Opportunities and Presidential Uses of Force: A Selection Model of Crisis Decision-Making (original) (raw)
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Decision research demonstrates that individuals adapt decision processing strategies according to the characteristics of the decision task. Unfortunately, the literature has neglected task factors specific to foreign policy decisions. This paper presents experimental analyses of the effects of the decisional stakes (i.e., salience of the values at issue) and threat (risk of loss on those issues) on decision-makers' information acquisition patterns and choice rules with respect to one of four hypothetical foreign policy scenarios. Contrary to the notion that normative (rational) decision-making is more likely in less dramatic settings, the results indicate that elevated threat encourages rational decision processing, whereas heuristic processing was more prevalent in less threatening situations. Interestingly, the added presence of high stakes magnified both threat effects. These results, although preliminary, suggest that stakes-threat effects are not direct reflections of stress and/or complexity effects, but should be considered independently in foreign policy analyses.
Presidential Studies Quarterly, 2011
We examine two competing arguments relating to the role of Congress in explaining presidential decisions to use force from 1953 argue that party control of Congress invites the use of force because it provides presidents with political cover. However, we offer a policy availability rationale that suggests Congress matters in the decision to use force because presidents are motivated by their ability to influence legislative policy making. The models demonstrate that presidential success in Congress is the significant factor determining military action, not party control. Presidents employ force when their ability to influence policy is weak and avoid military actions when Congress supports the president's agenda. The results speak to the intersection of two important literatures, namely, presidential unilateralism and conventional theories on domestic politics and the use of force (see, e.g.
Presidents and the diversionary use of force: A research note
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This study represents an attempt at further developing the diversionary theory of force. The analysis covers the period 1949 to 1994 using a simultaneous system of equations that treat presidential approval and force as endogenous variables. After controlling for opportunities and Soviet0Russian crisis behavior, the model reveals a rally effect and that unemployment has a positive effect on force levels. I discuss how presidential decisions to divert are made in the context of poliheuristic decision processing. An increasingly interesting question posed by scholars is whether U.S. presidents use military force to divert attention externally. While some still claim it to be a cynical view, the notion that the American president is capable of using the military to divert attention from domestic problems has now entered the American lexicon as a result of a recent Hollywood film and vivid uses of force in recent years. Diversionary theory evolved from the work of Simmel~1956! and Coser~1956! who postulated the in-group0out-group hypothesis. Coser~1956! suggested that leaders were aware that constituencies become more cohesive during times of conflict with out-groups. International relations scholars have borrowed the in-group0out-group hypothesis to account for leaders who are said to divert attention away from domestic problems such as a weak economy or sagging approval, by using force short of war~Levy, 1989; Russett, 1990!. 1 Implicit in the diversionary theory is a short-term boost in presidential approval known as the rally effect. Presidents are aware that uses of force are afforded wide media coverage-a factor that "weighs heavily" on decisions to use force~Grossman and Kumar, 1981:232!. Because of the positive political benefits said to accrue from force, leaders may also use the tactic to improve electoral fortunes~Mintz and Russett, 1992; Hess and Orphanides, 1995!. Several quantitative studies have found evidence of diversionary tendencies in the U.
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Political Research Quarterly, 2021
Scholars of foreign policy decision-making have argued that international interactions ultimately are grounded in people acting singly or in groups. Unfortunately, data limitations prevent many of these crucial foreign policy decision-making theories from being rigorously tested and systematically compared with theories from alternative perspectives. A promising approach to remedying this deficiency is the addition of decision-making variables to existing, large- N data sets. In this study, we coded a series of foreign policy decision-making variables for all U.S. cases in the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set, and examined how these decision-making variables compared with structural factors in shaping crisis outcomes. The results reveal that when controlling for structural factors such as conflict setting and power discrepancy, foreign policy decision-making variables related to leaders’ traits, advisory structure, and the political context shaped the severity and centra...
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Recent research on strategic conflict avoidance and targeting in the American case shows that states avoid militarily challenging presidents whose domestic situations might be improved by diversionary conflict, and that congressional opposition to presidential foreign policy invites increased challenges by decreasing other states' perceptions of likely American resolve. This article seeks to refine these lines of research by considering the intervening effects of partisan ideology. As previous scholarship indicates that diversion is a more attractive option for conservative than for liberal governments, there are likely greater incentives for other states to strategically avoid Republicans given lagging economic conditions. Conversely, the relative liberal aversion to military ventures means that the resolve-undermining effects of congressional opposition are likely more pronounced for Democrats. Analyses of the American foreign policy experience from 1949 to 2001 provide support for these hypotheses, as increases in the misery index are related to substantial decreases in the militarized targeting of Republican administrations and congressional foreign policy opposition acts are related to substantial increases in the militarized targeting of Democratic administrations.
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