The Social Bases of Support for Self-determination in East Ukraine (original) (raw)
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Since the Euromaidan debates around shifts in nationality and belonging continue to dominate the media agenda in Ukraine. The post-Euromaidan search for new commemoration practices with a simultaneous attempt to sweep away the Soviet past — which resulted, first, in the massive dismantlement of Lenin statues (Leninapad) and later in the passing by parliament (Rada) of controversial decommunization laws — launched another powerful wave of discussions in the media. At the same time relatively little work has been undertaken to analyze the transformations of identities in connection with historical memories adopting a comparative cross-regional perspective in Ukrainian social studies. Methodology Current sociological and political science studies on Ukraine (both in Ukraine and abroad) are limited by available resources (the size of a survey's sample) and, as a rule, have no choice but to group the largestt Ukrainian administrative units (oblasts) into four macro-regions (East, West, South and Center). Due to the specifics of sampling procedures, the majority of sociological surveys recently conducted in Ukraine can only grasp regional differences at the level of macro-regions and thus provide very little information about local communities in each oblast. The average nationwide sample is N=1800-2000. As Ukraine consists of 27 administrative units (24 oblasts and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, plus two cities with special status, Kyiv and Sevastopol), researchers have to combine several oblasts into a larger unit – a macro region — to be able to compare data at a statistically significant level. Such studies unavoidably level differences among oblasts included in one or another of the macro-region and stress differences among macro-regions. As a result, they contribute to the formation of stereotypical images of Ukrainian regional divisions rather than help to reconsider Ukrainian regionalism and map more precisely Ukrainian cultural identities and political loyalties. Studies that make use of representative samples of residents of Ukraine on a level of analysis other than the typical four macro-regions (which often are reduced to two: East and West) must involve a much larger number of respondents. The project " Region, Nation, and Beyond: An Interdisciplinary and Transcultural Reconsideration of
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Post-Soviet Affairs, 2018
Donetsk and Luhansk are often labeled pro-Russian regions as a result of the founding of Peoples' Republics there in spring 2014. This article investigates popular opinion in Donbas before armed conflict began, to determine whether the high concentration of ethnic Russians there drove support for separatism. Analysis of a KIIS opinion poll shows that, on the one hand, ethnic Russian respondents were divided on most separatist issues, with a minority backing separatist positions. On the other hand, they supported separatist issues in larger numbers than both ethnic Ukrainians and respondents with hybrid identities. Thus, while ethnic identity does not produce polarized preferences, it is relevant in shaping political attitudes. Also, analysis of an original database of statements made by Donbas residents indicate that they were motivated to support separatism by local concerns exacerbated by a sense of abandonment by Kyiv rather than by Russian language and pro-Russian foreign policy issues. We are sick and tired of our country, of our government's policies, so we're voting for what we've been offered so far. We want order; stability; salaries; jobs …-A woman in Donetsk explaining why she is voting for independence in the sovereignty referendum in Donetsk, May 11, 2014. (RFE/RL 2014) Demands for separatism in the eastern Donbas region of Ukraine in spring 2014 emerged rapidly. Residents of Donetsk and Luhansk, who had been politically quiescent throughout the Maidan demonstrations that started the previous fall, began to participate in a series of escalating demonstrations after the ouster of Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovych in late February. As events in Crimea crescendoed in early March, local activists of formerly marginal pro-Russian organizations in Donbas gained in popularity. 1 Whereas only a year earlier these groups' events consisted primarily of distributing literature to passers-by from folding tables, they now took advantage of the opening provided by Russia's annexation of Crimea. Activists forcibly seized government buildings in April and declared themselves leaders of the self-styled Peoples' Republic of Donetsk (DNR) and Peoples' Republic of Luhansk (LNR). They quickly adopted declarations of sovereignty (e.g. Declaration 2014), and in May, held referenda on state sovereignty. Support for separatism was not the dominant political opinion among residents of Donbas. Only a minority of the population-slightly less than a third of people surveyed in Donetsk and Luhanskbacked separation from Ukraine (KIIS 2014). Nevertheless, the percentage of citizens with opinions that