Presidential Political Appointments and Coalition Governance in Brazil, 2007-2010 (original) (raw)
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The authors are grateful to Acir Almeida and Tomas Bugarin for helpful comments and insightful discussions. The financial support of CNPq and IPEA is gratefully acknowledged. Mauricio Bugarin was a visiting researcher at the Graduate School of International Cooperation Studies of Kobe University, GSICS, during the fall semester of 2013. The institutional support of GSICS is gratefully acknowledged. The authors remain sole responsible for errors or opinions expressed here.
Brazilian Political Science Review, 2020
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