Differential growth, political instability and violent conflict (original) (raw)

There is a large pool of rigorous empirical studies investigating the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and armed conflict. A general finding is that ethnicity matters, although not as much as portrayed in popular media. But a largely neglected aspect of these quantitative studies is how changes in the relative strength of groups affect conflict. argues that differential growth may destabilize heterogeneous democracies internally. In democratic societies, political power is distributed according to popular support in elections. A changing balance between groups may thus alter the distribution of power and potentially lead to political instability and ultimately violent conflict. We argue that the relationship between differential growth and instability and violence may be even more important in semidemocracies with electoral systems, but with weak and inconsistent political institutions. In a cross-national time-series study we do a first empirical test of this notion. Starting from the premise that for differential growth to become a potential driver of conflict and instability, information of such change has to be recorded with a national census and actually published. Not yet having completed a reliable dataset on actual change between censuses, this paper investigates whether countries publishing identity data from consecutive censuses are at a greater risk of experiencing violence and political instability. Investigating the census data in two models of civil war and regime duration, we find no empirical support for the expectation that publishing identity data increases the risk of violent conflict and political instability.