Differential growth, political instability and violent conflict (original) (raw)
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Democratization, Violent Social Conflicts, and Growth
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Abstract: This paper investigates the empirical role of violent conflicts for the causal effect of democracy on economic growth. Exploiting within-country variation to identify the effect of democratization during the'Third Wave', we find evidence that the effect of democratization is weaker than reported previously once one accounts for the incidence of conflict, while the incidence of conflict itself significantly reduces growth. The results show in turn that permanent democratic transitions significantly reduce the incidence and onset of conflict, ...
Elections, Ethnicity, and Political Instability
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This article provides a new perspective on the impact of elections on violent political instability in ethnically divided states. A number of scholars argue that elections may provoke large-scale violence in ethnically divided states. In this article we theorize that elections have a pacifying effect in the most ethnically fractionalized countries as they reduce endemic uncertainty and encourage coalition-building, lowering the rate at which electoral losers discount the future. Probit regressions using cross-national data for the period 1960-2010 support the notion that instability onsets are less likely in ethnically fractionalized states during election periods, and especially in the year after a national election.
Political Change in Ethnically Diverse Societies: Democratization and Ethnic Violence
The project focuses on inter-ethnic relations in democratizing countries. The author explains how each ethnic group’s concern about their future in the new political system creates security dilemmas that lead to higher levels of violence among groups that live in the country. The theory is limited to certain types of democratization, namely quick democratizations, where institutional changes take place over a relatively short period of time and simultaneously with the expansion of political participation. Major changes in the political system mean two things. First, with a new political structure in place, it becomes inevitable that balances will change in society. Various groups mobilize to protect or improve their status. A second consequence of major political change is the uncertain environment caused by the replacement of old and familiar institutions with new and democratic ones. At least initially, these institutions are not only foreign to people, but also lack the track record they need in order to inspire confidence. In this uncertain environment people are left to fend for themselves. As a result, they tend to mobilize around their ethnic groups. The presence of various ethnic groups competing for position under the new political system leads to security dilemmas that are likely to turn to inter-group violence because the state often lacks the means to keep the situation under control. In order to evaluate the argument, the author creates a system of equations and using a data set that includes 284 tests it over a time period not only ethnically active, but also includes many democratization attempts. Results show strong support for the argument.
Does Recording of Ethnicity in Censuses Increase the Risk of Political Instability and Violence?
2006
There is a large pool of rigorous empirical studies investigating the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and armed conflict. A general finding is that ethnicity is associated with a somewhat higher risk of conflict in bipolar societies with two large groups. Very fragmented societies, on the other hand, are not particularly conflict prone. But a largely neglected aspect of these quantitative
The Journal of Politics, 2008
We examine the propensity of states to initiate international conflict conditioned on four primary explanatory variables: (1) changes in population over varying lags, (2) democratic status of the state, (3) the power status of the state and (4) changes in the state's level of energy consumption. We hypothesize that the responsiveness of a government to the needs of its citizens is sufficiently important that the effect of population growth cannot be properly examined independently of democracy and that major powers tend to become involved in disputes for a much wider set of reasons than minor powers. Thus, we expect to find the strongest effect of population change on conflict initiation in democratic minor powers. We also expect that decreases in energy consumption concurrent with increases in population will lead to conflict initiation. A series of negative binomial regressions over 20 yearly time lags lends robust support to our expectations.
Linking Ethnic Conflict & Democratization
An Assessment of Four Troubled Regions, 2007
Ethnic divisions have long been linked to civil war and recent history seems full of examples. However, the mechanisms that lead a society down the path of ethnic conflict are not yet fully understood. This working paper presents the results of a series of workshops discussing the link between ethnicity and conflict under the condition of regime change. Based on contributions of area experts for four regions - the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Great Lakes of Africa and the Middle East – this paper tries to answer four guiding questions: Is there a link between ethnicity and conflict? Are there transnational spillover effects? Does democratization contribute to ethnic violence? And are there institutional solutions for divided societies?
Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of a New Global Data Set
American Sociological Review, 2009
Quantitative research on civil wars has either discounted ethnicity as an explanatory factor altogether or maintained that wars are more likely in more diverse societies. This article shows that ethnicity is important, but that armed conflicts are driven by ethnic competition over state power, rather than high degrees of diversity. We identify three dimensions of this competitive dynamic and three particularly warprone ethnopolitical configurations: states that exclude large segments of the population on the basis of their ethnic background are likely to be challenged by rebellions; segmented states where power is shared between a large number of ethnic elites risk violent infighting between them; both infighting and rebellions will be more likely and take on secessionist forms in incohesive states where parts of the population have a short history of direct rule by the center and thus disidentify with the state. A new dataset covering all independent states since 1946 allows these three dimensions of ethnic politics to be measured directly.
Reducing the Impact of Ethnic Tensions on Economic Growth – Economic or Political Institutions?
We use a standard growth regression model and show that ethnic tensions reduce per capita growth rates. We also find evidence that "good" economic and political institutions improve per capita growth rates. More importantly, good economic institutions mitigate the effect of ethnic tensions on per capita growth while good political institutions do not. Consequently, it is foremost capitalist freedom that promotes peace and development.
Ethnicity, Regime Type and the Tendency for Violence
2018
Within the study of ethnicity and violence, there is a compelling puzzle: the number of ethnic groups in the world exceeds the number of violent ethnic conflicts. This puzzle alludes to an important question: what explains the tendency for violence among ethnic groups in multiethnic states? This essay argues that the tendency for violent ethnic conflict in multiethnic states depends on the regime type of the state. Using data from the Democracy Index developed by the Economist Intelligence Unit (2017) to classify regimes, this paper will argue that ‘anocratic’ regimes have a higher tendency for ethnic violence than states classified as ‘full democracies’ or ‘authoritarian regimes’. This essay contributes to the literature on ethnic violence and how regime type is an important and overlooked variable for explaining its onset.
Book Review: Democracy, Markets and Doomsaying: Is Ethnic Conflict Inevitable?
Amy Chua's World on Fire is a stimulating book that links the 1990s spread of democracy and market reforms with perceptions of increasing ethnic violence. Chua points out that many developing countries have "market-dominant" minority groups that wield disproportionate economic power. In the presence of such minorities, Chua argues, the simultaneous introduction of markets and democracy can lead to ethnic violence. Market liberalization can exacerbate minority control over the economy, while democratization provides incentives for demagogues to target the minority group. While her model has explanatory power in some contexts, the book pays insufficient attention to social science techniques and evidence. She defines her explanatory variables, democracy and markets, too broadly to facilitate a test of her theory. In discussing incidents of ethnic violence and tension, her approach to evidence is anecdotal, and she does not consider the number and intensity of cases where democratization and markets may have reduced ethnic tension. Recent studies suggest that the number and intensity of ethnic conflicts are in decline around the world, an important finding that should lead to caution in hastily adopting policies based on Chua's analysis. Both democratization and a reduction in ethnic tension, it is argued, can be facilitated by the international community.