Weak Notion of Animal Rights: A Critical Response to Feinberg and Warren’ Conceptions A. S. M. Anwarullah Bhuiyan (original) (raw)

Weak Notion of Animal Rights: A Critical Response to Feinberg and Warren' Conceptions

2012

The primary aim of this paper is to defend the idea that nonhuman animals have got equal rights to life. Some proponents of animal rights hold the view that nonhuman animals have the right to life, but at the same time, they adhere to the perception that the value assigned to a nonhuman animal’s life is much lower than that of human beings. This notion can be found in the works of Feinberg and Warren who have developed the idea of animal’s right to live. Both proponents agree that the other animals have weak rights to life. This paper attempts to show that the supporters of this argument have failed to explore adequately the view as why animals’ value to life is lower when compared to humans’ life. Here, the conceptions of these two authors in favour of weak notions of nonhuman animal rights are carefully scrutinized. Keywords:

Animal Welfare and the Moral Value of Nonhuman Animals

Law, Culture and the Humanities, 2010

The animal welfare position, which represents the prevailing paradigm for thinking about our moral and legal obligations to nonhuman animals, maintains that animal life has a lesser value than human life and, therefore, it is morally acceptable to use animals as human resources as long as we treat them ‘humanely’ and do not inflict ‘unnecessary’ suffering on them. According to this position, animals are not self-aware and live in an eternal present; they do not have an interest in continuing to live as distinguished from an interest in not suffering. The use and killing of animals does not per se involve inflicting harm on them. The view that animal life has a lesser moral value cannot be justified in that all sentient beings are self-aware and have an interest in continuing to live. Although we do not treat all humans equally, we accord all humans the right not to be treated as property. We cannot justify not according this one right to all sentient nonhumans.

Justification of Animal Rights Claim

2009

The objective of the paper is to justify the claim for animals" rights. For years, it is one of the most debated questions in the field of applied ethics whether animals" have rights or not. There are a number of philosophers who hold that animals are neither moral agent nor rational being and hence animals have no rights because the concept of rights is applicable only to the rational beings. On the other hand the proponents of animals" rights contend that the standard for having rights is not active rationality but sentience and animals have sentience as they feel pain. So they are also subject to have rights. The main questions to be justified in this essay are, what is it to say that animals have rights? Can animals have any rights at all, if yes, how far? Is it the moral obligation of the human being to ensure animals rights? Considering the questions, in this essay, it will be shown that animals have limited rights and not all animals are subject to having the same rights. It depends on the proportion of their having capacity and capability for the same. It will be tried to make a consensus between the two groups by the way that there are some aspects where we are to acknowledge the rights of animal. It will be shown that not all animals are subject to equal rights.

A discussion on the philosophy of rights and interests of animals

Theories of rights are many and engaging in a detailed discussion of those theories is beyond the scope of this essay. However, here we shall start with the views of the 17th century philosopher Rene Descartes, which informed attitudes towards animals well into the 20th century. Descartes based his rights arguments on cogito, ergo sum: I think, therefore I am 1. Therefore consciousness and thought were central to his views on humans and animals. In part five of Discourse on Method published in 1637, he examined the nature of animals and how they were distinguished from humans. Mind, for Descartes, was not part of the physical universe; it was a separate substance and a link between humans and the mind of God. This link to God i.e. mind was unique to humans and non-humans had no mind and therefore no link to the mind of God. 2 His views suggest that the use of language is a sign of rationality and only beings that possess minds and souls are rational and argues that animals do not have immaterial minds or souls and are therefore not rational. It therefore follows that animals do not have sensations like pain, thirst or hunger. Animals for Descartes, were therefore nothing more than a "complex automata" and the squeals of pain, were mechanical reactions of the animal to external stimuli and not evidence of any sensation of pain. Humans on the other hand have minds or rational souls hence their capacity to use language and feel sensations like hunger, thirst and pain and this justifies their entitlement to holding rights. Furthermore, philosophers such as Locke and Grotius attached great emphasis on the ability of humans to reason, which for them justified their equal access to rights. However, the basis proposed by Descartes, Locke, and Grotius and defended by modern philosophers such as Georodie Duckler is being increasingly questioned. Questions are being asked about the moral standing of animals and whether their interests should also be considered. Amongst the commentators who have increasingly questioned the justification for focusing exclusively on human interests to the exclusion of all other species is Peter Singer who has attacked the basis of the theories of natural law. Singer is an advocate of utilitarianism and in Animal Liberation Movement, he refers to the proposals of equality of consideration by many philosophers, but points to their failure to recognize that this principle also applies to members of other species and not only humans. 3

Can non human animals be allowed to enjoy rights ?

2016

Non human animals are used and exploited by human beings for different purposes such as, agriculture, carrying goods, circus, medical experiment and in laboratory for research activities where they have to suffer more. But against these cruel activities some thinkers have raised their voice. They are in favour of granting rights to them. They thought that being sentient, non human animals have feelings of pleasure and pain and therefore they are right bearers. They are entitled to enjoy their basic interest such as, avoiding suffering. In this paper I shall try to justify that we ought to allow rights to non human animals, particularly right to life. © 2016 Elixir All rights reserved. Elixir Social Studies 96 (2016) 41567-41571 Social Studies Available online at www.elixirpublishers.com (Elixir International Journal) Shanjendu Nath/ Elixir Social Studies 96 (2016) 41567-41571 41568 Animals are merely organic creatures and as such they lack of feeling pain. They are like mechanical r...

