a certain "healthy lifestyle" that honours one's "race" or nation; and finally, the movement's decline, following state repression as well as the 2014 Ukraine crisis, dividing the movement between "racists" and "nationalists", while providing leaders and movement activists with an opportunity to leave the country. Key organisations nevertheless survived around a temporary agenda signalling loyalty to the political regime and adopting state-close ideologies. The present contribution argues that despite the decline since the 2010s, the far right turned out capable of maintaining or transforming its spaces of hate, the settings in which it disseminates its message and ultimately survives.
"The White World's Future:" An Analysis of the Russian Far Right
An Analysis of the Russian Far Right R ussia has witnessed dangerously high levels of hate-based violence on ethnic or racial minorities carried out by groups described either as "Neo-Nazi" or "skinhead" in the Russian media. 1 These groups have been active in using violence against those who are racially different. In 2009, for example, at least 72 people were killed and 359 injured in racist incidents in Russia. In 2011, at least 16 people were killed and a further 90 were injured. 2 In the first half of 2012, five people were killed and over 77 were injured in different regions in Russia. 3 It should be noted additionally that these frightening statistics are conservative estimates, because not all violence gets reported. Yet while using such terms may be the most accurate way to define these groups, it is necessary to pay attention to nuances and details of their ideology, or else we risk misunderstanding them. This article aims to make a contribution to those efforts.