A Nash Bargaining Solution for Cooperative Network Formation Games (original) (raw)

Network Formation and Co-ordination Games

Advances in Understanding Strategic Behaviour, 2004

A population of players is considered in which each player may select his neighbors in order to play a 2 × 2 coordination game with each of them. We analyze how the payoffs in the underlying coordination game effect the resulting equilibrium neighborhood resp. network structure. Depending on the size of the communication costs the resulting equilibrium networks may be characterized by bipartite graphs if the coordination game is of the Hawk/Dove type while networks show a tendency to build complete or disconnected graphs if neighbors play a pure coordination game.

Coalitional Bargaining in Networks

2012

We analyze an infinite horizon, non-cooperative bargaining model for TU games with general coalitional structure. In each period of the game an opportunity for a feasible coalition to form arises according to a stochastic process, and a randomly selected agent in the coalition makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Agents that reach an agreement exit the game and are replaced by clones. We characterize the set of stationary equilibria by a convex program. We examine the implications of this characterization when the feasible coalitions are determined by an underlying network. We show how an agent's payoff is related to the centrality of his position in the network.

Coalitional Network Games † Preliminary version

2009

Coalitional network games are real-valued functions defined on a set of play-ers (the society) organized into a network and a coalition structure. The network specifies the nature of the relationship each individual has with the other individ-uals and the coalition structure specifies a collection of groups among the society. Coalitional network games model situations where the total productive value of a network among players depends on the players ’ group membership. These games thus capture the public good aspect of bilateral cooperation, i.e., network games with externalities. After studying the specific structure of coalitional networks, we propose an allocation rule under the perspective that players can alter the coalitional network structure. This means that the value of all potential alternative coalitional networks can and should influence the allocation of value among players in any given coalitional network structure. JEL classification: A14, C70.

Cooperative Network Design: a Nash bargaining solution approach

Computer Networks, 2015

The Network Design problem has received increasing attention in recent years. Previous works have addressed this problem considering almost exclusively networks designed by selfish users, which can be consistently suboptimal. This paper addresses the network design issue using cooperative game theory, which permits to study ways to enforce and