Animal Rights as an Extension of Self-Value

A number of theories have been put forward from the days of the pre-Socratic philosophers through modern times attempting to determine how the relationship between the animal species and the human species ought to function in regards to how humans treat animals. These theories have generated numerous ideas, but often rely on claims that animals are living creatures and thus deserve a set of rights, or, that animals are an inferior species to humans but are living creatures capable of feeling pain and thus a superior human species has a duty to keep the pain inflicted upon animals at the lowest level possible it not eliminate it all together. In this essay, I will argue that neither a rights based approach nor a duty to the animals based approach to how humans ought to treat animals are correct, but that humans possess a duty to our humanity to treat animals in a way that is commensurate with how we treat fellow humans. I will distinguish the difference between animals and humans regarding each set of species capabilities of performing moral actions and explain why these differences disqualify animals from being owed a set of inherent rights. I will then offer a thought experiment, "how we treat non-moral agents" to show how even without providing creatures capable of moral actions a set of inherent rights humans still have a duty to ensure animals are not mistreated. This duty will challenge the idea that we have a duty to animals for animal's sake, and I will show why a duty to animals for humans will still allow for animals to be treated in ways humans would not wish upon other humans. I will then put forward my theory on why humans owe it to humanity to treat animals with a basic respect.

Three standard arguments against the individual value of non-human animals

La ética animal ha presentado una serie de cuestiones desafiantes en lo que respecta a la relación entre humanos y animales. Para algunos filósofos, los animales no humanos tienen valor en sí mismos. Esta afirmación se basa en la mayor parte de los casos en una apelación a la sintiencia o a la conciencia en el sentido fenoménico: puesto que hay algo lo cual es ser un animal, los animales no pueden ser tratados como mera materia biológica. Sin embargo, esta afirmación ha sido objeto de crítica. Este artículo analiza tres de los argumentos más comunes contra lo que aquí se llama el "valor individual" de los animales no-humanos. Tales argumentos son el argumento de la capacidad, el argumento humanista y el argumento de las relaciones especiales. Se ha mantenido que todos ellos se enfrentan a problemas, que dejan la puerta abierta a la posibilidad de que los animales no-humanos puedan tener, y de hecho posean, valor individual. Palabras clave: Antropocentrismo, argumento de los casos marginales, derechos animales, ética animal, agencia moral.

The Political Status of Nonhuman Animals

2018

In this dissertation, I make the case that other animals are political subjects and I offer new proposals for how we should understand the political statuses of different groups of animals. In part one I make the case that other animals should be seen as having full political standing. First, I argue that all conscious individuals have certain basic moral rights and I defend this position against various objections. Once we recognize these rights, I argue that protecting and upholding them requires extending to all conscious animals full political standing, which involves legal rights, legal standing, and some form of institutionalized political representation. I would like to thank the members of my dissertation committee-Amy Mullin, Wayne Sumner, and my supervisor Tom Hurka-for their detailed feedback and guidance on this project. Special thanks are also owed to Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka, who read and provided feedback on several chapters of my dissertation. I would not have completed my dissertation were it not for the encouragement, support, and love of my family and friends. Thank you all for the numerous ways you have given me assistance and support as I worked on and completed my dissertation. v Table of Contents 1 INTRODUCTION 2 THE MORAL RIGHTS OF ANIMALS 2.1 THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 2.1.1 Conscious Individuality and Moral Rights 2.1.2 The Argument from Human Diversity 2.2 ARGUMENTS AGAINST ANIMAL RIGHTS 2.2.1 Attempts to Secure Rights for All Humans While Excluding Animals 2.2.2 Denying Rights to Non-Persons 2.3 OTHER OBJECTIONS TO ANIMAL RIGHTS 2.3.1 The Will Theory of Rights 2.3.2 Lifeboat Cases 2.3.3 Is Conscious Individuality Sufficient for Basic Moral Rights? 2.3.4 Is Conscious Individuality Too Low a Threshold for A Right to Life? 2.3.5 Rights and Thresholds 2.3.6 Medical Experimentation 2.3.7 Rights and Personhood 2.4 IMPLICATIONS OF THE MORAL RIGHTS OF ANIMALS 2.5 OBLIGATIONS NOT TO HARM ANIMALS 2.5.1 Experimenting on Animals 2.5.2 Against the Superiority Argument 2.5.3 Against the Consequentialist Argument 2.6 CONCLUSION 3 POLITICAL INCLUSION FOR NONHUMAN ANIMALS 3.1 WHAT IS

Existence and Needs: A case for the equal moral considerability of non-human animals

Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics, 2017

This paper reflects on the question, "Is there a sound justification for the existential view that humans have a higher moral status than other animals?" It argues that the existential view that humans have a higher moral status than animals is founded on a weak and inconclusive foundation. While acknowledging various arguments raised for a common foundation between human and non-human animals, the paper attempts to establish a common ground for moral considerability of human and non-human animals. The first common foundation is based on the existential notion of being in the world, which is common for both human and non-human animals. The second idea is based on the common desire to actualize different needs. The paper demonstrates these common foundations by referring to Heidegger and Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of needs.