Reid's foundation for the primary/secondary quality distinction (original) (raw)

Some remarks on Reid on Primary and Secondary Qualities

John Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities of objects has meet resistance. In this paper I bypass the traditional critiques of the distinction and instead concentrate on two specific counterexamples to the distinction: Killer yellow and the puzzle of multiple dispositions. One can accommodate these puzzles, I argue, by adopting Thomas Reid’s version of the primary/secondary quality distinction, where the distinction is founded upon conceptual grounds. The primary/secondary quality distinction is epistemic rather than metaphysical. A consequence of Reid’s primary/ secondary quality distinction is that one must deny the original version of Molyneux’s question, while one must affirm an amended version of it. I show that these two answers to Molyneux’s question are not at odds with current empirical research. Keywords: John Locke, Thomas Reid, primary/secondary quality distinction, killer yellow, puzzle of multiple dispositions, Molyneux’s question

Primary and Secondary Qualities: A Proposed Modification of the Lockean Account

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 1977

We intuitively feel that there is a difference between sensible qualities such as size, shape and solidity on the one hand, and color, taste, smell and sound on the other. The former seem to be more fundamental than the latter, and the latter more "subjective" than the former. I view the theory of primary and secondary qualities as an attempt to articulate the nature of this intuitively felt difference. Thus, I agree with Jonathan Bennett that the primary/secondary quality distinction is an ontological one, which need not be tied to representationalism or to any other epistemological theory.' In setting out the distinction I shall start from Locke's account of it, because of its insightfulness, historical importance, and familiarity. However, my purpose is not primarily exegetical but philosophical. Accordingly, I shall keep my remarks on alternative interpretations of Locke's seminal but frequently ambiguous account to a minimum and confine them largely to the footnotes, so as to develop uninterruptedly what I take to be his "best" line of thought. Further, I shall propose, in section 2, a significant modification of Locke's characterization of the secondary qualities. In section 3, I shall show that my proposed modification of Locke's account helps us to understand two puzzling claims that he makes about secondary qualities;' and in section 4, I shall draw out its implications for the contrast between primary and secondary qualities. Throughout the paper, I shall assume the correctness of an (Chisholmian) adverbial analysis of sense experience, as opposed to the sense-datum analysis that Locke accepted. I shall not defend this assumption here, though I believe that its clarificatory power with respect to the present topic is an important argument in its favor. 1. Secondary Qualities as Dispositional Properties. Locke defines primary qualities as those which any physical object must possess no matter what state it is in or what changes it undergoes. He says that these include size, shape, solidity, mobility (motion or rest), and number. He illustrates his claim that these qualities are "utterly Georges Dicker, Associate Professor of Philosophy at the State University of New York College at Brockport, received his Ph. D. from the University of Wisconsin (Madison) in 1969. He is the author of Dewey's Theory of Knowing, and his articles and reviews have appeared in The Monist, the Transactions of the C. S. Peirce Society, The Journal of Value Inquiry, and orher journals. In 1975-1976 he held an NEH Fellowship in Residence for College Teachers at Brown University. He is completing a book in perceptual epistemology and has an article, "Is There a Problem About Perception and Knowledge.?" forthcoming in the American Philosophical Quarterly.

Primary and Secondary Qualities

Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception

The understanding of the primary-secondary quality distinction has shifted focus from the mechanical philosophers’ proposal of primary qualities as explanatorily fundamental to current theorists’ proposal of secondary qualities as metaphysically perceiver dependent. The chapter critically examines this shift and current arguments to uphold the primary-secondary quality distinction on the basis of the perceiver dependence of color; one focus of the discussion is the role of qualia in these arguments. It then describes and criticizes reasons for characterizing color, smell, taste, sound, and warmth and color as secondary qualities on the basis of our commonsense divisions among sensory modalities; Grice’s proposal for distinguishing among the sensory modalities is focal here. The general conclusion is that reasons for drawing the primary-secondary quality distinction are unconvincing.

Reid's Inheritance From Locke, and How He Overcomes It

Journal of the History of Philosophy, 2003

Reid's unusual primary/secondary quality distinction is drawn along epistemic lines. Reid takes an epistemic turn because of Locke's failure to draw a metaphysical distinction. Secondary qualities differ from primary qualities in virtue of the fact that we acquire notions of secondary qualities via the mediation of sensations. Primary qualities require no such mediation. In one respect, the analysis I set out renders qualities relative to agents. I address whether Reid advocates a dispositional theory of secondary qualities, whether the phenomenology of color underlying Reid's theory is tenable, and whether Reid's distinction coheres well with his theory of perceptual knowledge.

Locke on Primary and Secondary Qualities

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 1997

In this paper, I argue that Book II, Chapter viii of Locke's Essay is a unified, self-consistent whole, and that the appearance of inconsistency is due largely to anachronistic misreadings and misunderstandings. The key to the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is that the former are, while the latter are not, real properties, i.e., properties that exist in bodies independently of being perceived. Once the distinction is properly understood, it becomes clear that Locke's arguments for it are simple, valid and (in one case) persuasive as well.

Secondary Qualities as Dispositions

Locke Studies, 2020

In this paper I will defend the view that, according to Locke, secondary qualities are dispositions to produce sensations in us. Although this view is widely attributed to Locke, this interpretation needs defending for two reasons. First, commentators often assume that secondary qualities are dispositional properties because Locke calls them "powers" to produce sensations. However, primary qualities are also powers, so the powers locution is insufficient grounds for justifying the dispositionalist interpretation. Second, if secondary qualities are dispositional properties, then objects would retain secondary qualities while not being observed, but Locke says that colors "vanish" in the dark. Some commentators use this as evidence that Locke rejects the dispositionalist view of secondary qualities, and even those that are sympathetic to the traditional interpretation find these comments to be problematic. By contrast, I argue that even in these supposedly damning passages Locke shows an unwavering commitment to the view that the powers to produce sensations in us, i.e., the secondary qualities, remain in objects even when they are not being perceived. Thus, the arguments against the traditional interpretation are unpersuasive, and we should conclude that Locke does indeed hold that secondary qualities are dispositions to cause sensations in us.