The emergence of coordination in public good games (original) (raw)
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Equilibrium Play and Learning in a Stochastic Public Goods Experiment
In the game we study, the benefit received from a public good is not linear but varies stochastically with effort. We experimentally examine the effect of a quality bound under which group members receive negligible benefits from the public good, if the bound is not met. Our theory predicts that the presence of such a “pass mark” on quality may under certain conditions reduce the incidence of free-riding. We obtain very mixed support for this hypothesis using both mixed strategy as well as quantal response equilibrium benchmarks. In contrast, a reinforcement-learning model does better at predicting laboratory behaviour.
The individual behaviour in a public goods game
International Review on Public and Nonprofit Marketing, 2005
Generally, with a standard linear public goods game, one observes at the aggregate level that contributions lay between the Nash equilibrium and the social optimum and decrease over time with and end-effect. Author is indebted to Alan Kirman for the supervision of this work and to Sylvie Thoron for her helpful advises. He also thanks Jordi Brandts for his help during his stay in Barcelona and Antoni Bosch for making the LeeX available for him.
standard attempts to explain the phenomenon of decaying contribution in repeated linear public goods games are based on a ‘representative agent’ approach, with either selfish or altruist agents and an ‘error’ component. In this paper we try to test by purely experimental means the alternative hypothesis that in experimental public goods games there are at least three types of player: free riders, cooperators, and reciprocators. We try to identify the various types by means of four classification methods, and then play the public goods game with homogeneous groups. We observe that (1) the average contribution level is enhanced in this setting; (2) the decay phenomenon is replicated in groups of ‘pure’ free riders, whereas in groups of cooperative and reciprocating players the contribution is high and fairly stable throughout the game.
Feedback and dynamics in public good experiments
2012
In this paper we study the effects of providing additional feedback about individual contributions and/or earnings on contributions and the dynamics of contributions in a repeated public good game. We include treatments where subjects can freely choose whether to obtain additional information about individual contributions or individual earnings. We find that, in the aggregate, contributions are lower when feedback on earnings is provided compared to when feedback on contributions is provided. We also find that there exist substantial but intuitively appealing differences in the way individuals react to feedback. Particularly, individuals with a high propensity to contribute tend to imitate the highest contributor more often and are more inclined to obtain feedback about individual contributions compared to individuals with a lower propensity to contribute.► We study the effect of different types of feedback (contributions and/or earnings) on contributions and dynamics in a public good experiment. ► We find that including feedback about past earnings of group members decreases contributions and induces individuals to imitate the lowest contributor relatively more often as compared to the highest contributor. ► We find that the effects are driven by cooperative types who change the way they imitate.
A note on the modelling and interpretation of a public goods game experiment
Journal of Applied Statistics
This paper presents an alternative interpretation of an experimental public goods game dataset, particularly on the understanding of the observed antisocial behaviour phenomenon between subjects of a public goods experiment in different cities around the world. The anonymous nature of contributions and punishments in this experiment are taken into account to interpret results. This is done by analysing dynamic behaviour in terms of mean contributions across societies and their association with antisocial punishment. By taking into account the heterogeneity between the cities in which the public goods experiment has been performed, this analysis shows a contrasting interpretation. Instead of one trend across cities, two opposite trends are seen across different cities. In addition, we find that the presence of these trends to have an impact on the role antisocial and prosocial behaviour in public goods games. When accounting for these trends, the antisocial and prosocial behaviour is found to have a significant role in Western societies.
2003
We explore by purely experimental means a heterogeneous agents scenario in experimental public goods games, assuming the existence of at least three types of player: free riders, cooperators, and reciprocators. We identify the various types by means of four classification methods, and then play the public goods game with homogeneous groups. We observe that (1) the average contribution level is enhanced in this setting; (2) the decay phenomenon is replicated in groups of ‘pure ’ free riders, whereas in groups of cooperative and reciprocating players the contribution is high and fairly stable throughout the game.
Heterogeneous Agents in Public Goods Experiments
2005
We explore by purely experimental means a heterogeneous agents scenario in experimental public goods games, assuming the existence of at least three types of player: free riders, cooperators, and reciprocators. We identify the various types by means of four classification methods, and then play the public goods game with homogeneous groups. We observe that (1) the average contribution level is enhanced in this setting; (2) the decay phenomenon is replicated in groups of 'pure' free riders, whereas in groups of cooperative and reciprocating players the contribution is high and fairly stable throughout the game.
Endogenous Shifts Over Time in Patterns of Contributions in Public Good Games
2000
This paper studies endogenous preference change over time in a public good environment as an explanation of cooperative behavior. We investigate experimentally the role of (i) uncertainty and (ii) in- centives for members of group size four. We compare the result to the benchmark with no uncertainty and no incentives. Our results show that (a) uncertainty in private account increases
Ignorance is not Always Bliss: Feedback and Dynamics in Public Good Experiments
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
In this paper we study the effects of providing additional feedback about individual contributions and earnings on the dynamics of contributions in a repeated public good game. We include treatments where subjects can freely choose whether to obtain additional information about individual contributions or individual earnings. We find that, in the aggregate, contributions decline less fast when additional information about contributions and earnings is provided on top of aggregate information. We also find that there exist substantial but intuitively appealing differences in the way individuals react to feedback. Particularly, individuals with a high propensity to contribute tend to imitate the highest contributor more often and are more inclined to obtain feedback about individual contributions than about individual earnings than individuals with a lower propensity to contribute.
The Dynamics of Individual Preferences in Repeated Public Good Experiments
2012
We investigate the stability of individual behavior in a repeated public good experiment over time by reinviting subjects back to the lab up to four times in one week intervals. We exclude effects due to learning about others' behavior and reputation building by employing a non-learning and non-reputation environment: subjects are neither told nor paid their earnings until the very