Against the Brainstem View of the Persistence of Human Animals (original) (raw)
Related papers
Animals, Identity and Persistence
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2011
A number of claims are closely connected with, though logically distinct from, animalism. One is that organisms cease to exist when they die. Two others concern the relation of the brain, or the brainstem, to animal life. One of these holds that the brainstem is necessary for life-more precisely, that (say) my cat's brainstem is necessary for my cat's life to continue. The other is that it is sufficient for life-more precisely, that so long as (say) my cat's brainstem continues to function, so too does my cat. I argue against these claims. Are we animals? Many say yes. But these people are not therefore animalists. For animalists hold that we are essentially animals. 1 My psychology could travel elsewhere, and find itself in a new body. But I wouldn't have travelled, on the animalist view. And my psychology could be obliterated, as in PVS. 2 But if the animal that I am survives, then I survive. I am unpersuaded. Yet apart from just a couple of comments, I won't directly discuss any of this here. My present concern is only with certain further theses: first, that animals cease to exist when they die, second, that the brainstem is necessary for the animal's survival, and third, that the brainstem is sufficient for its survival. These further theses are distinct from one another and neither imply, nor are implied by animalism's core. So someone might accept, say, the claim about death, but not those about the brainstem. And someone might reject them all and still count himself an animalist. Even so, there are links here. Perhaps the best-known defender of animalism is also a prominent supporter of these further views. And, in what follows, I will focus on several of Eric Olson's contentions and claims. Moreover, animalism proper and these further theses all overlap, both in Olson's arguments and elsewhere, more than might be expected. 3 A general issue here is a concern with precision. Animalism, against some rival accounts, offers a clear and well-defined answer to the question of what we are. The view that an animal's existence ends with death is in part motivated by the thought that an animal, in stark contrast to its remains, is a thing sharply drawn. And appeal to the brainstem connects here, promising crisp accounts both of animal survival and of animal identity. So anyone inclining to one of these views may well be drawn to others. 1 This is the neatest way quickly to characterize animalism, even though there is disagreement about its accuracy. Nichols [2009] puts it thus; Johannson [2007: 196] avoids commitment here, while Olson [2003: 321] expresses reservations about the essentialist claim. 2 A persistent or, as some prefer, a permanent vegetative state. The differences can be ignored here.
[Forthcoming in Philosophers' Imprint] Both advocates and opponents of the animalist view that we are fundamentally biological organisms have typically assumed that animalism is incompatible with intuitive verdicts about cerebrum isolation and transplantation. It is argued here that this assumption is a mistake. Animalism, developed in a natural way, in fact strongly supports these intuitive verdicts. The availability of this attractive resolution of a central puzzle in the personal identity debate has been obscured by a range of factors, including the prevalence in contemporary metaphysics of a certain conception of the nature of organisms. I end by explaining how the animalist can use intuitive verdicts, usually thought to present a difficulty for the view, as positive evidence for claims about the persistence conditions of the relevant kind of organism.
