SAFETY ANALYSIS OF SYSTEMS (original) (raw)
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Standards concerned with the development of safety-critical systems, and the software in such systems in particular, abound today as the software crisis increasingly affects the world of embedded computer-based systems. The use of formal methods is often advocated as a way of increasing confidence in such systems. This paper examines the industrial use of these techniques, the recommendations concerning formal methods in a number of current and draft standards, and comments on the applicability and problems of using formal methods for the development of safety-critical systems of an industrial scale. Some possible future directions are suggested. Winner of the IEE Charles Babbage Premium award, 1994. Other versions issued as a Oxford University Computing Laboratory Technical Report PRG-TR-5-92, and Chapter 1 in Towards Verified Systems.
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Proceedings of Algebraic Methodology and Software Technology, 8th International Conference, AMAST 2000, 2000
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