Superstitious Perceptions Reveal Properties of Internal Representations (original) (raw)
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Abstract: This report is divided into two parts. The first part describes studies done at the University of Minnesota. The second part describes studies done at the University of Southern California. In both cases, full lists of citations are given to work supported in full or in part by this grant. Because most of these projects have been described in detail in previous reports, the purpose of this final report is to provide summary of the many studies and a complete list of citations.