forthcoming in Dialectica
Here I develop an account of our persistence that accommodates each of the following compelling intuitions: (i) that we are animals, (ii) that we existed prior to the onset of whatever psychological capacities are necessary for personhood, and we can continue to exist with the loss of those and other psychological capacities, (iii) that with suitable psychological continuity, the person goes with the brain/cerebrum in remnant person and brain/cerebrum transplant cases, and (iv) that it is possible for us to survive gradual large-scale replacement of organic with inorganic parts. With the help of a couple of recent "hybrid" animalist accounts I develop an analysis of our persistence that entails (ii)-(iv) while being consistent with (i). Keywords animalism, brain/cerebrum transplants, identity, persistence, persons Here I develop an account that captures each of four compelling and widely discussed intuitions regarding what we (human persons) are and the changes we can undergo while
Review of Eric Olson: 'The Human Animal: Personal Identity without Psychology
2000
, 1997. 'The Biological Approach,' Eric T. Olson writes, 'is the view that you and I are human animals, and that no sort of psychological continuity is either necessary or sufficient for a human animal to persist through time.' Human 'persons' are selfaware human animals which, as they aren't essentially self aware, aren't essentially persons. Ranged against this position is the 'Psychological Approach,' a family of views according to which
Evolutionary continuity of personhood Commentary on Rowlands on Animal Personhood
Rowlands applies the two organizing ideas of the Lockean concept of personhood — mental life and unity — to animals as potential persons. Especially valuable in this context is his descriptive phenomenology of pre-reflective self-awareness as a fundamental form of mental life that necessarily entails unity. Rowland describes certain fundamentals of mental experience that exist across species boundaries, challenging assumptions of early modern philosophers regarding the definition of human personhood and affirming the principle of evolutionary continuity. This opens the door to a broader and deeper set of questions, related to whether we should continue to attempt to apply to other animals — or to ourselves — philosophical models that are ancient and revered but contradicted in significant measure by contemporary scientific findings, especially in evolutionary biology. 1. Philosophical Models of Personhood. Rowlands (2016) begins his target article by noting that concepts of personhood are variously defined as legal, moral, and metaphysical. He addresses the metaphysical specifically as defined by Locke. Pragmatically speaking, the legal case for animal personhood is advancing in the absence of metaphysical foundation — case by case, as the sciences shape our understanding of other animals and as real life situations make moral demands upon us for remediation (Benvenuti, 2016). Rowlands produces a convincing metaphysics of personhood satisfying the requirements of the Western philosophical tradition, particularly as advanced by Locke. We must remain aware of the distinction between satisfying the requirements of Western metaphysics as a human cultural artifact and making a true declaration about reality. The Western philosophical tradition has placed high value on the human capacity for rational abstraction. I (Benvenuti, 2014, 2016) have repeatedly argued that this evaluation of our capacity for rational abstraction — especially as contrasted with affective awareness — lacks merit. Human cognition has
Evolutionary continuity of personhood
Animal Sentience, 2016
Rowlands applies the two organizing ideas of the Lockean concept of personhoodmental life and unity-to animals as potential persons. Especially valuable in this context is his descriptive phenomenology of pre-reflective self-awareness as a fundamental form of mental life that necessarily entails unity. Rowland describes certain fundamentals of mental experience that exist across species boundaries, challenging assumptions of early modern philosophers regarding the definition of human personhood and affirming the principle of evolutionary continuity. This opens the door to a broader and deeper set of questions, related to whether we should continue to attempt to apply to other animals-or to ourselves-philosophical models that are ancient and revered but contradicted in significant measure by contemporary scientific findings, especially in evolutionary biology.
On What We are and How We Persist
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2014
This article defends novel approaches to what we are and how we persist. First it is claimed that we have disjunctive persistence conditions: we can persist by way of either biological continuity or psychological continuity. Then it is claimed that we are neither human beings nor persons essentially. Rather, we are essentially bio-psycho-continuers, a concept to be explained along the way. A variety of objections are considered and found wanting.
The Animal, the Corpse, and the Remnant-person
I argue that a form of animalism that does not include the belief that 'human animal' is a substance-sortal has a dialectical advantage over other versions of animalism. The main reason for this advantage is that Phase Animalism, the version of animalism described here, has the theoretical resources to provide convincing descriptions of the outcomes of scenarios problematic for other forms of animalism. Although Phase Animalism rejects the claim that 'human animal' is a substance-sortal, it is still appealing to those who believe that our nature is continuous or of a similar kind to that of other physical entities.
The human person: Animal and spirit
1992
In 3988 David Braine, who has taught philosophy at the University of Aberdeen for many years, published The Reality of Time and the Existence of God, a metaphysical proof of God's existence. Now, in this second book, The Human Person: Animal and Spirit (Duckworth, London, 1993) which certainly stands on its own although we are frequently referred back to the earlier book and forward to two (if not three) forthcoming volumes, he reconstructs the argument advanced by Thomas Aquinas in favour of our immortality, an even more audacious enterprise in the present intellectual climate.