What is Known About the Effectiveness of Police Practices in Reducing Crime and Disorder? (original) (raw)
The Benefits, Challenges, and Lessons of Evidence‐Based Policing
Law enforcement is a blue‐collar vocation, let’s face it, a majority of us in American policing still wear nametags to work. Policing a bar fight is typically the same today, as it was 100 years ago, but that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t pay attention to data and research to prove what works and what may not. Because many practitioners choose to rely on anecdotal experiences, traditions, and instincts while being reluctant to embrace research, the challenges are significant. However, just as the medical field was resistant to science and research for years, there are some shifts that signal law enforcement has begun to embrace research (Sherman, 2013). The acceptance of researchbased policing in the U.S. is progressing with positive examples in the Philadelphia, Rialto, and Sacramento Police Departments, all of whom successfully conducted randomized controlled trials (RCTs) aimed at evaluating policing strategies. Empirical data (e.g., hot spots policing and the effectiveness of body‐worn cameras) showed their methods were effective in reducing crime and bolstering legitimacy, for example, body‐worn camera usage reduced complaints and use of force in the Rialto study (Sherman, 2013). In spite of the benefits and challenges, we must realize the nuanced interplay of policing and research and how traditions, cultures, and cynicism can limit progress. We can learn many lessons from medical research as well, which this paper discusses. Finally, I draw on my experiences as a police practitioner, and some exposure to academia, to highlight the efforts and benefits that have been made toward evidence‐based policing in American law enforcement.
Identifying Effective Policing Strategies for Reducing Crime
2010
The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), working with police chiefs and mayors, have raised the concern that following a steady decline in violent crime that began in the early 1990s, the nation's cities are experiencing an increasing violent crime trend. A number of potential factors were identified as the possible sources behind an increase but the primary intent of PERF reports and forums has been to draw attention to this possible upward trend in violent crime so that the nation can act in such a way as to prevent this from escalating to a violent crime epidemic such as that experienced in the mid-to late 1980s. In response to these types of concerns, the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) requested that the Sagamore Institute conduct a study that could point to promising policing strategies that might inform local, state, and federal policy with the goal of violent crime prevention and control. As the PERF project indicated, there is variation across the nation's cities in terms of patterns and trends in violent crime. The current project sought to study this variation as a way of identifying cities that have avoided the increase in violent crime experienced in many communities in 2005-2006. The thought was that there may be policing strategies in such communities that have played a role in stemming the increase in violent crime that could serve as promising practices for other police departments and local governments.
2008
This paper examines targeted policing as a form of evidence-based policing. The paper reviews eight experimental studies related to targeted policing. The main objectives of this paper are (1) to discuss the theoretical perspective for implementation of targeted policing; (2) to discuss empirical evidence for implementation of targeted policing; and (3) to assess the impact of programs that are based on targeted policing philosophy; the focus will be to answer the question: does targeted policing reduce crime? This is assessed by using the Maryland Scientific Methods Scale (1 to 5 point SMS scoring system) to determine the scientific rigor of each study that has evaluated one or more of the proactive police tactics/strategies such as, “hot spots,” “second response,” and “crackdowns.” The overall agenda in this paper is to judge – through an extended literature review – whether targeted policing (as a proactive crime prevention approach) reduces crime, and based on the aggregate resu...
On the Beat: Police and Community Problem-Solving
1999
provided valuable crime mapping and analysis assistance. Jill DuBois, editorial director of our projects and one of the authors of this book, coordinated the production of this manuscript. This is an example of problem-solving policing in action. In 1993, the Chicago Police Department adopted this new strategy, first on an experimental basis and later as a citywide program. The plan was to involve officers in problem solving as part of a realignment of the entire organization toward more community-oriented policing. It was a big commitment. With more than 15,000 employees, Chicago's police department was the second largest in the United States. It served almost three million people and was responsible for responding to calls over a 225 square mile area. A great deal has been written about problem solving. There are extensive reviews of a few early problem-solving projects and textbooks for interested practitioners in the police field . Leadership training sessions at Harvard University produced a prominent series of reports for chief executives that touch on problem solving . Federal agencies charged with promoting innovation in policing have issued manifestos on the topic and sponsored symposiums to promote its visibility . However, while problem solving is a widely discussed policing strategy, descriptions of the theory greatly outnumber analyses of actual practice. This book devotes some attention to what others have said, and each of the chapters places Chicago's experience in the context of developments around the country. But its main focus is on how one city actually tried to formulate and implement problem solving as part of a thoroughgoing change in its style of policing. We sat in on meetings while the program was being planned and observed while officers and neighborhood residents were trained. We then went into the field to see how effectively the program was implemented and how well it met the needs of Chicago's diverse communities. What we found was mixed, as befits a huge city and a large organization struggling to change. This led us to ask why the program worked better in some places than others and to recommend more things that police departments could do to speed organizational change. There were important differences between Chicago's effort and problem solving in many other cities-differences that will be highlighted as we move along. The most fundamental such difference was that the program did not belong solely to the police department. From the beginning the project featured extensive resident involvement in all aspects of problem solving. Police and Analysis. This is the point at which a diagnosis of the problem is developed. Traditionally analysis involved nothing more than identifying suspects. Now it requires learning as much as possible about a problem, using information ranging from calls for service to interviews, observations and data from other city agencies. At its best, analysis looks beyond the symptoms and into the causes of the problem. Getting officers to actually do problem analysis is perhaps the most difficult part of the process. Because it sounds time consuming and gets in the way