The Two Movements: Liberals and Nationalists During Euromaidan (In English) (original) (raw)
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Maidan Past and Present (comparing the 2004 Orange Revolution and 2013/14 EuroMaidan in Ukraine)
2015
At first the EuroMaidan, seemed like something we have seen before: the ‘Orange Revolution’. We were brought back to 23 November 2004, when observers of Ukrainian politics were shocked when they witnessed a sea of ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians, joined activists and opposition party members in a moment of mass mobilization. While Ukraine had previously experienced several smaller protest events, such as the 1986 Chornobyl disaster protests, the 1991 Revolution on the Granite, and the 2001 Ukraine Without Kuchma protests, the sheer size of the 2004 protests and the fact that participation quickly shifted to a majority made of ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians was unprecedented (Onuch 2014a). First heralded as a democratic awakening and the first step to Europeanization, but after the election of Viktor Yanukovych (the villain of the ‘Orange Revolution’) as president in 2010, academics agreed that for a variety of reasons, including protest fatigue, Ukraine would not see another mass-‐‑mobilization any time soon (Meirowitz and Tucker 2013). Thus, when the November 2013 protests grew to 800,000, political scientists had to go back to the drawing board. It was happening again, and again they did not see it coming. While it seemed like déjà vu, it was very different and not least because it was happening with the events of 2004 as the precedent. This chapter’s aim is to analyse and contextualizes the EuroMaidan as a critical case of mass protest, by placing it in comparative reference to the ‘Orange Revolution’. First, the chapter will briefly outline the data used. Second, the chapter will highlight some key writing on mobilization and activism in Ukraine and identify potential contributions of this analysis to the literature. The majority of the text will assess the EuroMaidan mobilization. Employing interview and focus groups data collected by the author, we will be able to contrast and compare the parameters and trajectories of two protest waves (duration, location, and geographical diffusion); the central actors involved in the mobilization process and their main claims. At each step highlighting the convergence and divergence between the 2004 and 2013/14 mass mobilizations. Finally, once the main boundaries of the mobilization have been mapped out, the chapter will address the recent focus among the media and social scientists alike on: the rise of the right, the rise of violence, and the ‘new’ role of social media in the EuroMaidan mobilizations. This initial analysis seeks to provide a blue print for larger studies of the EuroMaidan mobilizations and in the conclusion will highlight key hypotheses for future testing.
Globalizations, 2020
The article traces nationalist polarization and divergence within the Ukrainian new left in response to the Maidan and Anti-Maidan protests in 2013–2014, and the military conflict in Eastern Ukraine. The ideological left-wing groups in the protests were too weak to push forward any independent progressive agenda. Instead of moving the respective campaigns to the left, they were increasingly converging with the right themselves and degraded into marginal supporters of either pro-Ukrainian or pro-Russian camps in the conflict. The liberal and libertarian left supported the Maidan movement on the basis of abstract self-organization, liberal values and anti-authoritarianism. In contrast, the Marxist-Leninists attempted to seize political opportunities from supporting more plebeian and decentralized Anti-Maidan protests and reacting to the far-right threat after the Maidan victory. They deluded themselves that Russian nationalists were not as reactionary as their Ukrainian counterparts and that the world-system crisis allowed them to exploit Russian anti-American politics for progressive purposes.
Protest, 2021
This paper compares the mass protests in Ukraine (the Euromaidan of 2013–14) and Belarus–2020 in the recent decade. The author tests the hypothesis that social movements successfully challenge the ruling groups if protests are sufficiently supported by Western governments, if autocratic regimes are not strong and consolidated, and if the regional tendencies are supportive of the protesters’ cause. Based on the comparative analysis of the two cases, the author concludes that the hypothesis is in general correct for Eastern Europe, but should be more nuanced: it should pay attention to the external influences of both Western states and Russia; it should note that the strength of an autocracy may create new opportunities for the challengers; and that it should take into account the changing nature of regional tendencies, which can be of democratization, autocratization, or some mixture.
Ukrainian Euromaidan: The exclusion of otherness in the name of progress
European Journal of Cultural Studies, 2015
Although criticism of Enlightenment ideas has become widespread within academic circles, the basic Enlightenment narrative-an inexorable movement to a progressive condition-remains a dominant assumption within the discourses of modernization and democratization. This article analyzes how the 'progressive' imagination of Euromaidan protesters in Ukraine discursively produced the internal 'other' as a singular monolithic subject whose 'underdeveloped' intellectual condition was judged against an imagined scale of human progression. The argument is explicated through the discourse analysis of popular blogs on Ukrainian Pravda-a political web site that played a crucial role in organizing Maidan protests. The article analyzes 189 postings of Ukrainian Pravda bloggers starting from 26 November 2013-the day when the bloggers' group 'Maidan' was formed-until 21 January 2014, which denoted the beginning of a murderous stage of the Maidan protest.
Euromaidan and the Role of Protest in Democracy
PS: Political Science & Politics, 2016
ABSTRACTProtest can be seen as a highly democratic expression of popular opinion. However, protest is also a non-representative, extra-institutional process for political change. In hybrid regimes, such as Ukraine, the legitimacy of effecting change through mass protest is a subject of debate. Because of the influence of mass protests in Ukrainian politics, individual views on the democratic legitimacy of protest are potentially important in perceptions of government legitimacy. Using original survey data from December 2013, this article finds that, whereas satisfaction with the functioning of democracy, partisanship, and the oft-cited regional divide are important determinants of approval for the Euromaidan protests, they do not influence how Ukrainians perceive the role of protest in a democracy. However, among those less committed to democracy, protest is more likely to be seen as illegitimate.
Who Were the Protesters? (EUROMAIDAN)
Journal of Democracy , 2014
This is the pre-print working paper version, see the full printed version: http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal\_of\_democracy/v025/25.3.onuch.html The protests that began in Ukraine’s capital of Kyiv on 21 Novem- ber 2013 and became known as the EuroMaidan took even seasoned observers of East European politics by surprise. By December, around 800,000 “ordinary” Ukrainians were demonstrating in Kyiv and other cities across the country. The rapid rise of mass protests, especially at a time when the world’s established democracies are struggling with growing political apathy and declining voter turnout, appears as what Timur Kuran has called one of those moments “when out of never you have a revolution.”1 These episodes may help the cause of democ- racy, but they can also destabilize countries by polarizing citizens and boosting extremists. In order to gauge what a protest outbreak will mean for a country’s democratic prospects, it is crucial to understand who the bulk of the protesters are and what goals they hope to achieve. Here follows original survey data that may help to shed light on Euro- Maidan protest participation and its implications for democratic hopes in Ukraine.