The Revolving Door, Partisan Alignments, and Communication Networks Among Health Reform Lobbyists (original) (raw)
Revolving door lobbyists sit at the intersection of two communications networks, one connected to Capitol Hill actors, the other to fellow lobbyists. A growing body of research has investigated revolvers’ success in gaining access to legislators, but we know less about whether congressional experience improves lobbyists’ position in interest group networks. We provide an informational rationale for why revolvers will be better connected in communications among lobbyists, arguing that this comparative advantage will be structured by prior partisan alignments. Using a new dataset on the self-reported communications among lobbyists active on the Affordable Care Act, we test our hypotheses recently developed techniques of inferential network analysis. We find that revolvers do enjoy an advantage in lobbyist communications, and that the advantage is particularly strong among copartisan lobbyists.
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