of getting something done, officers have to be convinced that problem solving is worthwhile. It helps to have a framework to organize what they glean. In Newport News, Virginia, the team of officers that developed the city's problem-solving program drew up a list of specific questions that were to be addressed while analyzing a problem. These asked for details about the victims and offenders, and about facts pertaining to the incidents and their immediate locations. For example, the list of features that need looking into included the typical sequence of events surrounding the problem, details about the setting in which it occurred and significant elements of the social context, such as the probability that any witnesses would step forward with information . As Chapter 2 describes, Chicago trained its officers to organize what they found around a "crime triangle" linking victim, offender and locational features of the problem at hand. Analysis can help sharpen the definition of the problem. William Spelman and John Eck (1987) report how, in one instance, the process of gathering information forced Newport News police to redefine the problem. They thought they were attacking a burglary problem but ended up recommending response to a problem can be mounted looms large in the response stage of problem solving. As Chapter 2 documents, Chicago chose to make implementation a separate step in its problem-solving model to highlight its importance and the distinctive skill and effort it demands. Assessment. The assessment stage of SARA is another that threatens to get lost. This is the point at which participants are supposed to consider whether the effort is having any of its anticipated consequences. Problem-solvers need to assess their "outputs," or what they have done. For example, if the project involved weekly community marches to confront street drug dealers, assessment could entail counting how many people turned out and what might account for weeks of high and low turnout. They also need to assess their "outcomes," or what the consequences of their effort have been. Are the drug dealers gone? Are there fewer of them, or are they being more discreet? Are fewer customers coming by? Once the benefits are clear, it could also be instructive to compare them with the effort that was invested and question the relationship between costs and benefits. The assessment stage often gets bypassed because it sounds hard. It is true that the further police stray from counting their activities and reported crime, much maligned by William Spelman (1988) as "bean counting," the harder it can be to assemble impact information that demonstrates that the project made a difference. However, as Mike Hough and Nick Tilley (1998) point out, modest "monitoring" efforts are probably appropriate most of the time. Monitoring involves assessing whether an initiative was well-implemented, if it seemed to do some good and whether it diverted too much attention from other important matters. Extensive and expensive evaluations probably are best left to others. Assessment also gets bypassed because the information is often little used. In an ideal world, police agencies would find ways of compiling their assessments and making use of them to benefit future problem-solving projects. Officers could tap into a bank of similar-sounding problems to find suggestions for workable and effective solutions. If there were a body of well-evaluated practice it would also not be necessary to reassess every intervention with excessive care; if we knew what worked, we could just assess program implementation. However, in actuality, American policing agencies have none of these capabilities. Assessment also is probably avoided because unalloyed success is often elusive in the real world of problem solving. Peter Rossi's "Iron Law of Evaluation" (discussed in states that the more carefully we examine programs, the fewer interventions seem actually to work. However, often the stated objectives of projects are too optimistic. Eck and Spelman (1987a) proposed several criteria that illustrate how broadly success can be construed. Success might mean that the problem goes away. This is Problem-solving projects can be organized without many of the features that accompany community policing. Mark argue that community policing is differentiated from problem solving by its emphasis on broad roles for the public in identifying, prioritizing and solving problems. Problem solving can be conducted without that, but then it is likely to focus narrowly on conventionally defined crime. Problem areas-locations of chronically recurring incidents-can be identified by intensive analysis of the data available through the 911 system, and resources can be deployed in response. During the 1990s, New York City police developed a command-andcontrol management system revolving around sophisticated crime analysis. Central databases were harnessed to statistical and computerized mapping software that enabled downtown analysts to identify crime hot spots and unexpected upward shifts in crime trends. The department's senior executives then put relentless pressure on precinct commanders to get the numbers to fall, monitored their effectiveness and got rid of the managers who did not succeed. Public meetings concerning this strategy were public relations exercises rather than fact-finding and responsive in character. Police took the initiative, monopolized definition of the problems, supplied the expertise in developing solutions to them, held the only data about what happened closely and pointed selectively to their successes. But it was wildly popular and, for the crimes that were targeted, seemingly quite effective. Chicago's model was different, featuring wide consultation with the community about both problems and their potential solutions, as well as a much broader view of what constituted police work. Chicago also tolerated an independent assessment of how well they were doing. Is any of this new? When they hear about problem solving for the first time, many officers exclaim, "But that's what good police officers have always done!" However, the implication that this is what many police officers are currently doing is certainly not accurate. It is true that good officers will work on some kind of problem some of the time, but most police activity, most of the time, is incident-driven. More important, problem solving by good officers has not traditionally been supported by their organization. Our response to this exclamation is usually a quick series of questions. Were they taught these skills in the training academy? Could they ask the dispatcher to stop assigning them 911 calls for a while so they could apply their skills to some problem? Could their successful...
Justice Quarterly, 2014
Available data make it impossible to reach strong conclusions about the role of policing in the New York crime decline. Instead, we examine whether innovations implemented in New York fit with what is known about effective policing strategies. Our main analysis focuses on how the New York City Police Department (NYPD) could have continued to contribute to the crime drop over the last decade when the number of police declined significantly. We examine geographic data on crime and stop, question and frisks (SQFs) to show that SQFs are concentrated at crime hot spots. We also show that the NYPD increased these specific hot spots policing strategies despite declining numbers. In our discussion, we speculate on whether this "doing more with less" could be an explanation for the continued crime drop in New York,