How did the 1967 oil embargo affect inter-Arab relations? (original) (raw)
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1960
An intelligent understanding of international relationships requires a special study of the critical places where continuous crisis arises. It was felt, therefore, desirable to examine a significant aspect of the conflict between the Arab World and the State of Israel that provides the subject of this study. The economic boycott of Israel has assumed a grave significance in international relations, yet to the author\u27s knowledge this subject has not been investigated in a scholarly and comprehensive manner in any available publication. The writer embarks on this topic in the hope that it may provide the American student of Middle Eastern affairs with the essential data for its clear understanding
Was the 'Oil Weapon' Effective in Achieving the Arab States' Goals in 1973–74?
2020
In October 1973 the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) jolted the industrialised Northern states by declaring oil production cutbacks and a selective oil embargo (the ‘Oil Weapon’) against states perceived as supportive to Israel in the Arab-Israeli conflict (Licklider 1988: 206). Scholars viewed this at the time as a watershed in history, as oil power was translated into political power and signified the growing dependence of the Global North on Arab oil for its capitalist development (Graf 2012: 185). In this essay I will provide a historical narrative of the 1973 OAPEC oil embargo. I will also discuss the economic and political context that underscored the decision by the Arab oil states to implement the oil embargo and assert that this economic and political environment served as the platform for the advancement of two sets of political goals by OAPEC. I will then evaluate the success of the Oil Weapon as an economic means to accomplish these political en...
The Gulf Arab states and Israel since 1967: from 'no negotiation' to tacit cooperation
This article analyses the Gulf Arab states’ changing posture toward Israel since the June 1967 War. Fifty years on, the ‘three no’s’ of Khartoum have been replaced by the Saudi-coordinated Arab Peace Initiative, which offers Israel normalization in return for the establishment of a Palestinian state. Furthermore, the meaning of ‘normalization’ has been re-defined over the years in accordance with the changing geopolitical circumstances. Mutually beneficial ties between Israel and the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have grown up in proportion to their shared interests and shared threat perceptions. In the period from the 1967 War to the 1979 Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty, the Gulf Arab states, for the most part, boycotted Israel in line with pan-Arab requirements. While Iranian propaganda during the Khomeini era (1979–1989) depicted Gulf Arab rulers as lackeys of Zionism and imperialism, GCC–Israel ties were anathema. In the 1990s, the GCC lent cautious support to the Israeli–Palestinian peace process, and two of its members, Oman and Qatar, expanded trade relations with Israel in defiance of Arab and Gulf norms. The emergence of the Saudi–Iranian regional cold war after the invasion of Iraq in 2003 gave rise to unprecedented levels of tacit security and intelligence cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia.