An evolutionary game-theoretic approach to congestion control (original) (raw)

We consider jamming in wireless networks with transmission cost for both transmitter and jammer. We use the framework of non-zero-sum games. In particular, we prove the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium. It turns out that it is possible to provide analytical expressions for the equilibrium strategies. These expressions is a generalization of the standard water-filling. In fact, since we take into account the cost of transmission, we obtain even a generalization of the water-filling in the case of one player game.

Abstract Next-generation wireless networks will integrate multiple wireless access technologies to provide seamless mobility to mobile users with high-speed wireless connectivity. This will give rise to a heterogeneous wireless access environment where ...

Distributed data stream processing applications are structured as graphs of interconnected modules able to ingest high-speed data and to transform them in order to generate results of interest. Elasticity is one of the most appealing features of stream processing applications. It makes it possible to scale up/down the allocated computing resources on demand in response to fluctuations of the workload. On clouds this represents a necessary feature to keep the operating cost at affordable levels while accommodating user-defined QoS requirements. In this paper we study this problem from a game-theoretic perspective. The control logic driving elasticity is distributed among local control agents capable of choosing the right amount of resources to use by each module. In a first step, we model the problem as a non-cooperative game in which agents pursue their self-interest. We identify the Nash equilibria and we design a distributed procedure to reach the best equilibrium in the Pareto sense. As a second step, we extend the non-cooperative formulation with a decentralized incentive-based mechanism in order to promote cooperation by moving the agreement point closer to the system optimum. Simulations confirm the results of our theoretical analysis and the quality of our strategies.

We consider the effects of altruistic behavior on random medium access control (slotted ALOHA) for local area communication networks. For an idealized, synchronously iterative, two-player game with asymmetric player demands, we find a Lyapunov function governing the “better-response” Jacobi dynamics under purely altruistic behavior. Though the positions of the interior Nash equilibrium points do not change in the presence of altruistic behavior, the nature of their local asymptotic stability does. There is a region of partially altruistic behavior for which both interior Nash equilibrium points are locally asymptotically stable. Variations of these altruistic game frameworks are discussed considering power (instead of throughput) based costs and linear utility functions.